ASP-KINGMAN ASSESSMENT

August 4-6, 2010
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ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
OFFENDER OPERATIONS

MEMORANDUM

TO: Charles L. Ryan, Director

THROUGH: Robert Patton, Division Director, Offender Operations

FROM: Therese Schroeder, Security Operations Administrator

SUBJECT: Security Assessment- ASP-Kingman Hualapai Unit / August 4-6, 2010
Final Report

DATE: August 18, 2010

Team members:
Therese Schroeder- Security Operations Administrator
Richard Haggard- Major ASPC-Safford
Thomas Higginson- Major ASPC- Eyman
Edwin Lao- Major ASPC- Florence
Ron Lawrence- Captain ASPC- Lewis
Dennis Bool- Captain ASPC- Perryville

On August 4, 2010, the Security Assessment team arrived at the Kingman facility. At
1000 hours, Warden Lori Leider met with us and reviewed the Management and Training
Corporation’s (MTC) time line and summary of the inmate escape on July 30, 2010.
Warden Leider then took the team on a tour of the Hualapai Unit.

Following is a summary of the team’s findings:

Initial Tour:

- While monitoring chow turnout we witnessed a large percentage of the inmate
  population- approximately 75%- walking without their identification cards. Many
  were out of grooming compliance (shirts untucked, beards, mustaches).

- The inmate attitude appeared to be poor. One inmate spoke in a disrespectful
  manner to the Warden when she questioned his lack of identification, another
  yelled out “Fuck ADC” as we approached.

- Unit sanitation was very good.

- DO 704/cell conditions were adequate but there was a large amount of cardboard
  and hobbycraft items in the cells.
• Staff morale was high and their demeanor was friendly when interacting with our team. The unit is staffed with a very high percentage of new staff and many of them demonstrated a lack of experience and “command presence”. Warden Leider reports that approximately 80% of her staff is new or newly promoted.

• Staffing- staff adequacy and/or collapsing of posts is not an issue for this facility. Overtime is utilized to fill vacant posts and all shift posts are filled.

Assessment Team’s Observation Summary:

Alarm Zone System:

The perimeter system at the Kingman Hualapai unit is not functioning properly, it is not maintained properly, it is not monitored correctly, and it is not tested properly. The procedures currently in place for all aspects of this system have bred a culture of laxness among the staff. The system:

• Alarms excessively throughout the day and night. Staff have become conditioned to the false alarms and react to them with complacency.

• Zones are often left activated and unattended for extended periods of time.

• Contract Maintenance on the system has not been performed for over one year.

• Staff report repeated documentation of malfunctioning alarms, yet Unit IT and Maintenance staff do not get these reports and the Security Device Inspection report does not contain them.

• The system does not audibly alert staff to zone activations. Control room staff are extremely busy opening doors and gates and answering the phones and the alerts often go unnoticed and are not a priority duty. Cameras automatically switch to gates when a button is pushed to access gates. Thus most often only gates are being monitored.

• Maintenance of the system is done by the unit maintenance and IT staff. These staff have not been trained to maintain the system.

• The system has not been calibrated professionally by the contract vendor and IT staff report that staff complain if it is set to be too sensitive.

• MTC officers and supervisors are not familiar with the system and are not properly trained to operate or test it

• While testing the system each day, each zone is left in activation status until the testing is completed. We witnessed one alarm zone test that took 22 minutes thus the zones were not functioning for this time period. This testing was also being
conducted in a predictable pattern each night on grave shift following the 2115 count.

Perimeter:

- The perimeter is in fair condition. It is regularly raked and weeded by an inmate crew however it lacks sand and is somewhat dry and hard packed. It is difficult to see tracks and in fact several tracks that were laid by our team were missed by MTC staff. MTC staff report that the wind blows the sand away each time they replace it.

- The procedures in place for shift relief are ineffective and detrimental to security. It creates an un-manned perimeter for extended periods of time, 10 to 15 minutes or longer, at the beginning of each shift.

- COs are inadequately trained on response to alarm procedures. The post orders need to be more detailed.

- At the time of the escape only one perimeter patrol was in place.

- COs even in the days following the escape, failed to detect tracks or to challenge team members' presence on the perimeter. This did improve by Day 3 of our assessment.

- The malfunctioning alarm system has led to desensitization to alarm activations. Staff assume it is just another false alarm.

- There is too much traffic (pedestrian and vehicular) in close proximity to the perimeter.

- There is one section of perimeter road that is a shared use section. It is traveled by perimeter vehicles, and civilian and staff traffic en-route to the Cerbat unit.

- Drainage ditches have been rocked in. They look visually pleasing but create a barrier to sound security practices. An inmate could hide in the ditch while the perimeter patrol passed and he could go undetected.

- Staff are not proficient with weapons. In addition to safety concerns this also further delays the relief process.

- Large amounts of cardboard are stored in no-mans land for the recycling program.

- Eight (8) light poles were noted with lights burned out.

The amount and condition of the razor wire is adequate and it is spaced appropriately. There were a few areas in which the wire needs to be re-attached at the bottom.
Counts:

Count is cleared by the Accountability officer or the Shift Lieutenant. Housing unit officers call in their numbers only. They do not call in out counts or vacant beds. If the number they give does not match for a pod, they are directed to do a recount. Every count monitored by the team resulted in pods that had to be re-counted.

Many of the officers did not effectively control inmate movement during count. Inmates were not all at their bunks for a proper face to ID process. Inmates were witnessed in the showers and on phones during count. There was some confusion on the new 2030 count time and this may have played a role in some of the movement, but in general it appeared to be a staff training or lack of "command presence" issue in most cases.

Armory:

The armory was out of compliance in several areas. Ammunition and inventory deficiencies were noted.

Dart Equipment and drill procedures are also out of compliance. Weapons are stored loaded and drills are not being conducted regularly.

- Major Richard Haggard’s report has additional information on Armory and Dart.

Inmate Movement:

Our team was not able to monitor typical inmate movement patterns due to the unit lockdown.

Warden Leider reports that all inmates from the 3 fenced yards within the unit recreate at the same time. This would result in a very large number of inmates out to recreation at the same time. She is reviewing the recreation procedures and scheduling now.

Prior to the escape, the yard closed at 2045 hours. Count was conducted at 2115 hours. This has now been changed to 2000 hour yard closure and 2030 hour count. Shift change for MTC staff is at 2100, this is currently under review.

Ingress/Egress:

MTC employees appeared to be surprised by the searches of their property. Team’s belief is that procedures were lax prior to our arrival.

Searches:

Unit was in compliance for cell and unit searches.

Inmate pat searches are not being conducted. Warden Leider reports that random pat searches of inmates exiting chow are required but are not being done. Seeing no pat searches being done, I asked an officer if he conducted random pat searches of inmates
exiting chow. He hesitated and then said that he, “pat searches a couple of inmates every 30 minutes.”

Keys:

Overall the key audit was in compliance. One key error was noted and corrected on the spot. * More information on keys is included in Captain Dennis Bool’s report.

The unit has a “hot box” key system. Staff have a take home key that opens their assigned “hot box” located in the main control room. They turn in their key and are given their assigned key set for the day.

The Hualapai detention unit has a “hot box” with emergency keys in the open pod area. Warden Leider reports that this is an ACA accreditation requirement.

Tools:

Tool audit was in compliance.

Journals:

MTC uses a pre-printed journal page. The team felt that these forms could easily be “pencil whipped” and lead to officer complacency for reporting required duties.

Phone Monitoring:

MTC does not have an SSU officer in place. The shift lieutenant does act as SSU when possible and he monitors phone calls as time permits.

Visitation:

No issues noted. Suspended visitors are to be suspended for phone usage. This did not happen in the case of Casslyn Welch. The Shift Lt. reported first that it fell through the cracks, and later said that he did not have her phone privileges revoked in order to gather intel information from her calls.

Emergency Response Plan:

Kingman’s ERP is a very generic plan – See Major Lao/Higgins’s report. Also our team was told on numerous occasion that private prison staff may not “chase” an escapee.

Transition from Minimum Custody to Medium Custody:

It appears that very little action was taken to prepare the physical plant and the staff for the transition to Medium Custody in April of 2010. Warden Leider did not report any physical changes that were implemented. She stated that several evening program times were changed.
The dog program was left in place in the area behind Dorm 2 with a 10 foot fence that had no razor wire. Staff report that the door to the outside was often left on access due to the amount of traffic. A large rock was next to the door, it appeared to be there to prop open the door.

Metal dust mops, mop wringers, and metal horse shoes are still being used.

All 3 yards with in the unit recreate at the same time.

Shower curtains do not allow for any staff visibility. They should be shortened to allow for “feet visibility”

The sweat lodge is in the no-man’s land. It is currently being renovated to increase fence height and to add razor wire.

No additional or follow-up training has been done with MTC staff to assist with the transition of populations.

Nothing has been done to reduce inmate movement. Radio traffic for opening gates is constant and keeps the tower and/or control room officer focused on gate and doors versus perimeter alarms and inmate monitoring.

Random pat searches of inmates are not being done.

Assessment of MTC Executive staff:

Captain Smith:
Captain Smith is ineffective in his role. Both the Complex Administrator and the Warden expressed concerns over his promotion to Captain and his performance. He lacks attention to detail and the energy level to do the job. All team members noted that he had a lackadaisical attitude and was more than willing to abdicate his responsibilities. He stated that “once he makes the higher ups known of SDI issues- in reference to the malfunctioning alarm system- he washes his hands of it”. I asked him about the PA system microphone which is not working in HU2- he stated it had been broken for 3 days. I advised him that staff reported it had been broken for weeks and that so many IRs had been written that a notation was made in the read book to stop writing IRs. He was unaware that it had been that long.

ADW Ramsey:
ADW Ramsey was very quick to advise multiple team members that he is not in the chain of command for the Captain and that he is not “over security”. He reported that Captain Smith reports directly to the Warden and that he has been told not to interfere with the supervision of him.

ADW Ramsey did not seem to understand his role as an Administrator or to embrace his ownership of the unit.
Warden Leider:
Warden Leider interacted often with our team. She toured with us and worked through until grave shift on Thursday. It was apparent from her interaction with staff and inmates that they knew her and were comfortable talking to her.

Warden Leider is aware of the poor performance of her COS. However, she does not seem to have taken steps to address the issue. She discussed the supervision of Captain Smith and stated that although ADW Ramsey is not in the chain of command for the Captain he has been directed to interact and become involved with monitoring his performance. Warden Leider showed me a large stack (12 or more inches high) of journal pages that she had directed the Captain to review. Because he had not done so, she had and there were a very large amount of notations indicating that corrections were needed.

Warden Leider attributes issues on the unit to the high percentage of new staff and supervisors. When asked what has been done to counteract this, she did not advise me of any additional training or mentoring. She mentioned the FTO officers but admitted that many of them had transferred or promoted as well.

Complex Administrator Darla Elliott:
I had a conversation with Warden Elliott on Thursday, August 5, 2010. I asked her who the contract vender was for the Zone Alarm System. She reported there was none on contract and that Unit IT staff made the necessary repairs. I asked what the procedure was for a malfunction on a Friday evening, would the needed repair wait until Monday? She said IT would be called out. We discussed Captain Smith and Elliott said that she was surprised he had been the candidate chosen, and that she questioned it at the time but he was the one promoted.

Cerbat Unit:
The assessment team spent only a short time on the Cerbat Unit and some of our observations were made from touring the perimeter of the unit.

- Unit sanitation was excellent. There were large numbers of inmate labor pool workers out to work on the unit.
- Many inmates were seen without wearing their Identification cards.
- There are fence tyes that need to be painted red.
- Several piles of dirt are located behind the buildings in the no-man’s land.
- Visitation benches are not secured and could be used to assist in climbing fences.
- Awning/shade structure parts were stored in no-man’s land.

The reports from the members of the Security Assessment Team follow this report.
Malfunctioning alarm system:

- The alarm system in the perimeter zones has not been serviced or maintained by trained experts. Maintenance staff check the system for power failures, cut cables, exposed cable, etc. If the discrepancy does not involve a mechanical problem, the issue is passed to the IT person. By his own admission, the IT person has read manuals on the system, but has received no formal, let alone advanced, training. The sensitivity of the zones is not routinely tested or adjusted. This has led to constant false alarms (during one five minute period on Swing Shift, I noted six alarm activations) which, over the course of months, has led to staff being desensitized.

Maintenance of Perimeter Zones:

- Several perimeter zones have deep ruts cut through the area by water drainage. These ruts (in some areas as much as 5 feet wide and 18 or more inches deep) have become “institutionalized” in that they have been lined with rock to reduce erosion. In a number of areas these ruts cut right across the buried cable path.

- The “drag” area of the perimeter is, in most areas, only 10-15 feet wide. According to the Unit ADW, sand has been added to the drag a number of times, but the wind in Kingman blows the sand away. The sand was raked when I observed it.

However, I personally watched an Officer lay track in the sand during daylight hours. Knowing where the track had been laid and looking for it in daylight hours, it was still very difficult to see.

- One zone has the remains of a concrete header that was part of a (since removed) fence system running perpendicular across the zones.

Staff Training / Response Contributors:
• Alarms regularly and routinely activate throughout the day.

• This has become such a "norm" that zone activation events are treated at a lower priority than other duties such as answering the telephone, issuing keys, checking staff in, etc.

• We discovered several instances where zone alarms were left unattended for as much as ten to fifteen minutes.

• On the night the escape took place, I observed video coverage of the perimeter officer passing a zone which had just activated. The zone activated at 2143 hours. The perimeter officer continued his path away from the activated zone. He did not turn around to check it. The Perimeter Officer is next seen after he has made an entire circuit of the perimeter. He enters the camera 2151 hours. Either the zone was not cleared, or Main Control failed to reset the zone. Note: The perimeter officer discovered the hole in the fence at 2207 hours according to video footage shot from the Cerbat Unit.

• Staff have not been trained on the proper way to conduct zone checks on a buried cable system.

• I walked the zones with COs as well as Sergeants. None demonstrated the proper technique (crossing the zone at three distinct points in each zone).
  
  o In two instances with MTC Sergeant King, we found areas within zones that did not activate.
  o None understood how the zones work or how they are activated.
  o None understood how the microwave system worked
  o There was no attempt made (or tools readily available such as a rake or similar device) to activate the upper microwave that detects movement above the main staff ingress corridor
  o There is no audible cue to alert the Main Control Officer that a perimeter zone has activated.
  o The perimeter zone monitor is one of several monitors the Main Control Officer is expected to observe.

• The perimeter monitor is set off to the side of the Main Control Officer. His primary focus is on yard cameras and opening gates.

• If the Main Control officer is viewing a perimeter monitor, and someone from the yard presses a call button to access a gate, the camera view immediately switches to the gate being accessed.

• Staff are fairly "green" across all shifts. Many staff have under one year of service. Finding staff with 2 or more years of service is rare.
- Although most of the Sergeants and Lieutenants I encountered had more tenure, they also seemed hesitant and less assertive than their ADC counterparts. In fairness, this may have been because of the circumstances under which we were interacting with them.

**Security Practice Errors:**

- Dog pens accessible through the emergency exit of Dorm 2 C and D pods

- According to staff, these doors were placed on “access” during open yard times. Inmates could move freely within the building (Inmates who were not part of the dog program were told if they were discovered in C or D pods they would be placed on report).

- The emergency doors were on access until 2045 hours when the yard closed according to the two officers who worked Dorm 2 on the night of the escape.

- The dog pen had already been taken down and the program suspended by the time we toured the facility.

- There is still a sweat lodge in no man’s land. The Unit is working to increase the fence height and installing razor wire – however, it is my recommendation that no inmate activities be allowed outside the confines of the secure yard unless the inmates are under direct supervision at all times.

- Perimeter Officers travel the same pattern, same direction of travel, consistent cycle time throughout the shift – making the perimeter officer predictable and easy to avoid.

- Zone checks are done once per day, on Graves.

- This practice had not been changed, even after the incident

- Zone lights are reported out only once per month.

- Several poles were noted with lights burnt out (8 total)

- Inmates from Cerbat are allowed to walk unescorted on the perimeter road for Hualapai – making it “normal” to see inmates on the perimeter.

- Perimeter Officers between shifts meet each other at the front of the Unit, then drive to the unloading barrel at the Sallyport to exchange weapons. The relieving Officer then drives the relieved Officer back to the front of the Unit so he can go inside and stamp out.

- This provides an extremely reliable, predictable window of opportunity for inmates to exploit the lack of perimeter coverage.
- Recommend all ADC facilities implement a process where the oncoming perimeter Officer picks up his own weapons, equipment, and vehicle and relieves the off-going Officer via radio.

**Other Issues of Note:**

- Trash Compactor is not enclosed in a cage. It is similar to the compacter that was at Stiner when the inmates escaped from there.
- Very poor controlled ingress onto the Unit.
- Limited signage directing traffic
- Route to Cerbat Unit is confusing
- No time is allotted for briefing of any kind
- Numerous pallets of compressed cardboard and other recycle bins behind the Kitchen area. Provides areas for inmates to hide as well as “body armor” to defeat razor wire.
- We did not observe any signage along I-40 advising drivers they are near a state prison – do not stop for hitchhikers.
- According to IT, no alarm sounds in Main Control when an emergency door is accessed to no man’s land. The only indication in Main Control is if the Officer pulls up the building overview, the door icon will show red instead of green. I did not confirm this
- Morale of staff on the Unit was extremely high. They appeared very eager to learn how the systems work and why they are in place.
Assessment provided by: Captain Richard Haggard

Perimeter Security:

- The Zone alarm system has been malfunctioning for months. Zones continually are activated and more so after 1930 hours, according to staff.

- Staff and Supervisors claim work orders have been submitted, but when checking the SDI log, this was found to be incorrect. None have been submitted for months.

- My observations of staff while riding with them in the perimeter vehicle is that they are obviously affected by the continuous alarms and take responses to zone alarms less seriously. Comment made, “Sometimes I don’t even want to get on the radio to clear it, because it takes up so much radio time.”

- Perimeter Officer had no idea the procedure for responding to tracks in the sand trap. His response contradicted the Post Order, which was actually the correct way.

- Post Orders give little direction in regards to, “Outside Intrusion,” this needs to be more specific and added into them.

- Swings to Graves weapon exchange took app. 9 minutes with an additional 7 minutes in the front parking lot (checking oil, starting their journal etc.) leaving the vulnerable zones 8 – 14 unattended for app. 16 minutes.

- The Graves Perimeter Officer was not proficient with either weapon. He struggled to unload the shotgun and required assistance from the Swings officer and did not safely load the, “Hot round,” in the chamber on the 9mm.

Armory Weapons/DART:

- No master inventory is maintained in the Armory or where weapons are stored. They utilize a “Daily Armory Inventory” (Attached) which only provides you with what is currently in that area. Not what is supposed to be there. This includes the Tower, DART lockers, and Regular Use Weapons storage areas.

- Armory Post Order sec. 1.8.7 requires a Daily

- The last inventory on the Duty Ammunition was also on 7/21/10. The Birdshot count was off by 800 rounds. Noted was 2050, Actual 1250. 800 rounds were moved to the training locker last month and never notated. 00 Buck was off by
50 rounds. They had 50 more than reflected on the Daily Inventory sheet. This was accredited to a counting error.

- Their Red Tag Seal System is in place and they are utilizing the logs. Although, it is apparent this has substituted for the inventory process.

- Beginning and ending inventories are completed by the shift commanders, but with no master inventory the accuracy is questionable.

- Supervisors above the rank of Lt. have not completed inventories for months according to their staff.

- Armory Post Order sec 1.6.4 requires weapons in the Armory shall remain empty at all times. DART shotguns remain loaded with 5 rounds of Birdshot with no rounds chambered. See Attached IR 10-M59-0822 for these results during the Cerbat disturbance.

- DART drills are not being regularly conducted. When they are conducted, they utilize only Shotguns even to simulate the 37 mm. This does not allow staff to become familiar with this weapon.

- Review of the Weapons qualification revealed only 4 out of 233 staff have expired weapons cards.

**Keys:** Restricted

- They utilize a “Hot Box” key system for their restricted keys.

- A Permanent issued key is assigned as a take home set.

- That key opens the “Hot Box” that holds their duty keys. Main Control cannot access restricted keys without the persons take home set or without breaking the seal on the restricted key set.

**Concern:** Not all the take home sets have just the “Hot Box” key on the ring. Transportations take home set has the Belly chain padlock key on it for the entire Complex.

**Count/Inmate Movement:**

- Inmate movement could not be observed due to the lockdown. The movement plan was explained by Warden Leider which defined movement to approved programs only occurred 10 minutes before the hour and half hour. The yard movement is controlled by officers running gates at two different locations. One of which is uncomfortably close to the tower. The Tower does not maintain lethal weapons. Only non-lethal.
• Different observations on the count procedures. Some staff was struggling to get the inmates to go to their bunks for count while other staff completed the task correctly. Appears to be more of a training issue rather than a systemic problem.

• Observed two formal counts; both counts needed to have at least one cell block re-count before clearing. Proper procedures for this were followed.

• The shift commander was actively involved in clearing the count. During Swings we actually observed the Shift Commander receiving the count.

Searches:

• Searches are being conducted on a regular basis. With a unit population of over 1500 they complete on average of 500 plus searches per month. This is accredited to the Unit Management and the fact that they are fully staffed at all times. Every post is filled every day utilizing overtime if need be. They never collapse a post.

Environmental Observations:

• Grooming and Housing compliance is not being enforced, giving the impression that the inmates are in control. DO 704 is in place yet the impression is that the staff are reluctant to challenge the inmates for compliance.

• Excessive amounts of cardboard in the Housing cubicles being used for hobby craft.

• The Unit still utilizes the use of Metal Horseshoes.

• Mop buckets in the housing units still have the metal rods that we eliminated years ago.

• Observed one male supervisor with an earring in his ear.

• They recycle cardboard in the no man’s land and it accumulates in “Semi Loads” waiting to be picked up.

• The SSU position is only part time as it is not part of the contract according to a MTC Lt. With the addition of medium custody inmates this needs to be added to their post charts as we have learned the valuable importance of this position.

• The Chief of Security position seems to have a lack of security. Tour reports indicated lack of attentiveness to the shifts. No corrective action taken on serious security conditions, and no follow up on items that should require his direct involvement.
- The complete separation of the MTC ADW from the security aspect of the unit needs to be reconsidered as we have learned this position need to be directly involved with the unit Captain.
Assessment provided by: Major Edwin Lao
Major Thomas (Sam) Higginson

Operational Objective:

Conduct a forensic operational security audit of ASPC Kingman Hualapai Unit of the following security areas:

- Perimeter / Zones
- Ingress / Egress
- Emergency Preparedness
- Collateral Security Issues

Methodology:

Evaluate live operational security practices and determine if there is any deviation from the ADC mandated guidelines and policy compliance utilizing current Data Collection Instruments and visual observation of application and field practices.

Executive Summary of Findings:
The executive summary of findings is divided primarily into four areas based on the security topics assigned to this team. The findings are bulleted to provide a “straight to the point” type approach of deficiencies that we felt are key and noteworthy areas that require immediate rectification.

Perimeter / Zones:

- Perimeter Patrol failed to challenge our vehicle when entering the ASPC-Hualapai perimeter road. None of the additional “static” perimeter patrols communicated to the unit controls our presence. Both the static and mobile patrols failed to observe Major Lao planting tracks on the perimeter. The area was in direct view of both “static” perimeters.

- Perimeter Patrol failed to detect the “footprints” that Major Lao had introduced to the outer sandtrap.

- The oncoming Graveyard Perimeter Officer failed to note the intrusion on the perimeter as well. Even after the conclusion of the unit Zone Check the footprints remained undetected. (The zone check requires an officer to walk and “trigger” every zone while the perimeter patrol is required to clear the zone by visual inspection of the area, fence, and sandtrap.) Approximately two hours had elapsed since the security challenge was implemented without detection.

- The Perimeter Patrol failed to log our presence on their perimeter in his correctional service journal.
• The inner "no mans land" in Zone 10 still has numerous footprints. The area being referred to is the "no mans land" between the nuisance fence and the external perimeter fence where the actual fence had been compromised by the escapees. This area should have been re-sanitized after the repairs.

• There is only one Zone Check conducted within a (24) twenty four hour day. A zone check by the facility staff definition is physically walking in an S pattern to trigger the electronic detection system. If this system by definition is being considered a security device, inspection of such should occur at least once per shift.

• During the Zone Checks, the Main Control Officer left the alarms accessed in every zone. This was clearly visible because the triggered zone had turned from "Green" to "RED" on the monitor. All the triggered zones were left in that state even when the officer was already out of the zone area throughout the duration of the zone check. This practice rendered the perimeter security system ineffective because the zones would not trigger new perimeter intrusions.

• The main control electronic zone detection system lacks an "audible" and persistent alert during zone activations. This is necessary as the officer in the unit control is tasked with other various duties that does not allow him to focus solely on the Zone Alarm System.

• There are a lot of false alarms during our tour. Most of them are from Zone 13. This is the corner where the unauthorized vehicle was observed during the incident. The officer posted stated that that has been a norm and that they referring to other officers have written several security device work orders to address the perimeter security system. We reviewed the last (90) ninety days of the Security Device Tracking Log the following day. The log does not indicate a single report of persistent zone alarms.

• Perimeter Patrols both the "static" and roving lack the assertiveness and command presence to challenge anyone entering the perimeter. The lack of command presence provided us with the opportunity to place tracks on their outer perimeter sandtrap both during the day and night time.

• The outer sandtrap was in fair condition. Although there are some areas that appeared to be packed, It was free from weeds indicative that the maintenance intervals are frequent to discourage the growth of foliage and weeds.
- The condition of the razor wire was in good condition. The spacing fell within the parameters of the manufacturer recommendation. However there are areas in the perimeters that have the razor wire not touching the ground or that is bent.

- The Perimeter Officer posted during our assessment appeared to have great difficulty in handling the Remington 870 Shotgun during the relief process.

**Egress / Ingress:**

- Staff arriving at the unit mostly had their uniforms off to clear the scanner.

- Staff arriving at the unit seemed to be surprised when they were asked by the scanner officer to carry their food items to the scanner to clear. This indicates that this practice is not a norm but an exception.

- A female staff just threw her boots thru the scanner to clear them. This was not observed by the scanner officer because he appeared to be busy processing other staff property. This staff member realized that she was being observed retrieving her boots and submitted them for inspection to the scanner officer.

- Some staff was clearing their own property instead of relinquishing them for inspection with the scanner officer.

- A Canteen Personnel was allowed access into the facility without clearing the scanner because there was no officer. Main Control allowed the Canteen Staff access into the unit. This incident was referred to the Unit Chief of Security, Captain Smith immediately.

**Emergency Preparedness:**

- The ASPC-Kingman Hualapai Unit Emergency Plan is not compliant with the ADC Emergency Preparedness Plan. Their plan contains various “annexes” to that identify specific incidents such as Inmate Hunger Strikes, Utility Interruption, Disturbance Procedures to name a few.

- Close inspection of the plan annexes are just simplified checklist which are similar to our matrix notification.

- Their emergency plan does not contain specific technical annexes. They are rather generic and defer incident mitigation to local public service entities. The only exception to this which we found to be detailed is the Chase Annex. However it
was reiterated to us that they cannot engage in fugitive apprehension even with exigent circumstances because they are a private company.

**Collateral Security Issues:**

- The Dog Program break area behind the building did have a 10 foot fence but no razor wire. This pen type area had a water faucet which could have been used as a natural step when negotiating out. This area led directly to the outer perimeter fence “no man’s land”.

- There were large rocks left by the door indicative that those doors were propped most of the time. This was confirmed by some officers that were working in that building to another audit team.

- Enormous amount of cardboard awaiting recycling pick up is kept at the back lot. This not only poses a high risk for fire loading but also is usable for defeating razor wire in our perimeter fencing.

- The Unit Main Control Officer is tasked with a lot of collateral duties in addition to monitoring lobby pedestrian traffic and equipment return and issue.

- Cameras although present in almost every location are not monitored closely because only two cameras can be viewed from the monitors at any given time as per the officers.

- Most officers working the Unit Control Center and Tower lack tenure and familiarity and training with the electronic surveillance and monitoring equipment.

- A review of the zone alarm activation at the time of the incident indicates that the Zone 9 had indicated an intrusion alarm initially at 2022 hours and was not cleared until 2045 hours. This was a 23 minute gap without Zone Coverage. Zone 9 again triggers at 2049 hours and was not cleared until 2117 hours. This is another 28 minute duration without electronic zone coverage.
Assessment provided by: Captain Dennis Bool

Staffing:

- The shifts have few vacancies and although there is some very minor RDO balancing issues, they are generally balanced. The shift vacancies are filled through paid overtime, and I found no evidence of any posts being collapsed due to staffing. There is no collapsed Post list due to the paid overtime.

- There is a question of experience. I conservatively estimate that one third of security employees have less than three months on the job or in their promoted position. Further, there is no FTO program to teach staff new to their job or position.

- I found no indication that the available staffing contributed to the escape.

Visitation:

- I met with visitation CO Moore and he had not read or signed his post orders, and did not know where to find them. He was eager to learn, but had not been taught.

- Visitation for Cassie Welch had been suspended for inmate McClusky after she was caught attempting to bring in drugs and was arrested.

Phones:

- Lt. Winkler did not end phone privileges between inmate McClusky and Cassie Welch, because he felt he could glean information about the introduction of drugs into the prison.

- There is no SSU type position on the Post Chart, but Lt. Winkler is the staff member assuming those duties. He is the one that can monitor phone calls, but this is not a fulltime position.

Keys and Tools:

- I found that Hualapai Control was using a key inventory dated March 2010. This was fixed on the spot. The Key control officer, CO McKee had been out for three months and his replacement did not know to update the inventory monthly.

- I found that staff were not properly utilizing the key check out form and were splitting check out spaces when keys were passed on. I instructed one staff member directly, as well as his Lieutenant on the proper way to document such exchanges.
The unit utilizes a “Hot Box” system for restricted key sets Hualapai control. It is comprised of a Lazy-Susan mounted system of individual key boxes which are labeled for a particular position: Store, Canteen, etc. and authorized staff have a take home key to open the individual boxes. There is no indication this contributed to the escape.

I observed tool room operations and found no discrepancies from ADC policies.

Counts:

I observed during several counts that inmates have free movement within the pods during counts, including inmates cutting hair. I asked Lt. Jones about this and he made three separate outcalls for inmates to stay on their bunks during count. The inmates either ignored the directives or slow stepped their compliance. To me, it was clear that this was new to the inmates.

Some staff conducting count did not start their face to ID until inmates are on their bunks. The inmates slow step their compliance and I timed it between 3 and 5 minutes per pod before the Officer started count. At even three minutes per pod inmates could delay count by 12 minutes.

I observed some staff conducting count, and after the face to ID of an inmate the inmate was allowed to move about the pod. Because there are so many new officers not familiar with their pod population I am concerned that an inmate could be counted correctly and then move and “cover” the bunk assignment of a missing inmate.

I observed a Face to ID count on an inmate Robles #199911, whose ID was a white blur where the facial picture should have been. This was corrected immediately by re-photographing the inmate and issuing a new ID card.

Perimeter:

I observed an Officer walk onto the exterior fence drag no more than ten feet from the original breach point. It was broad daylight and I had trouble discerning his footprints. The drag was too compacted for a good print.

Shift relief begins with the perimeter officer driving to the front entrance, picking up his relief and then proceeding to the clearing barrel by the unit sally port. There they exchange weapons and verify ammunition counts. Then the relieving Officer drives the off-shift perimeter officer back to the front entrance. We observed this process took about 7 to 10 minutes. During this period there is no perimeter coverage.

There is a common road shared by the perimeter and access to the Cerbat unit. Although there is a sign
Pointing to the Cerbat unit, there are no signs that the perimeter is off limits to unauthorized traffic. As well, there is no warning signage for drivers leaving the Cerbat unit to restrict traffic from ingressing further onto the perimeter.

**Zone Alarms:**

- I observed that the zone alarm panel is constantly activated. Staff will clear a given zone only to have it re-activate within 5 seconds. I also observed perimeter staff reporting the activation of zone lights where the panel showed no activations. This is a constant and chronic problem for all shifts. Staff reported the zones had been this way for months. I found that the constant activations took 90% of the officers’ time assigned to Hualapai control. Staff are frustrated and I believe absent my presence, alarms would have been re-set without a perimeter verification.

- Staff reported that they write up maintenance requests that are then reviewed and sent to either maintenance or I.T. for resolution.

- I was told there is no contracted vendor to repair and/or calibrate the zones. The IT person assigned to assist us had no training on the buried cable system used.

- We observed that rain runoff diversions were built into the buried cable zones in front and west of the unit. These diversions appeared to be within inches of the buried cable system, possibly creating a source of false alarms. They were deep enough to obscure a human from observation by perimeter officers.

- Staff conducting zone checks completed the task without testing the elevated microwave system that covered the front entrance, because they did not have the tools (a pole with a board) to do so.

**Post Orders:**

- I observed that post orders were insufficient to be used by staff new to the post. As an example, the Post Order #52 for Dorm/Yard officer has no specific instructions on inmate movement during count or how the Yard officer is to conduct turnouts or fence inspections.

- Most Post Orders had a signature gap of months and many had all the recent signatures signed off by the same supervisor regardless of shift.

- Contract Bed ADW Lee could not find many post orders, but Lt. Jones was able to find them.

**Security Device Deficiencies:**

- I found that that when there were security deficiencies the prevailing attitude was “I reported it, therefore my hands are clean”. There was no follow up to ensure that repairs were completed. ADW Ramsey stated that security devices were the
job of the unit Captain. Captain Smith told me he reported them. Neither had any involvement in follow up.

Observations:

- Unit management is piece-meal and there is very little communication between the administration and shift staff and inmates. There is no shift briefing: I was observing count when there was an inmate on inmate assault. The following shift of the same building (#5) did not know there was an assault the prior shift.