SUPPLEMENTAL MAJORITY REPORT OF THE BERKELEY CITY COUNCIL AD-HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON URBAN SHIELD

JULY 2018
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Background

A special meeting of the Berkeley City Council was held on June 20, 2017 to consider an agreement between the City of Berkeley and City & County of San Francisco for Homeland Security Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant funds, and examine BPD’s relationship with the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC). The meeting was called pursuant to a 1973 ordinance adopted by the people of the City of Berkeley that stipulates Council must approve of all agreements, letters or memoranda of understanding of policies between the City and/or the Berkeley Police Department and all other local, state and federal law enforcement, military and/or intelligence agencies, police departments or private security organizations. Council approval of agreements is valid for one year.

The Council also considered and discussed the implications of the City’s continued participation in Urban Shield, a three-day law enforcement counter-terrorism focused exercise funded by UASI, organized by the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office and approved by the Alameda County Board of Supervisors. Under the City of Berkeley Charter, the Council can consider whether to authorize City personnel to continue participating in Urban Shield.

At the meeting, the Council adopted a motion on a 7-2 vote to participate in the 2017 Urban Shield event. As a condition of approval, the Council created a Subcommittee to review the City’s involvement in Urban Shield, determine whether the City should continue to participate in Urban Shield and present alternative programs that better reflect the values of Berkeley’s citizens. A subcommittee of Mayor Jesse Arreguín and Councilmembers Susan Wengraf, Cheryl Davila and Kate Harrison was formed. The Berkeley Chiefs of Police and Fire were non-voting members. The Subcommittee met frequently over the last year. The following

1 Berkeley City Council, Annotated Agenda Special Meeting of the Berkeley City Council, June 20, 2017, City Clerk, http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/Clerk/City_Council/2017/06_June/Documents/06-20_Special_Annotated.aspx; See also Berkeley Police Department, Revised Agenda Material, MOU Compendium Items: Item #3.6: Agreement with City & County of San Francisco for Distribution of UASI Grant Funds; Item #3.12: Berkeley Police Department Relationship with NCRIC as codified in BPD General Order N-17, by Andrew Greenwood, June 20, 2017, accessed January 4, 2018, https://www.cityofberkeley.info/Clerk/City_Council/2017/06_June/Documents/2017-06-20_Item_1a_MOU_Compendium_Items.aspx, 9.


5 City of Berkeley Charter, art. IX, s 49(5).

6 Annotated Agenda, 4.

7 In addition, the Council voted to assign the Subcommittee to “[c]onsider whether Berkeley should end its relationship with NCRIC, continue, and/or create formal protocols to limit Berkeley’s contribution and access to the database.” On May 8, 2018, the Subcommittee voted to adopt a draft outline of an MOU between the City and NCRIC, and to recommend the adoption and execution of a formal MOU between the parties. See also Annotated Agenda, 2-3.

report contains the conclusions, observations and recommendations of the Subcommittee’s majority.

In the interim, on March 27, 2018, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors voted to approve funding for Urban Shield 2018 with the condition that this represents the last time the Board funds Urban Shield as “currently constituted”. The Board also voted to create an ad-hoc committee of Board members’ appointees to work with the ACSO to determine what programs to fund for 2019. As a result, the Berkeley Subcommittee on Urban Shield also considered how Berkeley can provide useful input to the county as it deliberates on how to prepare the county and its residents for natural and manmade disasters.

This report considers the City’s involvement in Urban Shield (pages 10-14, 24-27), the benefits of participation (pages 24-27), the costs of participation (pages 28-38), the nature of Urban Shield exercises (pages 10-22), any possible elements that might be contrary to the City’s values of community policing, nondiscrimination, and respect for human and civil rights (pages 28-38), and whether Berkeley should continue to participate in 2018 (pages 28-41).
Executive Summary

The Urban Shield event is a direct descendent of an earlier exercise known as the “High Sierra SWAT Challenge,” a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) competition established by the San Francisco branch of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1996. The event was designed to test the endurance and skillset of the FBI SWAT teams and other federal, state and city teams from the Western United States in 20 police operation scenarios conducted over 60 miles of Sierra Nevada mountain trails. The teams participated in hostage rescue, high-risk warrant service, terrorism scenarios, among other themes. However, following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the FBI refocused its attention towards national security priorities and the ACSO assumed the lead role in hosting the event. In 2007, the ACSO SWAT exercise competition relocated to the Bay Area, rebranded as a terrorism-focused exercise titled Urban Shield, and secured its funding through Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grant funds. The event was, and still is, aimed at serving both public safety personnel and profit-seeking vendors.

SWAT teams were first established by police departments in the 1960s to respond to incidents unfamiliar to the standard police patrol officer. They are typically trained to respond to complex yet infrequent calls for service, including hostage situations, active shooters, high risk warrants, crowd management support operations, dignitary protection and, in extremely rare instances, terrorism. While these teams are designed to be seldom deployed, they train and exercise to develop specialized capabilities to respond to worst-case scenarios. These capabilities are designed for purely civilian policing purposes, but they also have the potential to be perceived by the public as bearing some semblance to military tactics, weapons and equipment.

America’s history is founded on an inherent wariness toward military encroachment into civilian life. Therefore, the onus has been on police and local government to balance public concerns about militarization with protecting the public during critical incidents. The balance upon which important SWAT activity relies is precarious.

In recent years, the Urban Shield event has expanded into a broader exercise testing the capabilities of other public safety entities such as fire departments, explosive ordinance disposal teams (EOD), and community emergency preparedness teams (CERT). In terms of attendance and emphasis, however, the event is at its core still primarily focused on exercising the capabilities of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams.

During its extensive year-long assessment of the Urban Shield event and the City of Berkeley’s participation, the Subcommittee found that the event as currently constituted—while beneficial to Berkeley’s own team, known as the Special Response Team (SRT)—serves to distract from the important public safety mission of specialized policing by amplifying concerns about militarization and corruption of the public safety mission to an unacceptable degree. The event does so through its overwhelming emphasis on counterterrorism, commodification of public safety and absence of input and oversight from local stakeholders.

The broader context within which Urban Shield has come into existence is critically important. Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has sought to reorient local governments towards counterterrorism preparedness. The Bush Administration, in declaring a global “War on Terror,” also proclaimed the existence of a domestic front to the war that would be fought by local law enforcement and first responders. Congress ensured the flow of billions of dollars from public coffers to fund these local initiatives. Given that the 2001 attacks targeted New York City and Washington D.C., the epicenters of major counterterrorism funding in the post 9/11 era has been the country’s major urban areas, such as the Bay Area.

The UASI grant program is administered by DHS, which requires that metropolitan area grant recipients’ projects have “a clear nexus to terrorism.” Of the roughly $30 million in annual funding allocated by DHS to the Bay Area through the Bay Area UASI approval authority, the ACSO is awarded $5-7 million in funding for both its SWAT and first responder exercise competition and training courses independent of Urban Shield that serve all the counties and cities of the Bay Area. According to the ACSO, in 2017, the combined costs related to operation and management of the SWAT and other exercises, equipment and logistics and a banquet for 2,500 government officials totaled $1.7 million. This figure does not include the unspecified proportion of an additional $1 million of UASI funding allocated to the ACSO for planning the event and other UASI training courses.

A key finding of the Subcommittee is that the BPD and BFD already conduct a substantial amount of training and exercises independent of Urban Shield. For example, the SRT members complete 80 hours of mandatory basic SWAT school, required by the state of California. SRT members also receive 16 hours of training and exercise per month as recommended by National Tactical Officers Association. Monthly training includes tactical theory, negotiations, physical skills training, fitness, and specialized medical training. In addition, BPD is exemplary in designing and managing tactical de-escalation exercises and training for its officers and conducting tactical active-shooter exercises to meet the needs of the most vulnerable members of its community and its officers. The BFD hazardous material (HAZMAT) and water rescue teams also conduct training and exercises primarily funded internally, in collaboration with neighboring agencies and from UASI grant funding unrelated to Urban Shield. Berkeley Office of Emergency Services staff also conduct exercises internally.

The SRT has successfully trained and exercised for critical events since its establishment in the 1970s. Most notably, in 1990, the SRT team was recognized in the community and across the world of policing for its handling of the Henry’s hostage crisis. Nevertheless, from the perspective of BPD, the benefit of Urban Shield is that it provides realistic and cost-effective scenario-based exercises for critical incidents that are supplemental to ongoing internal exercise efforts. BPD leadership values the additional opportunities to test the team’s capabilities offered by the event. The key advantage of Urban Shield, according to BPD personnel, is its scope; the two-day event pushes participants to the breaking point and prepares them for the stress of a major event.

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An analysis by the Subcommittee found that, each year, the vast majority of Urban Shield scenarios are focused on terrorism. BPD noted that terrorism is an important potential threat to the City of Berkeley, but also conceded that it is not the most likely threat. Nevertheless, BPD maintains that the extra counterterrorism exercise could be beneficial in the unlikely occurrence of such an incident. BPD also indicates that the terrorism-centric scenarios are relevant to the SRT’s handling of high-risk warrants, crowd situations, dignitary protection, react teams, and block searches. BPD leadership feels that the terrorism emphasis of Urban Shield does not distract from the largely non-terrorism focus of its historic public safety operations.

While the BFD Hazmat and Water Rescue teams have participated in the terrorism-focused fire scenarios on two occasions, they have not participated since and have no immediate plans to participate again. The BFD’s primary interest in Urban Shield is in the Yellow Command table-top exercise that provides an opportunity for the BOES to interface with Bay Area county and city EOCs. Though the Yellow Command exercise must have a nexus to terrorism, past scenarios have not been overwhelmingly focused on terrorism, taking advantage of the dual-use exception provided by the statute that governs the investment of UASI funding. The newly developed CERT scenarios and community preparedness programs at Urban Shield 2017 also fall under the dual-use exception.

This does not appear to be the case with regard to the bulk of the tactical SWAT scenarios. The ACSO has consistently prioritized terrorism over other SWAT competencies in the design of its tactical scenarios. SWAT teams must of course be prepared for the threat of terrorism, but the sheer quantity of terrorist scenarios in Urban Shield unnecessarily inflames public concern about militarization. Urban Shield’s terrorism emphasis risks signaling to the community that the threat of terrorism is orders of magnitude larger than the other threats and responsibilities that law enforcement and first responders address every day. The Subcommittee also recognizes that in the public’s view, excessive terrorism exercises cannot be easily separated from the broader context of the federal government’s ongoing wars against terrorist organizations.

The department has led police forces across the country in prohibiting unduly aggressive military-style tactics utilized by other departments and in pioneering de-escalation training. Unfortunately, Urban Shield’s narrow interpretation and implementation of UASI’s nexus to terrorism regulations contravenes and potentially undermines these locally held values and priorities.

The result of Urban Shield’s interpretation is evident in the militaristic terrorist camp scenario that Subcommittee observers witnessed in 2017. The event was designed by a private security firm, featured an implausible terrorist related scenario and involved private security officials, active duty foreign and domestic military personnel. It also featured military equipment not relevant to local police work.

The diversion of UASI funds to Urban Shield terrorism scenarios limits the amount of money available to counties and cities. Subcommittee staff attended a BAUASI approval authority meeting and witnessed the organization reject Solano County’s request to fund an emergency regional radio system in the wake of the North Bay fires due to the priority given to funding of Urban Shield and the terrorism-focused NCRIC surveillance-fusion center.

14 UASI funding must have a nexus to terrorism, but it can be used to fund non-terrorism exercise and training activities so long as they are also useful in a terrorism event.
Of equal concern is Urban Shield’s vendor orientation, which provides for vendors to sponsor the event in exchange for access to their target customers: public safety personnel. For example, ACSO requires participants to listen to vendor sales pitches regarding weapons and surveillance technology. Neither the grant’s Congressional mandate nor the Berkeley community’s expectations for training include this element. The Vendor Show is indirectly funded by the government through the participation of salaried public servants. Implementing a tactical exercise competition with a strong relationship to for-profit companies raises serious ethical concerns.

The show is not the only avenue through which vendor technology is marketed. The ACSO works directly with top paying sponsors to design scenarios around vendor technology, so that SWAT teams may beta test vendor products. In some cases, vendors design the scenarios themselves. Vendor marketing in the form of ads adorn the Urban Shield website, and during the event, physical banners hang across the fairgrounds, and at the official event hotel. Ads appear in brochures and, in some cases, at the scenario sites.

It is unclear how ACSO is spending the funds collected from sponsorships. However, a recent California Public Records Act request regarding the fund’s expenses and revenues shows that the ACSO used the fund for a number of activities not remotely related to emergency preparedness.

Community-oriented policing and emergency response are also undermined by the absence of opportunities for departmental leadership to weigh in on critical matters of local concern. While in past years BPD has been invited to design and evaluate scenarios, there appears to be no mechanism for Berkeley staff to review the entirety of scenarios before the event. The competition model adopted by Urban Shield precludes review of Urban Shield scenarios by local law enforcement leadership so that teams do not gain a competitive pre-event advantage. Documentation on how the scenarios are designed is limited. However, through conversations with Berkeley and ACSO staff, scenarios appear to be largely designed by the ACSO and in some cases by other public safety agencies and vendors. This reduces opportunities for Berkeley to object to scenarios that do not comply with the City’s values. In addition, this arrangement largely discounts the needs of the cities themselves, who are best situated to understand and prepare for the threats facing their populace.

Local input into the design of exercises is critical. The City of Berkeley faces unique public safety challenges related to its dense urban character, proximity to a major university, proximity to a major seismic fault, wildfire hazards, among many other concerns. The Berkeley public holds local public safety officials responsible for training and exercising for challenges unique to Berkeley, not only to threats facing the various twelve counties in BAUASI. Urban Shield prioritizes so-called “regional” threats to physical infrastructure such as the Golden Gate Bridge and the Livermore Laboratory. Additionally, community concern regarding Urban Shield has highlighted the ways in which current disaster preparedness systems emphasize manmade disasters and often overlook and underfund the significant impacts of the natural disasters, including recovery from these disasters.

Moreover, the Urban Shield event and the ACSO have been the subject of a series of scandals in recent years—episodes that may have been avoided had the public and local jurisdictions been meaningfully involved in the exercise’s design and operation. In the recent past, event organizers overlooked racist stereotyping, and invited the participation of a fundamentalist militia organization, the investigative arm of Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) and countries with documented human rights abuses.
After an extensive assessment of the ACSO event and the City of Berkeley’s participation, the Berkeley City Council Subcommittee on Urban Shield recommends that the Berkeley City Council suspend the City of Berkeley’s participation in vendor show as well as BPD’s participation in the tactical scenarios in 2018, pending reevaluation of the potential tactical-related offerings in 2019.

While the Subcommittee agrees with the Alameda Board of Supervisors’ decision to “reconstitute” the event in 2019 to address serious community concerns, due to the uncertainty surrounding the content of the reconstituted event, the Subcommittee also recommends that the Council send a letter to the Board containing a series of specific recommendations to improve the reconstituted event. The Subcommittee also recommended that the Council request that Berkeley’s members of Congress seek to expand Homeland Security Grants to fund disaster preparedness activities.
Urban Shield Overview

Introduction

Urban Shield is an annual full-scale regional preparedness exercise that has been hosted by the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office (ACSO) since 2007. The event is primarily funded through a grant from the United States Congress and distributed via the DHS. Statutes and Homeland Security regulations governing the grant require that the focus and content of the three-day event have “a clear nexus to terrorism.” Many Berkeley organizations and community members have expressed concerns about Berkeley’s participation in Urban Shield.

At its core, the event is a 48-hour SWAT competitive exercise aimed at exercising the tactical capabilities of SWAT teams from the Bay Area, but it often features teams from across the state, the country and world. Fire departments and explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) teams also compete in separate exercises focused on their respective competencies. At the Urban Shield vendor show, international companies market specialized military-grade material to law enforcement and emergency response departments. In recent years—in part to address community concerns about the event and to meet the requirements of UASI funding regulations—the ACSO has added new components to the event such as: Yellow Command, a regional preparedness tabletop exercise; Green Command, a CERT exercise; and Gray Command, a community preparedness fair.

BPD’s Special Response Team (SRT), the BFD, and the BOES have participated in Urban Shield in the past. The BPD reported that they have sent eight SRT members to the event in each of the ten years of Urban Shield’s existence. The Fire Department reported that it does not participate in the fire scenarios every year, but regularly sends BOES personnel to the Urban Shield Yellow Command exercise.

Vendor Show

The first day of Urban Shield provides for-profit companies with an opportunity to market to potential SWAT, EOD, Fire and other potential customers. In 2017, the ACSO devised a five-tiered sponsorship level of between $750 to $15,000, with the four highest sponsorship levels earning a booth and a “logoed presence” at the show. The show occurs in a large convention center at the Alameda County Fairgrounds before the tactical, fire and EOD scenarios begin.

16 Agenda - Board of Supervisors’ Meeting, January 10, 2017, 10.
18 “About Urban Shield.”
19 Revised Agenda Material, 9.
Representatives of the Subcommittee attended 2017 Urban Shield and observed the vendor show and a handful of tactical exercises. The 2017 Vendor Show included weapons and other technologies. The Subcommittee witnessed military-grade firearms, surveillance technologies, and drones on display. Vendor products were promoted with labels such as “military-grade” and “battle-tested.” Some of the vendors advertised that their products were developed at military installations. Observers also witnessed booths for arms manufacturers like BAE Systems, Sig Sauer, and Winchester. Bob Barker Industries, “America’s Leading Detention Supplier” had a booth, as well as the Correctional Medical Group, and Gemalto, a facial recognition company.

Throughout the day, SWAT personnel inquire at booths about vendor wares, handle and test firearms and other technology, listen to marketing lectures, and enter raffles for rifles and other equipment.

Even though the Vendor Show technically ended on Friday, the ACSO allows the highest-paying vendors to directly participate in tactical scenarios over the weekend.

**Seminars**

The first day of Urban Shield also features hour-long seminars on public safety topics. First responder participants in Urban Shield exercises did not appear to have attended the seminars. While they were sparsely attended, some of content in the seminars appeared useful to public safety personnel. Subcommittee members and their staff attended seminars on the ACSO’s acquisition and use of drone technology across the Bay Area and a seminar on the ACSO’s role in the Ghost Ship fire.

**Tactical Exercises (Black, Blue, Gold and Silver Commands)**

Urban Shield began as, and still is, primarily a tactical exercise for SWAT teams. Local, county and federal police SWAT teams (and foreign police and military teams in past years) made up of eight operators participate in approximately 30 terrorism-related scenarios. Each team’s performance is recorded and tallied as to construct competition between them.

The competition lasts from 5:00 a.m. on Saturday morning until 5:00 a.m. on Monday. By the end of the competition, each team completes each of the 30 scenarios, scattered throughout the Bay Area. Each scenario takes about an hour to complete. Teams in full tactical attire travel in vans between scenario sites. Over the course of the 48-hour event, team members are deprived of sleep and nourishment, except during travel.

The scenarios are staffed by volunteer role players, Alameda County Sheriff personnel and SWAT evaluators from Bay Area police departments and, in some cases, by federal law enforcement personnel and vendors. When a team arrives, it is unaware of the context and content of the scenario; one of the evaluators role-plays as an on-scene law enforcement briefer. SWAT team leaders are given a chance to ask questions about the scenario, the terrain, victims, possible suspects, equipment available to the team, sniper support, etc. After the briefing, the SWAT team is usually deprived of sleep and nourishment, except during travel.

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21 Such as Fort Meade, Livermore, Los Alamos, etc.
22 See “Sponsor Levels.”
given weapons modified to fire non-lethal simulated rubber and paint ammunition and other equipment, sometimes including vendor technology, such as cameras, torches or drones. However, two scenarios per year typically feature the use of live (lethal) ammunition.

Teams proceed to accomplish some objective, for example killing terrorists or active shooters, rescuing hostages, etc. The role of suspects and victims are typically performed by volunteers. The team returns for a debriefing by SWAT evaluators, lasting around five minutes. Evaluators quickly share their thoughts on the team’s performance. As soon as the debriefing is over, teams travel to the next scenario.

**Fire Exercises (Red Command)**

Urban Shield features a number of terrorism-related urban search and rescue (USAR) and HAZMAT scenarios that test the capabilities of fire departments. The fire scenarios take place over 12 hours on Saturday 9:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. Vendor technology is featured in some scenarios.23

The ACSO did not invite the Subcommittee to observe the fire scenarios.

**EOD Exercises (White Command)**

Urban Shield features four EOD exercises aimed at testing “multiple skills sets including robot operation, render safe procedures, IED recognition [and] Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) selection and hand entry techniques.” Vendor technology is featured in certain scenarios.24

The ACSO did not invite the Subcommittee to observe the EOD scenarios.

**Yellow Command**

Although Urban Shield was originally designed as a SWAT competition, since 2013, the ACSO has expanded the scope of Urban Shield to include an EOC exercise, a Community Emergency Response Team exercise and a Community Preparedness Fair.

The Yellow Command is the name for the Urban Shield exercise established in 2013 that tests the ability of regional EOCs across the Bay Area to communicate and collaborate through the State of California’s Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS). In addition, the exercise lets Bay Area emergency preparedness personnel test the eight Bay Area Regional Catastrophic plans.25

Since 2013, Yellow Command has featured the following scenarios:

- passenger train crash testing the Regional Mass Fatality Plan (2013),
- high explosive terrorist attack exercising the Regional Donations Management Plan (2014),

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• coordinated terrorist attacks throughout the Bay Area testing the Regional Mass Transportation and Evacuation Plan (2015),
• EOC activation exercise in coordination with the State and Federal governments (2016), and
• Distribution of resources during the first week after an earthquake through the Regional Catastrophic Earthquake Logistics Response Plan (2017).  

The ACSO did not invite the Subcommittee to observe the 2017 Yellow Command scenario.

Green Command

In 2017, Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) from across the Bay Area participated in the first Urban Shield scenarios designed to test CERT capabilities. Trained community participants tested their capabilities through a number of disaster role-playing scenarios.

According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, CERT was developed and implemented by the Los Angeles City Fire Department in 1985 when an earthquake “confirmed the need for training civilians to meet their immediate need.” FEMA adopted the concept officially in 1993 and now supports CERT through Train-the-Trainer and Program Manager courses for members of the fire, medical and emergency management community.

The Subcommittee observed the 2017 Green Command scenarios. Various Bay Area CERT teams, including from Berkeley, tested their capabilities through earthquake, severe weather, obstacle course and building collapse scenarios. Unlike the fire and tactical scenarios, none of the scenarios appeared to be explicitly related to, or inspired by, terrorism.

Gray Command

Also in 2017, to enhance the community’s role in disaster preparedness, the ACSO hosted a community preparedness fair, known as Gray Command, featuring earthquake simulators, food trucks, booths and community-orientated safety preparedness literature.

The Subcommittee observed the 2017 Gray Command community preparedness fair. Observers witnessed a number of valuable public safety-oriented booths as well as one extremely troubling booth featuring the Oath Keepers militia.

Orange Command

The Alameda County EOC is activated during Urban Shield to coordinate and monitor the various exercises scenarios. Subcommittee observers visited the Orange Command but did not witness much in the way of emergency management activity.

Emergency Medical Services and Medical Branch

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During Urban Shield, the ACSO invites medical and Emergency Medical Services personnel to monitor and tend to injured participants. In addition to their “real-world” medical function, medical personnel train tactical teams on techniques and technologies focused on trauma, ballistic injuries and other related topics during the scenarios. Past scenarios have featured “tourniquet use, wound packing, chest injury assessment and treatment, medical packs, triage, etc.”

Despite repeated requests to visit a medical checkpoint, the ACSO did not invite the Subcommittee to observe them. Additionally, during the Subcommittee’s scenario tour, observers did not witness any scenarios that featured medical training.

History of UASI and Urban Shield

The first Urban Shield event took place in 2007, evolving from the High Sierra SWAT Team Challenge, featuring SWAT teams from the across the Bay Area, state and country. Situated in the Sierra Nevada, the event featured “exercises include[ing] hostage rescue, tactical rappelling, engaging terrorist cells, dealing with weapons of mass destruction, fugitive apprehension, and daytime and nighttime land navigation.”

It is unclear how the event was funded.

Established in 1996, the High Sierra Challenge was eliminated by the FBI in 2006, presumably to refocus on threats from Al Qaeda and other violent groups. A 2006 article published in the East Bay Times confirmed that “… the agency was forced to redirect its resources because of national security concerns.” The ACSO sought to inherit the High Sierra SWAT Team Challenge and rebranded it as Urban Shield in 2007.

After September 11, federal officials worked to reorient the country’s military, intelligence apparatus, investigative bodies and its state and local law enforcement and emergency agencies. The reorientation was fashioned to fight the “War on Terror,” on two fronts: one abroad and the other domestically. While the U.S. military pursued terrorism abroad, the federal government also expected that domestic law enforcement would prevent and protect against the threat of renewed attacks in the “homeland.” This gives Urban Shield its funding and focus.

Congress allocated substantial funding to states and cities through a series of legislation: the USA Patriot Act of 2001, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The USA Patriot Act empowered the U.S. Attorney General to give grants to “States and units of local government to improve the ability of State and local law enforcement, fire department and first responders to respond to and prevent acts of terrorism.” In addition, the Patriot Act created the Grant Program for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support “to enhance the capability of State and local jurisdictions to prepare for and respond to terrorist acts including events of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction and biological, nuclear, radiological, incendiary, chemical, and explosive devices.”

These grants became the basis for the subsequent DHS grant program known as UASI—the primary funding source for Urban Shield. The UASI grant program distributes funding to high risk

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29 One journalist described the High Sierra SWAT Team Challenge as the “ultimate competition,” depriving competitors of sleep and food over “a mountainous 62-mile course that reaches altitudes of more than 9,000 feet.”

30 The federal government claims that these efforts have prevented a repeat of 2001, but they have also resulted in violations of human rights, global war, mass unchecked surveillance and secrecy, fraudulent and wasteful expenditures, Islamophobia, and—significantly for the purposes of this report—further militarization of local law enforcement.


33 Id. 115 Stat. 399-400.

34 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred existing terrorism grant programs to the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP).
eligible urban areas based on an analysis of relative risk of terrorism faced by metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).\textsuperscript{35}

By design, the UASI program is a federal effort aimed at augmenting local law enforcement’s preparedness for terrorist incidents. The prominent role of local first responders was unveiled in the fiscal year 2003 Budget, which set aside billions for local terrorism preparedness. Between 2003 and 2005, UASI grant funding for terrorism preparedness was distributed to major Bay Area cities such as Oakland, San Francisco, and San Jose, and through them, to associated counties and adjacent cities.\textsuperscript{36} That same year, President Bush issued a series of Homeland Security presidential directives that overhauled pre-September 11 national preparedness. Although the new system retained the goal of preparing the country for all-hazards—both natural and man-made—the new system strongly emphasized enhancing local antiterrorism capabilities.\textsuperscript{37}

In FY 2006, UASI funding was consolidated into a singular Bay Area urban area, known as the Bay Area Urban Areas Security Initiative (BAUASI).\textsuperscript{38} The organization is directed by an Approval Authority consisting of eleven members who determine policy. The members include one representative each from San Francisco, Oakland and San Jose, and one each from the counties of


In FY 2004, DHS expanded the eligible urban areas to 50, including the San Francisco metropolitan area defined as the City and County of San Francisco; Counties of Alameda, Marin, Contra Costa, Santa Clara, San Mateo; and the Golden Gate Bridge District. The cities of Oakland and San Jose received funding separately; See Office for Domestic Preparedness, Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year 2004 Urban Areas Security Initiative Grant Program, Program Guidelines and Application Kit, accessed January 4, 2018, https://ojp.gov/docs/fy04uasi.pdf, 9-13.

In FY 2005, funding was distributed to: the Oakland urban area, including the City of Oakland; Alameda County; the Port/Airport, Berkeley, San Leandro, Alameda, Emeryville and Piedmont, and a “secondary area” defined as the entire counties of Alameda and Contra Costa; the San Francisco urban area, defined as the City and County of San Francisco; Counties of Marin, San Mateo; and the Golden Gate Bridge District; and the San Jose urban area, defined as: City of San Jose; County of Santa Clara; Counties of Monterey, San Benito, Santa Cruz, Cities of Campbell, Cupertino, Gilroy, Los Altos, Los Altos Hills, Milpitas, Monte Sereno, Morgan Hill, Mountain View, Palo Alto, Santa Clara, Saratoga, Sunnyvale, and town of Los Gatos. See Office of State and Local Government and Preparedness Office for Domestic Preparedness, Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program, Program Guidelines and Application Kit, accessed January 4, 2018, https://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/hsgp/fy05_hsgp_guidance.pdf, 8-12.


San Francisco, Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Monterey, San Mateo, Santa Clara and Sonoma. The ACSO Undersheriff represents Alameda County. The approval authority also has its own staff which serves as the liaison between the City and County of San Francisco (the Bay Area UASI fiscal agent), the Department of Homeland Security, the State of California, and local government grant sub-recipients. Together, the authority makes sub-grants of UASI funding to counties, cities and other entities within its jurisdiction.

The year following the BAUASI consolidation, Congress provided explicit instructions for the administration of grant funding and the management of UASI approval authorities. The types of terrorism-related UASI funding investments local jurisdictions are to pursue include:

- developing and enhancing homeland security, emergency management, or other relevant plans, assessments, or mutual aid agreements;
- designing, conducting, and evaluating training and exercises, including training and exercises;
- protecting a system or asset included on the prioritized critical infrastructure list;
- purchasing, upgrading, storing, or maintaining equipment, including hardware and software;
- ensuring operability and achieving interoperability of emergency communications.

Each year, a percentage of the DHS funding awarded to BAUASI is retained by the State of California. In fiscal year 2017, the BAUASI authority received $22.4 million from DHS after the state share. The Management Team also allocates money for its operations. In 2017, the BAUASI Management Team spent $3.31 million supporting its own operations.

BAUASI regulations require UASI grant funds to “[h]ave a high threat, high density urban area terrorism focus” or “a clear nexus to terrorism.” However, funding is also available for activities that prepare communities for either terrorism or other emergencies such as fires and earthquakes. Many capabilities which support terrorism preparedness simultaneously support preparedness for other hazards, including natural disasters and other major incidents. UASI funds may be used for other preparedness activities as long as the dual use quality and nexus to terrorism is clearly demonstrated. Grantees must demonstrate the “dual-use quality” for any activities implemented that are not explicitly focused solely on terrorism preparedness.

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40 “About the Bay Area UASI.”


BAUASI is taking advantage of this exception for the 2018 mass care and shelter exercise as a part of Yellow Command. Their 2018 project proposal detailed the dual need for shelter in the case of a terrorist scenario that would also apply in natural disasters:

“With oversight by the UASI’s Emergency Management Work Group’s Care and Shelter Subcommittee, the Regional Care and Shelter Capability Building program will provide training and tools for all UASI jurisdictions to enhance their capabilities to conduct care and sheltering operations….terrorist attacks and various natural hazards could result in the need to feed and/ or shelter large populations for a sustained period of time.”

The project manager for the 2018 Yellow Command appears to be an official of the City of San Francisco and the event costs $150,000. The BPD could but has chosen not to participate in this exercise.

Congress also provided that 25% of the total Homeland Security Grant Program expenditures must specifically be “used for law enforcement terrorism prevention activities.” That means that in 2017, approximately $46 million in federal dollars would have been allocated to law enforcement terrorism prevention activities in California. Funding for prevention activities appears to be fungible: the State of California could meet the 25% requirement at the state level alone or through a combination of state expenditures and UASI metropolitan areas expenditures.

Reforms to the grant program following Hurricane Katrina specifically emphasized risk and capabilities, making grants contingent upon local jurisdictions evaluating risks to their communities and also considering the quality of their existing disaster response capabilities. Congress expected that this evaluation would inform which capabilities should be targeted for federal funding.

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49 DHS Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) Fiscal Year 2017, p. 36.


52 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, 121 STAT. 283, emphasis added.
In 2011, President Barack Obama issued a presidential directive emphasizing the need to address the greatest risks to the country while recognizing that distinct risks facing each jurisdiction. In 2012, the DHS developed the Threats and Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment (“THIRA”) to assist in identifying community-specific threats and hazards, setting capability targets and estimating resources. Annual THIRAs are required and are, in theory, utilized by the BAUASI in determining how to invest UASI grant funding. The THIRA is one of the most important documents informing how the BAUASI decides to invest its money, however, the document is marked “FOUO,” or For Official Use Only.

The results of the annual THIRA process inform the Bay Area Homeland Security Goal, which in FY 18 included: (1) planning and risk management, (2) information analysis and infrastructure protection, communications, (3) chemical, biologic, radiologic, nuclear and explosive (“CBRNE”), (4) medical and public health, (5) emergency planning and community preparedness, and (6) recovery.

The BAUASI maintains five “Working Groups” around these goals, open to all BAUASI jurisdictions. However, projects are ultimately selected through two additional BAUASI groups: sub-regional groups (Hub Groups) and the Regional Proposal Work Group. For example, when the City of Berkeley proposed acquiring an armored van with UASI funding, the proposal was routed and prioritized through the Easy Bay Hub. The Regional Proposal Work Group considers proposals that support the capabilities of all three hubs. The BAUASI also solicits projects from agencies affiliated with the BAUASI core cities of San Francisco, Oakland and San Jose. The Approval Authority ultimately votes to approve projects prioritized by these groups.

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58 Id., 10-11.
In FY 2017, total Bay Area UASI funding was allocated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 17 UASI Allocations (¹)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Hub</td>
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<td>North Hub</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Hub</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Hub</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
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<tr>
<td>Core City (San Francisco, San Jose and Oakland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Retention</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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**Urban Shield and BAUASI Regional Training and Exercise Program**

Sheriff Ahern and the Alameda County Board of Supervisors formed the Urban Shield tactical competition from the High Sierra SWAT Team Challenge when Bay Area-wide funding was established in 2006. However, Urban Shield has grown beyond its original design as a tactical exercise. In 2011, when BAUASI sought to delegate all regional training and exercises for the entire Bay Area to an outside agency, the ACSO was the only agency to respond. Under a 2011 MOU between BAUASI and the ACSO, the Urban Shield SWAT exercise was folded into a formal BAUASI Regional Training and Exercise Program (RTEP) “including but not limited to; law enforcement/tactical, fire/emergency medical services, emergency management and public health.”⁶¹ On July 12, 2011, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors gave the ACSO permission to enter into the MOU and accept additional funding.⁶² Thus, after 2011, Urban Shield expanded beyond a SWAT exercise, and the ACSO was empowered to assist in managing millions of dollars in additional BAUASI training and exercise programs apart from Urban Shield.

The Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan (MYTEP) is the long-range planning process through which representatives and key BAUASI stakeholders, primarily the Training and Exercise Workgroup (TEW), outline the needs of the region and a plan for achieving them. The plan is informed by the THIRA, the Bay Area Homeland Security Goals and Objectives, the BAUASI Risk and Gap Analysis and Urban Shield After-Action Reports.

⁶¹ See also BAUASI Project Proposal Guidance for Fiscal Year 2018, 8; and, Bay Area Urban Areas Security Initiative, Bay Area UASI Regional Training & Exercise Program, accessed January 8, 2018, https://www.BAUASItep.org/?p=home.

While the MYTEP includes a preliminary list of course offerings, BAUASI members can submit course proposals as priorities change.63

Alameda County Board of Supervisors Role in Urban Shield

The Alameda County Board of Supervisors is responsible for authorizing the MOUs between BAUASI and the County of Alameda for Urban Shield, the Regional Training and Exercise Program, and agreements with contractors who conduct the event.64 The Alameda County Board of Supervisors has authorized the ACSO to accept sponsorship donations from individuals and corporations and collect fees from exhibiting vendors.65

In response to growing public criticism of Urban Shield, the Board of Supervisors in 2017 set conditional “principles and guidelines.”66 Separately, Supervisor Keith Carson secured another condition: the establishment of an Urban Shield Task Force (USTF) consisting of government officials, non-governmental organizations, activists and other community members. Its primary tasks were to investigate five key questions. After meeting seven times in 2017, the Task Force released a report on February 21, 2018 finding that:67

- Urban Shield meets the requirements of UASI,
- Urban Shield is essentially an emergency preparedness program, with room for improvement in implementing the FEMA’s ‘Whole Community’ approach to emergency management.68
- No other [non UASI] significant sources of funding appear to be available for regional large-scale preparedness trainings and full-scale exercises.
- It is unclear “1) how the assessment of the risk relevance, level of capability, and gap level is determined, and 2) how the Regional Threat Hazard Identifications and Risk Assessment (THIRA) is applied when selecting and drafting exercise scenarios, prioritizing capability

64 Agenda - Board of Supervisors’ Meeting, January 10, 2017, 10. See also Agenda - Board of Supervisors’ Meeting, July 12, 2011.
68 Id. 6-7. FEMA’s Whole Community approach values the participation of the entire community in preparedness efforts. The USTF conceded that the event is still largely dominated by law enforcement activities.
targets and gaps, and selecting capabilities to be tested and gaps to be addressed each year and over multiple years.\textsuperscript{69,70}

It could not make a recommendation regarding the impact of Urban Shield on community relationships “given that the Urban Shield Task Force does not represent vulnerable communities or those most impacted by” Urban Shield.\textsuperscript{70}

The Board of Supervisors adopted the task force's recommendations on February 27, 2018,\textsuperscript{71} with the proviso that the ACSO be required to report annually on its adherence to the conditional principles and guidelines established by the Board of Supervisors.\textsuperscript{72}

On March 27, 2018 the board considered the Sheriff's request for accepting FY 2018 UASI funds.\textsuperscript{73}

During that meeting, the Sheriff revealed that approximately $1 million is spent on administrative costs to manage Urban Shield and other BAUASI programing, $1.5 million is spent on operating Urban Shield and the remaining $3 million is spent on other BAUASI Regional Training and Exercise Program offerings.

Among the concerns raised during this discussion were:

- That since Urban Shield was inaugurated in 2007, politics and social conditions have significantly changed. Supervisor Chan pointed to the economic crisis, increased political polarization, increased officer-involved shootings and a breakdown in trust between the community and police. Supervisor Chan suggested that Urban Shield is now largely seen in a negative light and that “regardless of what we do, the Urban Shield exercise itself is viewed as a show of force, which in this atmosphere…is probably not the most appropriate way … to protect the community.” She proposed that the Board suspend Urban Shield and send out a request for proposals for the entire $5.5 million in UASI RTEP funding for the benefit of the BAUSI region, however, there was no agreement on this proposal by the Board.

- Support for future events should be contingent upon implementing major changes; the Sheriff agreed that the Board and the community would be more involved in designing the event in the future. Supervisor Valle also expressed his intention to remove the negative aspects of Urban Shield while keeping the positive aspects. Supervisor Haggerty expressed concern about the existence of racist undertones at past events. The Sheriff agreed to assign a sensitivity officer to monitor for objectionable content in 2018. He also promised to mitigate concerns about the Vendor Show in 2018 by “isolating” military vendors from the general public and other vendors.
Finally, Supervisor Carson made a motion to accept Urban Shield funding for 2018, but to end funding for Urban Shield after 2018 as it is currently constituted. The motion also called for the creation of an ad-hoc committee comprising of Board Member appointees to work with the ACSO to determine what to fund in 2019. The motion passed with a 4-1 vote.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Summary Action Minutes of Regular Meeting}, March 27, 2018, 15.
Training and Exercises for Berkeley’s First Responders

BPD SRT’s Training, Exercise and Tactics

In the tactical SWAT scenarios at Urban Shield, the City of Berkeley is represented by BPD’s SRT. Berkeley’s SRT team is analogous to a SWAT team. Berkeley’s Subcommittee met on January 18, 2018 to learn more about the activities, training outside of Urban Shield and equipment of the Berkeley SRT team. BPD leaders explained that additional medical, tactical and negotiation training is the key factor that distinguishes SRT members from BPD patrol officers.

Unlike in larger cities, the Berkeley SRT is a part-time team staffed by elite officers from the regular police force who train regularly for SRT operations and respond as a unit when called upon, rather than as a dedicated full-time team. SRT members are on-call 365 days a year and respond when BPD leadership deems that a situation is special, unique or unusual. Examples of SRT missions include those involving barricaded subjects, hostage rescue, high-risk arrest/search warrant, high-risk area search, dignitary protection, crowd control and less lethal weapons support. The Captain stressed that in addition to their part-time duties, SRT members work in various assignments throughout the department and their specialized training and experience often enhances routine (non-SRT) BPD responses.

From 2013-2017, SRT was deployed 61 times from 2013-2017. The Police Chief reported that in the nearly ten years of BPD participation in Urban Shield from 2007 to 2016, the SRT team was formally involved in over 75 full or partial deployments. The Chief broadly categorized the types of formal SRT missions conducted over that time period:

- 28 high-risk search and/or arrest warrant services operations, in support of homicide, robbery, weapons investigations, et al.
- 22 dignitary protection missions, either as primary or support.
- 14 Patrol Support operations, including barricades, block searches, and similar assistance incidents.
- 14 + Crowd management support operations, including the violent clashes in March and April 2017.

In that period, the Chief reported no shootings or serious injuries to suspects, team members, or community members in tactical operations conducted by SRT. Furthermore, the Chief stated that “in its 40 years of existence, Berkeley’s tactical team operations have resulted in shootings in only two cases: The Henry’s hostage rescue in Sept. 1990, and the Cramer’s Robbery case, in 2002.”

SRT members complete mandatory 80 hours of basic S.W.A.T. required by the state. SRT members also receive 16 hours of training per month as recommended by National Tactical Officers

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75 Examples of deployments during unusual occurrences include the SRT response to 2017 protests in Civic Center Park and University of California campus and dignitary protection for the Dalai Lama and Congresswoman Barbara Lee.

76 SRT training is designed to prepare the team for the following operations: (1) patrol response, e.g., on-duty SRT members are called to a developing situation like a robbery suspect who is within a particular city block; (2) emergency callouts, e.g., where on- and off-duty SRT team are called to a situation; and 3) planned operations: e.g., if a detective wants to arrest a suspect wanted for murder, the SRT will methodically plan for the operation leading to the arrest.

77 Revised Agenda Material, MOU Compendium Item, Berkeley Police Department, 9.

78 Id.
Association, with content from the California Police Officer State Training (POST) standards. Monthly training includes tactical theory, negotiations, physical skills training, fitness, and specialized medical training.

The team currently has 24 members. They train together quarterly and also participate in regional training with the California Association of Hostage Negotiators. The SRT Communications Commander and team leader for hostage negotiations reports that the negotiations team is a central component of the SRT’s de-escalation strategy. According to the Commander, their focus is on peaceful resolution and consulting with tactical operators to minimize injuries. The department’s de-escalation training plan and course was created by SRT members in response to community desires and because the California POST standards manual lacked sufficient de-escalation emphasis. The plan has been certified by POST and sought after by as many as seven other departments. The training emphasizes verbal de-escalation, use of BPD crisis intervention team, negotiators, mobile crisis teams, suicide by cop awareness, use of less lethal options and use of sound tactics.

The Sergeant also noted that the SRT team is integral to providing active shooter training in the Berkeley community, including at Berkeley High, Berkeley Adult School, Jewish Community Center and at Zaytuna College. They have also provided survival training for the YMCA, BUSD, City of Berkeley Staff and businesses.

**BPD Participation in Urban Shield**

Training in preparation for the Urban Shield exercise includes at least two eight-hour days before the event. During the month of Urban Shield, training in anticipation for the event and the time spent at the event fulfills the 16-hour BPD training requirement for the team. BPD reported that overtime hours for monthly training in August 2017, the month before Urban Shield, was 132.5 hours and for October 2017, the month after Urban Shield, was 109.5 hours. These hours fluctuate from month to month due to vacations, other trainings, schedule conflicts and other factors.

Overtime cost to attend Urban Shield is not a fixed because scheduling is dependent on staffing numbers and the participants’ shifts. Participants typically flex their normal schedule to cover at least half of the event each year. For BPD’s participation in the 2017 Urban Shield event, members accrued a total of 110 hours of overtime.

The Chief believes Urban Shield to be irreplaceable because it allows BPD to apply and test their tactics in high stress scenarios and assess their tactical performance through a peer evaluation process. He suggested that during the “high-risk/low-frequency incidents,” such as bombings, mass shootings, etc., police officers’ responses are determined by their training and experience. He elaborated that there is a critical balance between training and experience, and while the BPD receives training for these events, the experience component is lacking because Berkeley has not recently been subjected to these types of emergencies.

Multiple officers sought to highlight that Urban Shield helps establish departmental leaders. SRT team members with Urban Shield experience often become trainers and formal and informal leaders within BPD. The Captain of the operations division indicated that the department’s workplace active

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79 To include slowing situations down, keeping distance, using cover, using a single voice, staging medical staff and working as a team.
shooter, school active shooter, and de-escalation trainings and programs were directly inspired by department personnel who identified unmet needs and training goals from their participation in Urban Shield. The Captain said that she has served in every SRT tactical leadership position and claimed that this would not have been possible without Urban Shield. While she conceded that these trainings may have come about regardless of Berkeley’s participation in Urban Shield, she and other officers reiterated that they would not exist with the same thoroughness and quality.

BPD also indicated it was not capable of conducting a full-scale exercise locally because of limited resources and because the county is the appropriate facilitator of county-wide and regional emergency response. Moreover, the department noted that Urban Shield positively challenges the way BPD operates and facilitates departmental growth due to the performance assessment provided by Urban Shield scenario evaluators. For example, the BPD indicated that the Zaytuna exercises were informed by Urban Shield.80

The Subcommittee also received a written statement from an SRT medical team member who attended Urban Shield seven times and recalled multiple incidents where lives were saved due to the techniques learned, stress inoculation received and the networking opportunities with other tactical medical officers. Other comments included:

- Officers look to those who are trained at Urban Shield to determine the best course of action. When it comes to providing medical attention the difference between the performance of Urban Shield participants and non-participants is palpable.
- The inoculation received through Urban Shield (and through non-Urban Shield trainings) helped officers successfully deescalate situations.
- Participants are able to pass lessons learned at Urban Shield along to the newest officers.
- The non-stop two-day, multi-faceted event at Urban Shield helps participants evaluate the bigger picture of an uncertain and stressful emergency situation with a plan.
- Scenarios are based upon real events from across the country and the world, and in some cases provided realistic opportunities to train for incidents that are highly relevant to Berkeley. For example, a participant argued that a 2017 scenario featuring a vehicle rampage at a festival was directly relevant to major Berkeley community events such as the Solano Avenue Stroll.

Training and Exercises for the Berkeley Fire Department and Office of Emergency Services

According to the Fire Chief, the Berkeley Fire Department has only sent two teams to the Urban Shield fire scenarios. The intent of participating was to test the teams’ hazardous materials and water rescue capabilities. Berkeley firefighters have also participated in Urban Shield in an off-duty capacity as medics in active shooter scenarios.

Members of the Berkeley Office of Emergency Services (“OES”) staff have attended Urban Shield each year since Yellow Command started in 2014. In addition, they have served as evaluators and controllers for Urban Shield partner EOCs and otherwise supported the Alameda County EOC during the event.

80 Id.
More generally, the Fire Department follows the City’s Training and Exercise Plan for emergency management and participates in internally-funded training and exercises, through collaboration with neighboring agencies and from UASI grant funding unrelated to Urban Shield. The plan outlines the requirements for City staff to be trained and exercised in the emergency response structure, EOC operations, care and shelter operations, disaster cost recovery and how to respond and work in the Multi-Agency Coordination System should the need arise.

The Fire Hazmat team gets its training and exercises almost exclusively from UASI grant funding unrelated to Urban Shield. Additional training and exercise for all firefighters in Hazardous Materials Awareness is conducted internally. Similarly, the BFD Water Rescue team is largely trained and funded by the City with some training opportunities conducted as joint exercises with neighboring agencies.

The Chief reported that in 2015 BOES staff put on a city-wide BART drill, EOC Setup Drill, MRA Drill, and in 2016, an Incident Command Center-EOC Interface Exercise and EOC Operations Support Exercise. No city-wide exercises were held in 2017, and none are planned for 2018.

BOES has also coordinated and assisted in full scale UASI shelter exercises for aging and recreation staff in at least four Berkeley locations. Since 2014, BOES has coordinated and assisted with shelter training in:

- Shelter Forms and Serving People with Disabilities (2014)
- American Red Cross Shelter Training (2016)
- Shelter Workshops (2017)
- Shelter Forms and Procedures (Planned) (2018)

In addition, the BOES participates in an annual Statewide Public Health Exercise with Berkeley Public Health preparedness staff, coordinated by Alameda County. Although BFD does not have formal tactical medic team, the department stated that it has trained in BPD active shooter exercises on at least two occasions.

By the end of 2018, the Chief expects that the BOES will have completed all of the City-sponsored trainings outlined in the SEMS and National Incident Management System (NIMS) Compliance Schedule. Going forward, designated staff will still need to complete position-specific courses through UASI (free) or other trainings (at a cost). Starting in 2019, BOES plans to offer baseline training to newly assigned staff to account for attrition.

Overall, the Fire Chief noted that the City has had more success implementing the training part of the training plan than the exercise part, mostly due to the intensive resource pull on staff to design and coordinate exercises.

**Benefits to the Fire Department and BOES from Participating in Urban Shield**

The Chief of BFD reports that only the Fire Hazmat and Waster Rescue have participated in Urban Shield. The Assistant Fire Chief noted that while Urban Shield’s scenarios are not the only opportunity BFD has to test their department’s capabilities, they are potentially useful because funding for conducting certain exercises is scarce. According to the Chief, the emphasis of the
county before Yellow Command was on disaster planning and not on exercises. Only a few regional and state-wide exercises were conducted each year between the Oakland firestorm and 2013. It was not until 2013 that the county fully engaged with the City to establish sufficient communication channels for disasters and began to provide for county-wide exercises to test these capabilities.

The Assistant Chief also shared that he actively participated in the 2017 Urban Shield Orange Command, providing him invaluable emergency preparedness leadership training and connections with county officials.

A representative of the Berkeley Office of Emergency Services (BOES), a subset of BFD, attended the Urban Shield Yellow Command exercise and various UASI planning groups. Exercises focused on care and shelter, interjurisdictional regional and state coordination, and specifically how counties could marshal care and shelter-related resources from the state. The Yellow Command was particularly useful because it identified regional shortfalls just a month before the devastating Tubbs Fire and other wild fires in the North Bay.

Finally, the Chief indicated that the City does not have the resources to design and plan a full-scale table top exercise that includes all of the different levels of government independent of the county. Due to the existing governmental hierarchy and funding sources, he argued that the logical coordinator for these intercounty events will likely continue to be the county and the ACSO.

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81 BAUASI planning groups are not part of Urban Shield. The Fire Department and a representative of BOES highlighted their importance in strengthening existing public safety-related relationships to Alameda County Working groups include emergency management, public information, specialized training, mass care and shelter, joint information, and medical and public health. BAUASI’s Mass Care and Shelter Working Group, which is funded through the UASI grant, provided a valuable opportunity to collaborate with other jurisdictions in learning best practices and improving preparedness. The BOES representative stated that she served as the Care and Shelter lead with the City of Santa Rosa, which she feels happened because of her participation in Yellow Command.
Subcommittee’s Assessment of Urban Shield

The City of Berkeley, with its density and vibrant university town environment, faces the low probability but high impact threat of a mass shooting, vehicle rampage or other mass violence attacks, whether politically inspired or not. There is no question that our law enforcement officers must train and exercise for the very real threat of mass violence requiring a tactical response.

On the other hand, Urban Shield prioritizes the threat of terrorism above other needs. This federal framework, developed after an unprecedented attack in 2001, was hastily designed to fill a gap in domestic terrorism preparedness. The attack inspired fear that large-scale attacks in American cities could become a new normal. Accordingly, federal policy began to dictate that local law enforcement needed to dramatically shift their preparedness efforts towards counterterrorist operations. All UASI funding for law enforcement and first responder disaster preparedness requires a nexus to terrorism.

According to BPD statistics, the SRT team has focused over the last decade on high-risk search, arrest warrant services, dignitary protection, patrol support and crowd management. Urban Shield largely falls short of appropriately exercising these core competencies because its focus is almost exclusively on terrorism. For each of the past five years of Urban Shield (2012-2017), the Subcommittee found that between 75 and 90 percent of the scenario descriptions listed in the Urban Shield booklets either contain explicit references to terrorism or suggest that the scenarios were directly inspired by historic terrorist events.

The Subcommittee’s concern with the content of the Urban Shield is not that the event contains scenarios featuring politically-motivated mass violence; the problem is the sheer volume and repetition of these scenarios which, as a whole, do not realistically exercise the most common threats to Berkeley and the surrounding East Bay. Through the Urban Shield approach to emergency preparedness, the BPD SRT exercises their tactical counterterrorist skills some 30 times, continuously, over a 48-hour period, each year. For example, in 2017, the team in the course of 48 hours engaged armed protesters, a vehicle rampage, a nightclub shooting, various hostage takings, a terrorist camp, an airplane hijacking, armed encampment, airport terrorist attack, refinery attack, Amtrak attack, hospital attack, a terrorist attack on the Golden Gate Bridge, a bus hijacking, and a BART hostage taking among some ten others. Featuring so many terrorist scenarios back-to-back, in aggregate creates a perception of a state of simulated counterterrorist warfare in the Bay Area.

Urban Shield evolved from a previous FBI exercise competition. The FBI has statutory counterterrorism obligations. Local law enforcement should have a broader focus.

Over-exercising terrorism response can also risk obscuring the important principles of de-escalation that officers employ in their everyday encounters with the community. For this reason and others, terrorism shouldn’t be the sole framework underpinning the few yearly tactical exercises available to SRT teams outside of their normal preparedness efforts.

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82 In the case of war or insurrection, pursuant to the Constitution and federal law, the Congress and President can deploy armed forces and the Governor of California is empowered to deploy the national guard to the Bay Area during grave emergencies. Moreover, in critical situations the Bay Area can expect to receive support from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other federal agencies with all of their attendant resources.
Our country’s founding principles of separation of civilian and military forces have been preserved in the face of war, mass violence and social unrest, and they underlie wariness of not only Urban Shield but SWAT teams in general.\(^{83}\) However, it is important to note that the BPD SRT has demonstrated leadership in eschewing the unduly aggressive military-style tactics of SWAT’s early days. BPD finds that these tactics are often dangerous, unconstitutional and risk the trust of the public. Unfortunately, however, Urban Shield’s nexus to terrorism contravenes and potentially undermines these locally held principles. It also largely fails to appropriately compartmentalize the exercise of routine SRT duties into scenarios unrelated to terrorism.

Although SWAT teams are clearly an important last resort tool in mass violence situations, the nexus to terrorism requirement underlying Urban Shield and the ACSO’s scenario design decisions, have combined to exaggerate the threat of terrorism and needlessly exacerbate public’s preexisting concerns about the SWAT concept.

Urban Shield’s Exercise Plan claims that all scenarios in Urban Shield are based on real-world events. The Subcommittee observed some scenarios where this was the case, such as the Pulse nightclub shooting, and the Event Security scenario, which involved an act of vehicle terrorism. However, in other events, the connection between the real-world scenario and the tactical exercise was unclear. For example, the 2017 terrorist camp scenario, for which ACSO outsourced the design and operation to the private security firm, Execushield, had as its premise a Hezbollah terrorist cell based in South America coming across the United States border and establishing a camp near a reservoir near Livermore, CA. Participating SWAT teams, including BPD, were tasked with assaulting the compound to kill the terrorists and rescue an FBI agent. The scenario featured two combat rubber raiding craft on loan from the U.S. Navy Seals. Active-duty U.S. military personnel and Colombian Marines were also on hand to train the SWAT teams in utilizing the craft and to instruct and judge teams’ assault and rescue performance. The scenario blended the worlds of the military and law enforcement.

According to the Exercise Plan, these scenarios by Execushield (the only double scenario in the 2017 program) were based on the 2008 attacks that occurred in Mumbai, India where a group of terrorists coordinated ten shootings and bombings across a large urban area over the course of four days. Conversely, the Urban Shield version did not feature a coordinated and extended terrorist attack and was not urban in nature. The exercise, which took place at San Antonio Reservoir in

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\(^{83}\) In the Declaration of Independence, American colonists’ objections to stationing and provisioning of British troops, unaccountable to local civilian oversight, in homes and businesses were listed as factors leading to the Revolutionary War: “[h]e has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures…render[ed] the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power…[and]… quarter[ed] large bodies of armed troops among us.” See Continental Congress, “The Unanimous Declaration of the thirteen United States of America,” *A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774 – 1875*, Journals of the Continental Congress, Volume 5, accessed May 1, 2018, [https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=lljc&fileName=005/lljc005.db&recNum=96, 512. The 1789 Constitution gave Congress the ultimate power to declare war. Yet, many Americans were still not satisfied that they would be sufficiently protected from undue uses of military or police force. Congress passed and the States ratified the Bill of Rights “to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its [the government’s] powers.” Among those amendments were the Third Amendment, preventing unauthorized quartering of troops in homes;\(^{83}\) the Fourth Amendment, specifying generally the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures”; and the Fifth Amendment, specifying that “No person shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” See Congress of the United States, *The U.S. Bill of Rights*, December 15, 1791, National Archives, accessed May 1, 2018, [https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights-transcript.](https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights-transcript)
Livermore—very different from Mumbai, the largest city in India—featured a remote reservoir and a wooded cabin and Hezbollah terrorists. Ideally, tactical scenarios should not only reasonably resemble the scenario they are supposedly based upon but they should also be designed with the Berkeley specifics and vulnerabilities in mind.

The fact that a terrorist attack of some type has occurred anywhere in the world (most of the scenarios are based on foreign events) does not by itself justify preparing for a similar situation in the Bay Area. For example, an al-Qaeda terrorist takeover of a gas facility in Algeria, a country where the economy is heavily reliant on natural gas, does not mean that it is appropriate or prudent to prepare for a similar situation at the refinery in Richmond. To achieve better alignment between scenario design and the context of our regional needs, the scenario design process could include consultation with experts in criminology, terrorism, disaster management, and other related fields. Unfortunately, the current design process does not leave room for this kind of input.

The Subcommittee finds that mass violence tactical preparedness exercises should be included as part a broader, balanced and more holistic conception of threats to the Berkeley community and the first responders. For example, high-risk warrants and dignitary protection operations should be exercised for their own sake, not solely within the framework of terrorism.

The terrorism-centric framework of UASI funding can be traced back to the priorities of Congress and multiple presidential administrations. Yet, these laws and policies have been amended since 9/11 to provide for relatively less stringent usage requirements. Despite new policies that provide for dual-uses, the BAUASI and ACSO continue to prioritize projects with an overwhelming nexus to terrorism.

At the January 11, 2018 BAUASI Approval Authority Meeting to consider and approve the FY18 Allocation of UASI funding to the ACSO, including for Urban Shield, the ACSO delivered brief presentations regarding why their organization deserved funding. Concrete details about how the funding would be spent to enhance public safety were sparse. By contrast, later in the meeting, scores of public safety officials from Solano County, many of whom were recently involved in fighting the epic 2017 Northern California Firestorm, made a passionate and detailed plea for relatively minor UASI funding to purchase a P25 trunked radio system to facilitate critical emergency communication and collaboration between Solano County and adjacent counties within the BAUASI footprint. The death and destruction resulting from the fires has been front and center in the minds of Northern Californians. Despite the obvious public benefits resulting from such an allocation, the chair of the Approval Authority dismissed Solano County’s request, explaining that the ACSO was unwilling to give up a part of its sizeable share of UASI’s regional funding allocation. The board voted to remand the radio project to the hub working group where it will likely be tied up for at least another fire season.\(^4\)

BPD and BFD both reported to the Subcommittee that while the majority of Urban Shield exercises are nominally about terrorism, the counterterrorism skills exercised carry over to the non-terrorism competencies implemented in their day-to-day public safety duties. The ACSO could remedy this problem by designing scenarios that realistically capture the overwhelmingly non-terrorism related

day-to-day duties of SRT and fire fighters while simultaneously stating that they are also useful in a terrorism situation. This kind of arrangement is clearly provided under the dual-use provision of federal law and UASI regulations and is utilized heavily by San Francisco. Nevertheless, the ACSO continues to overwhelmingly design their scenarios around international and domestic terrorism.

Greater use of the dual-threat provision could lead to a larger flow of resources towards preparing for natural disasters such as floods, wild fire, and earthquakes, the kinds of hazards that Alameda County’s Emergency Operations Plan identifies as most serious. As demonstrated in the table below, earthquakes, flood and wildfire are all given a disaster rating of 50. Notably, Terrorism is deemed unlikely and a received a disaster rating of 5, the second lowest score given.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disaster/Threat</th>
<th>Probability of Occurrence</th>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Disaster Rating (Probability x Effect)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Likely 10</td>
<td>Possible 5</td>
<td>Unlikely 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture Infestation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Incident</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Disturbance</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dam Failure</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drought</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Emergence</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epidemic/Infectious Disease</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood/Storm</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazardous Materials</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landslide/Mudslide</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquefaction</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floods and High Wind</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train Derailment</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsunami and Seiche</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildland Fire</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: URS analysis, 2011.

Similarly, the 2017 Bay Area Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) also identifies earthquakes, floods, and wildfires as “primary concerns” despite their non-terrorism-related status. In each of their core capability assessments, the report details the magnitude of the response necessary to address the large-scale disasters that it designates as “primary concerns.” Urban Shield as it is currently constituted prioritizes a tactical and weapons focused model that ignores the importance of training under high-stakes, high-stress situations in non-tactical capacities. According to the THIRA report, after an earthquake, “approximately 2.2 million people will require feeding and other commodities” but “existing stockpiles of critical commodities are limited.” It goes on to explain in the “Housing” section of its core capabilities that the “displaced population”

87 Bay Area UASI, 2017 Bay Area Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, 60.
from an earthquake will be approximately “2.9 million” people, all of whom will require interim housing in the Bay Area, which clearly lacks both the infrastructure and space to accommodate that number of people. The massive scale of a threat like this requires trained responses in terms of coordination but also in terms of the on-the-ground nature of handling of numerous refugees. Urban Shield’s tactical exercises do not exercise the type of crisis management skills necessary to meet fulfill the THIRA goals.

Specifically, the Hayward Fault located along the East Bay is among the most active and dangerous in the United States because it runs along a densely urbanized region with a population of over 7 million. Preparing for a hypothetical high magnitude earthquake, and the destruction that accompanies it must be a top disaster preparedness priority for the Berkeley Community. Unlike terrorism, science advises that a major earthquake is almost certain to occur in the near future.

The United States Geological Survey’s 2018 “Haywired Fault Scenario” modeled the risk to the Bay Area during an event on the Hayward fault. It found that East Bay residents could experience loss of up to six weeks or more of water service from pipe damages incurred from a high magnitude earthquake, as well as catastrophic damages from potential landslides in the Berkeley hills. Estimates of area casualties resulting from a high magnitude earthquake are 800 deaths and 18,000 nonfatal injuries, along with a total of 24,500 individuals that would need rescuing from collapsed buildings and stalled elevators. Infrastructure damage to roads and highways, and the threat of aftershocks, would be a huge obstacle in bringing aide to affected communities. First responder agencies, like the BPD and BFD, need to be adequately trained and exercised to respond both locally and regionally during an earthquake event. Unfortunately, the UASI funded Urban Shield event adopts an almost exclusively terrorism-centric approach to emergency preparedness that underappreciates the critical need to coordinate and respond effectively to earthquakes.

Similarly, natural disasters resulting from climate change pose real threats to Berkeley. Record-breaking temperatures across the Bay Area will likely continue. We know that increased temperatures and drought coincide with increased fire danger, and the potential threat to homes and human life. The 2017 Tubbs Fire in Sonoma County became unmanageable due to growth of combustible grasses, shrubs, and trees followed by a period of extremely intense dry, heat. Major storms and rising sea levels are also cause for concern. Rising sea levels threaten to flood the coastline in the next few decades, displacing individuals from their homes. Flooding also may intensify since larger storms often result from warmer temperatures. Urban Shield fails to consider these emerging threats.

Privatization of Public Safety at Urban Shield

Berkeley, and other cities, utilize local public safety funds to pay their first responders to attend Urban Shield. ACSO uses county funds and federal funds to operate the event.

From the perspective of defense companies, the vendor show represents a unique opportunity to market to customers. The Subcommittee could not find an official written justification for the

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vendor show but learned from ACSO officials that it provides a venue through which police can learn about new technologies and build relationships with vendors. While procuring the right technology and equipment is an important facet of first responder preparedness, there is also a strong public interest in not muddying the ostensible purpose of Urban Shield—first responder exercises—with promoting sales. SRT participants, who are public servants, are required to check-in at [the] vendor booths of companies who paid $8,000 to become “Diamond Executive Sponsors.” Urban Shield provides vendors a marketing platform from which to market their weapons, surveillance technology and other products. This was an ACSO innovation.

The Vendor Show is indirectly funded by the government through the participation of salaried public servants. It is this participation, and the broader event funded through substantial public federal funds, which makes the Urban Shield so valuable to sponsoring companies. Implementing a tactical exercise competition with a strong relationship to for-profit industry raises serious ethical concerns.

Of equal concern is Urban Shield’s placement of vendor technology in tactical scenarios for use and testing by public servants and in some cases outsourcing of scenarios to private companies who have a clear interest in turning trainees into customers such as Execushield.

The technology feature page on the 2017 Urban Shield website stated in no uncertain terms how vendor technology fits into scenarios: “Urban Shield will allow companies to place their products and technology directly into the hands of SWAT, Fire, EOD, and EMS professionals.” Triple Diamond Sponsorship ($15,000) and Diamond Sponsorship ($7,750) entitles the vendor to a “[p]roduct demonstration at a designated tactical scenario,” meaning SWAT teams and Fire teams will be exposed to the vendor technology in the scenarios. The ACSO even suggests that scenarios are in part tailored around vendor technology: “to ensure your product is being utilized to its full potential, it is highly recommended you commit your product early during the scenario development process.”

At Urban Shield, exercises are not just designed for preparing first responders in counterterrorism operations, but also for providing for-profit companies with “networking opportunities” and a “Beta test environment for vendor products.” The website cautions: “Vendors are STRONGLY encouraged to be at the scenarios their product is involved in to ensure the correct presentation of the product and its use” because following each scenario “teams are questioned concerning the benefits and drawbacks of each piece of technology used in that scenario. This is invaluable real-time feedback for vendor’s products.”

Subcommittee observers witnessed many vendors attending scenarios. Vendor-sponsors are entitled by virtue of their sponsorship to VIP observation passes for the scenarios. Their level of access even surpassed Berkeley City government observers; in one instance, Subcommittee observers were prohibited by the ACSO from observing a scenario briefing involving vendor technology, while vendors were not.

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90 “Sponsor levels.”

Large banner ads of vendors such as Axon, the maker of the Taser, and countless others adorn the Urban Shield website throughout the year, and during the event banners hang across the Alameda County fairgrounds, at the official event hotel, and appear in brochures and in some cases at the scenario sites. The ACSO rules also provides for the commodification of teams. For example, a military defense contractor, such as BAE Systems, could have sponsored a team such as the BPD’s and placed its logos on the vans used by BPD to travel from scenario to scenario. The Subcommittee was not able to confirm whether vendors have taken advantage of the team sponsorship opportunity.

The stated purpose of Urban Shield is to prepare for terrorism and disasters generally. The Berkeley community pays taxes to support their fire and police departments with the expectation that they will be well-trained and prepared to perform a variety of public safety functions in the event of an emergency. Urban Shield modifies this contract so that public servants also serve private companies for a weekend and raises questions about whether the ACSO has a conflict of interest.

In addition, the Sheriff has accepted campaign donations from many of the vendors that he hosts at the vendor show and whose technology or services are featured in scenarios. This situation creates a perception that the Sheriff’s priorities are not entirely focused on public safety.

 Supervisor Carson, in establishing the USTF, called upon its members to consider whether “Urban Shield [is] strictly an emergency preparedness program.” This Subcommittee is less certain given the way that the ACSO accommodates the interests of vendors. The privatized aspects of the design and operation of the event are inherently flawed.

Exacerbating this problem is the fact that ACSO and BAUASI have not been transparent about how UASI and county funds are being spent at Urban Shield. For example, the critical question of whether federal or county funds are directly subsidizing the Vendor Show, and how the ACSO is spending the funds collected from sponsorships, has not been officially answered. Nonetheless, the disclosure of the ACSO’s special vendor donation fund that was authorized by the Board of Supervisors in 2007 inspired a member of the public to make a California Public Records Act request regarding the fund’s expenses and revenues. In March of 2018, the request revealed documents showing that the ACSO used the fund for activities not related to emergency preparedness.

For example, the fund financed airfare for two undisclosed individuals to Israel in 2008, and approximately $75,000 towards expenses related to ACSO staff travel in 2010 to Israel and Jordan. The latter visit included a costly presentation to the King of Jordan. Public documents showed that the fund financed: “at least two parking citations in Oakland… paid $9,000 to paint humves … spent $112,723 on customized Urban Shield coins… [and] paid the $500 deductible for a car hit during Urban Shield.” Among the donors to the fund are military defense contractor BAE

92 “Sponsor levels.”
95 Id.
Systems, arms manufacturer Sig Sauer, Taser, Adamson Police Products, the Blackwater Training Center, Corizon (the prison service provider for Alameda County jails), and Bob Barker “America’s Leading Detention Supplier”. Berkeley’s Investment Policy prohibits investment in arms manufacturing and private prisons⁹⁶. Paying city staff to test these products and provide a platform for their promotion violates both of these principles. Fortune 500 retailers such as Walmart and Target, and tech giant Facebook, also donated.

Urban Shield extends beyond the Bay Area. In 2011, the Board of Supervisors authorized the Sheriff to enter into an agreement with A. Baker of the Cytel Group for the, “development of individual disaster training exercises and/or programs similar to Alameda County’s ‘Urban Shield.’” Subsequently, Cytel Group created Urban Shield exercises in Boston and Austin Texas, both of which lasted for just one year. Staff contacted Austin, a city with a major university like Berkeley, to learn about their experience with Urban Shield. Austin officials shared that the event was too costly and difficult to manage, and provided little return on investment. Since then, they have spent time dealing with wildfires, floods and hurricanes.

Cytel Group has also expanded components of Urban Shield internationally. The website describes their national and international consulting, “Cytel Group provides high value solutions for local, state and federal government agencies within the United States as well as international governments, particularly within the Middle East.”⁹⁷ Former Alameda County Assistant Sheriff, James Baker, owns the company. According to the agreement with Alameda County, one percent of the gross revenues collected by Cytel Group is paid into the Urban Shield cash fund. This arrangement creates the perception that the Sheriff’s office is leveraging a regional emergency preparedness exercise to enable an enterprise that consults on matters of international security and defense strategy.

⁹⁶ Revision to the Investment Policies and designation of Investment Authority. Item 19, June 27th 2017.
**Lack of Local Input and Oversight**

The fundamental principle of community-oriented policing and emergency response is that local agencies work closely with the community to meet their needs and to conform to their values. Public oversight and dialogue are critical components and local leaders are entrusted to oversee and operate these agencies with the public’s interest in mind. The design and operation of Urban Shield, centralized within the ACSO, violates the principles of community-oriented public service through largely removing departmental leadership on critical matters of local concern.

The Subcommittee was unfortunately unable to determine much in the way of information about how Urban Shield is conceived and operated at the most basic level. The design of the tactical, fire and EOD scenario competition is kept secret as to not give teams a competitive pre-Urban Shield training advantage; BFD and BPD leadership are not invited to consult on or give consent to the scenarios. The ACSO’s purview in day-to-day county-wide law enforcement matters are largely limited to augmenting existing emergency response of cities and coordinating county-city efforts during major disaster. Ultimately, it is the cities themselves that are best situated to understand and prepare for the threats facing their populaces.

For example, the City of Berkeley faces unique public safety challenges related to its dense urban character, proximity to a major university, its proximity to a major seismic fault, wildfire hazards, etc. The Berkeley public holds local public safety officials responsible for training and exercising for challenges unique to Berkeley, not just threats to the various twelve counties in BAUASI.

The Urban Shield event and the ACSO has been the subject of a series of scandals in recent years—episodes that may have been avoided had the public and local jurisdictions been meaningfully involved in the exercise’s design and operation. Earlier Urban Shield scenarios featured play actors with primarily darker skin tones. The event also made national news in 2015 when observers witnessed derogatory t-shirts with “Black Rifles Matter” graphics being sold at the Vendor Show.98 As recent as 2017, despite the Sheriff’s pledge to rid the event of racist stereotyping, a citizen discovered that one of Urban Shield’s contractors, Strategic Operations, had a website adorned with, in words of Supervisor Valle, “derogatory, racist messages in the form of images.”99

At the fair in 2017 the ACSO hosted a fundamentalist militia organization known as the Oath Keepers in the ACSO’s official tent to “explain who they are.”100 Members of the Oath Keepers aggressively conducted heavily armed vigilante patrols in the streets of Ferguson, Missouri during

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the 2014 protests against the wish of local law enforcement.\textsuperscript{101} Ironically, groups such as the Oath Keepers are the very organizations that have taken the public stance that law enforcement agencies, such as the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, are incapable of protecting the public. The Oath Keepers have previously been singled out in a Department of Homeland Security intelligence study on right wing nationalism, for their efforts to recruit active as well as retired law enforcement officers.\textsuperscript{102} Significantly, a sergeant using the Alameda County Sheriff’s Twitter in August 2017, a month prior to the Oath Keepers arrival to the Urban Shield event, retweeted a link of a speech featuring two prominent white supremacists, Richard Spencer and Nathan Damigo.\textsuperscript{103} The Oath Keepers were one of the primary groups at the April 2015 armed protest at the Bureau of Land Management in Medford, Oregon, an event that was used as the basis for the 2017 Urban Shield Scenario 4 “Armed Protestors.”\textsuperscript{104} ACSO invited the Oath Keepers to their community fair while tactical teams simultaneous participated in a scenario designed to address their group’s extremist tactics and tendencies. The subcommittee explicitly requested access to observe this scenario but was told it was off limits. No other extremist or terrorist groups whose actions were used as the basis of tactical scenarios were invited to the community preparedness fair.

That same year, a public records request unveiled that Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the investigative arm of Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE), was found to have surreptitiously competed in Urban Shield. Community members have reasonably questioned why Alameda County, a sanctuary county, would host an ICE SWAT team at a highly controversial law enforcement exercise.\textsuperscript{105} Not coincidentally, ICE, which takes a militaristic approach to enforcement and administration of U.S. immigration laws, was established through the terrorism-focused Homeland Security Act of 2002—one of the key laws underpinning the UASI program. The 2017 event also featured evaluators from Colombia, and observers from Saudi Arabia and the Philippines in contravention of the Sheriff’s pledge to “[e]xclude participation from countries with documented human rights abuses.”\textsuperscript{106}

There are also concerns about the quality of feedback received following scenarios. Although the BPD and BFD participate in Urban Shield using their own tactics and training, teams receive input on their performance from other local, county, city or federal (e.g. the DHS in 2017) law enforcement evaluators. Overall feedback may represent the best possible practices, but departmental leadership is often not in the debriefing room throughout the event to ensure that feedback comports with departmental policy. This situation could potentially lead to departures

\textsuperscript{101} Id.


\textsuperscript{106} See Gregory J. Ahern to the Honorable Board of Supervisors, January 6, 2017.
from, or confusion around, established community-orientated tactical or emergency response policies. At the same time, the Subcommittee found that the debriefing period, often lasting only a few minutes for competition facilitation purposes, does not appear to provide sufficient time for an effective training opportunity.

With regard to the tactical scenarios, it is unclear the extent to which ACSO and BAUASI expand regional collaboration. While this may be true of the tabletop exercises like Yellow Command, the inherently competitive nature of the tactical and fire exercises prohibit meaningful collaboration. The Subcommittee observed no collaboration between SRT teams, except in the case of evaluators from outside agencies giving feedback to SRT teams during the course of the competition.

Recommendations to the Berkeley City Council

Berkeley’s Participation in Urban Shield 2018

Discussion

According to the Alameda Board of Supervisors, the Urban Shield event, “as it is currently constituted,” presumably including the exercise scenarios and vendor show, will be substantially altered in 2019. There is no clear indication as to how the event will be reconstituted.

The Subcommittee finds that positive public safety benefits of Berkeley’s participation in the event’s tactical scenarios for an additional year are relatively small. The BPD SRT has participated in the event for ten years, and according to BPD, the beneficial aspects have been firmly integrated into BPD’s institutional memory. According to BFD leadership, department personnel have seldom attended the fire scenarios in the past, and therefore would likely not send a team to the 2018 event. For these reasons, an additional year of Berkeley participating in the Urban Shield fire and tactical scenarios will likely not have measurable positive effect on the City's preparedness for critical incidents.

On the other hand, the Subcommittee finds that an additional year of Urban Shield tactical and fire exercises, given their design, will likely have a significant negative impact on community-first responder relations, over-exercise counterterrorism competencies, and perpetuate concerns about the role of vendor marketing in public safety and the lack of local input and oversight.

The Subcommittee recommends suspending participation in the vendor show and tactical scenarios as currently constituted in 2018, pending reevaluation of tactical-related offerings from the county in 2019. In addition, the Subcommittee recommends that the public safety interest is served by the participation, at the discretion of BPD and BFD leadership, in the 2018 Yellow Command mass care and shelter and tabletop exercises, the CERT exercises (Green Command), the Orange Command, the Community Preparedness Fair (Gray Command) or public safety seminars.

Recommendations

1.1. Suspend Berkeley’s participation in the vendor show and BPD’s participation in the tactical scenarios in 2018 pending timely reevaluation of the tactical-related offerings
from the county in 2019. The suspension should not extend to the tabletop exercises (Yellow Command), the CERT exercises (Green Command), the Community Preparedness Fair (Gray Command) or to public safety seminars at Urban Shield.

**Beyond Urban Shield 2018**

*Discussion*

On balance, the current Urban Shield exercise and vendor show model is inherently flawed. Nevertheless, the Subcommittee appreciates that BPD and BFD have received significant public safety benefits from the event over the last ten years, including an opportunity to enhance leadership skills, a venue to test tactics and make training adjustments, exposure to realistic critical incidents that could occur in Berkeley, exposure to tactical medical techniques, stress inoculation and tactical police-fire coordination experience. The Subcommittee also appreciates that BFD has received public safety benefits from its participation in Yellow Command from sending teams to the fire scenarios even though it did so infrequently.

Fortunately, Berkeley’s withdrawal from the 2018 Urban Shield does not have to trigger an ‘all or nothing’ tradeoff with respect to public safety. First, the BPD and the BFD already conduct robust training and exercise outside of Urban Shield. 107 Second, the Council has the power to supplement existing local exercises to independently provide access to the positive aspects of Urban Shield. Local emergency exercises will have greater visibility and oversight, preventing the excesses of Urban Shield. They will also create important opportunities for SRT tactics and equipment to reflect our City’s needs. Whereas the scenarios conceived by the ACSO have engendered confusion, fear, and mistrust, local ad hoc exercises have the potential to open a positive dialogue between the departments and the community they serve.

Many of Berkeley’s preparedness challenges are unique to the City and are not always appropriately considered or provided for at the county level. For example, a county study shows that earthquakes and wildfires represent the leading emergency preparedness challenges to Alameda County, while the risk of terrorism is considered as less urgent.108 BPD statistics suggest that counterterrorism is not a typical responsibility of SRT officers, and therefore should not be the overwhelming focus of exercise. Despite these understandings, Urban Shield exercises have continued to be overwhelmingly focused on responding to terrorism. Importantly, by centering supplemental emergency preparedness efforts locally, the Berkeley community would be empowered to advocate for and design supplemental exercises to address critical preparedness gaps.

The BPD and BFD should be commended for already conducting realistic local active-shooter exercises for the benefit of its officers and the public, and in concert with the community. These whole community initiatives should be encouraged and pursued as model upon which future local exercises are based. In addition the Council should strive to work with the Board to ensure that the reconstituted event reflects Berkeley’s values. To that end, the Subcommittee adopted a series of recommendations addressed the Board, the ACSO and the BAUASI.

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107 SRT presentation to Subcommittee, January 18, 2018.
Recommendations

1.2. That the Council send a letter transmitting recommendations to the Alameda County Board of Supervisors, ACSO and BAUASI regarding the reconstitution of Urban Shield and providing tactical and emergency preparedness training for local law enforcement using the established principles and guidelines for Urban Shield and request an accountability mechanism for enforcing them.

The recommendations are as follows:

- Urban Shield will exclude Immigrations and Customs Enforcement
- Urban Shield will include a sensitivity officer to ensure the programs alignment with community values and these guidelines
- Expand the involvement of the community, local departments, and the Board of Supervisors in the planning of the program
- Urban Shield will expand scenarios that integrate of police, fire, EMT and public health officials
- Expand the ‘dual-use’ exception so that scenarios prepare first responders for impacts that stem from terrorism and other disasters.
- Urban Shield will have a greater focus on local threats
- Urban Shield will prioritize training exercises for civic natural disasters and health concerns that have a large impact on Berkeley and the Bay Area including environmental concerns caused by climate change, wildfires, gas pipeline explosions, landslides, and sea level rise
- Urban Shield will increase the amount of time spent on de-escalation tactics
- That no invitations to participate in the planning or competition of Urban Shield be extended to teams from countries with documented human rights violations
- That tactical training is based on real-life incidents without attributing offenders’ motivations or beliefs to the scenario.
- Urban Shield vendors should primarily focus on local law enforcement rather than the military and prison industries.
- Urban Shield will not include surveillance technology or training.
- Require full transparency regarding what events Berkeley staff are to take part in, and require community observers to be present at all Urban Shield events and trainings.
- Expand capability of local jurisdictions to prepare for and respond to events of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction and biological, nuclear, radiological, incendiary, chemical, and explosive devices

1.3. That the Berkeley City Council recommend to our members of Congress to expand Homeland Security Grants to fund disaster preparedness activities.