SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A study prepared by a working party, initiated by the American Friends Service Committee and the Canadian Friends Service Committee and acting in association with the Friends Service Council (London), the Friends World Committee for Consultation and the Friends Peace and International Relations Committee (London).
Search for Peace in the Middle East

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The working party’s report is presented for the consideration of all persons seeking a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Middle East. It does not speak for Friends groups other than those listed above.

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Preface

Out of our own concern, and with the urging of both Jews and Arabs, a group of Quakers began in 1968 the exploration of possible approaches to peace in the Middle East. As we listened to people in many walks of life, and to high officials in Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, the United Arab Republic, at the UN, and in various world capitals, we were drawn into an effort to record the viewpoints we encountered and to make some attempt at assessing the possibilities of finding a solution. Such a task staggers the imagination and may be beyond the capabilities of any group. We have been tempted to give up the effort, in the face of what many experts have judged to be an insoluble conflict. That we have persisted is less a proof of confidence in our judgments than a demonstration of our anguished concern and of our belief that many human beings on both sides yearn for the world to pay attention to their continued suffering.

Having listened long and carefully to the many viewpoints of the interested parties, we believe we have a reasonably clear understanding of those viewpoints and how they developed. We have tried to hear all of the assorted and contradictory voices as the cries of real people overcome by real fears and frustrations—and explainable hatreds. We are convinced that no solution to the conflict can be found until it is possible for the outer world and the antagonists themselves to hear—really hear—what the divergent voices are trying to say. No one truly interested in eventual peace in the Middle East can dismiss any of these voices as manifestations of depersonalized evil or demonic unreason.

It is one thing to listen; it is another to sort out the sounds of hope. It is still another to put together a set of coherent and feasible suggestions for finding the way to peace. We confess at the outset our limitations as students and observers of the Middle East, even though some of us have spent many years studying, working, and living with its peoples and their problems. We and other Quakers have had considerable exposure to the interests and concerns of Arabs and Jews, but this experience does not guarantee us against humanly fallible judgments.

In the Hitler years and afterward, Quakers worked closely with Jewish organizations to oppose the persecution of Jews and to aid its victims. Work among Jewish refugees was carried on by Quakers on a substantial scale in the United States and in Europe. Quakers have worked with Arab educators in the operation of schools in Palestine
and Lebanon for almost a hundred years. At the time of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, Quakers were asked by the United Nations to administer relief for over 200,000 Arab refugees in the Gaza Strip. During the past twenty years, there have been a number of Quaker programs in Israel and in several of the Arab countries. This involvement has deepened our concern for both Arabs and Jews as people, and increased our desire to be useful in their time of conflict.

In recent months, through far-ranging talks with political leaders in the area, visits to refugee camps, discussions with many displaced Palestinian Arabs and with Arabs in the occupied West Bank and in Gaza, and numerous conversations with Israeli citizens representing a variety of viewpoints, our deepest conviction is that a comprehensive political settlement is the most urgent need of both Israelis and Arabs and that all men of concern and good will must support the search for such a settlement.

We believe, as do many people of other faiths, that the spirit of reconciliation is an ultimate power in human relations and that it can overcome the hatreds aroused by exaggerated nationalism and war. We recognize in ourselves, and in all men, dark forces of fear, bitterness and hatred which can drive us toward violence. We may differ among ourselves as to how the forces of destruction may be best contained. However, we acknowledge an inner imperative, linked to the ancient Quaker testimony against war, to affirm our deep conviction that violence almost never brings a permanent solution and rarely produces even a short-term answer for deep and continuing tensions.

A major obstacle to rational understanding of the Arab-Israeli dilemma is to be found in the polarization of popular attitudes in the West, especially in the United States. This polarization has resulted in frequent distortion of the issues in the press and in other communications media. The tendency is for each side to deny that the other has any legitimate case and to attack as enemies those who seek a middle way.

Many Israelis and their supporters regard the Palestinians and the refugees as “invisible men,” without historical or current claim to national rights. Most Arab nationalists, on the other hand, regard the state of Israel as having no legal basis.

These Arab and Israeli images of each other have been so widely and persistently disseminated that they have seeped into the public images of the conflict in the Western world and infected much of the Western press. Expression of concern for Arab refugees or for a peace which includes Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories is often regarded by Jews as anti-Israeli or even anti-Jewish. On the
other hand, expression of the case for accepting the reality of an Israeli state, or of concern for the future of its people, is regarded by many Arabs as tantamount to endorsement of the full Zionist credo, approval of all Israeli government actions, and rejection of the rights of Arabs.

We wish to make clear to all, particularly to our countrymen of Jewish and Arab backgrounds, that our position is one of concern for both peoples and is based on the conviction that the rights and interests of both must be recognized and reconciled on some just and peaceful basis. We believe that to ignore or to deny the essential rights of one group will lead to the ultimate destruction of the rights of the other. Peace and decent living conditions, if not available to both, will be unavailable to either. We firmly believe that it is possible to be both pro-Jewish and pro-Arab. And for both the essential need is peace.

Despite our best efforts to treat this issue with objectivity and candor and to win the widest possible agreement for a peaceful solution, we face these realities:

a) It is impossible to come to a fair and responsible judgment on the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of endorsing the Israeli government position or the positions of the Arab governments or of the Palestinian Arab organizations. No side has a case so right and just that all its past or present actions can be defended.

b) Many on each side will denounce any comment which does not support their position on the grounds that "if you are not for us, you are against us."

c) It is impossible to reach an even-handed judgment on the basis of some neat compromise. On some issues, we believe, the Arabs have been clearly wrong and on other issues the Israelis have been clearly wrong. We have had this manuscript reviewed in detail by many Jews and Arabs, including high Israeli, Lebanese, Jordanian and United Arab Republic officials and by scholarly experts of varied nationalities. Acting on their advice, we have made many changes, while writing more than a dozen drafts, to correct mistakes of fact and to eliminate phrases and nuances deemed unfair or unsound by either side. We must assume that defects will still be found in the document. But, more important, we must accept the fact that on some issues we have had to declare ourselves in ways that put us clearly, with respect to a given point, on one side or the other.

We have tried simply to follow the best light we could find toward the most complete truth we could understand.
The Jews and the Arabs are ancient and long-suffering peoples, and their sufferings continue. Both have been cruelly dealt with by peoples of other cultures, and both are still subject to manipulation by forces beyond their control. Both are distrustful of other peoples and of each other, as they seek to establish their own identity, their right to respect, freedom and national self-development.

It is one of the great ironies of history that the roots of the present Arab-Jewish struggle should have grown, not in a poisoned soil of ancient mutual animosities, but in the mistreatment each has received at the hands of others. The Jews and the Arabs are Semitic cousins, share cultural traits and traditions, and through long centuries lived in relative peace with one another even during periods when Jews were subject to sustained persecution by the Christian West.

At a time when Europeans tended to confine Jews to money-lending and certain other commercial trades, Jews served as physicians, government officials, philosophers, and scholars in Muslim-controlled societies from Moorish Spain across North Africa to the borders of India. The cultural vitality of the Islamic world, which kept alive Graeco-Roman culture and made fresh advances in mathematics, medicine, science, and philosophy while Christian Europe was struggling through the Dark Ages, was in part attributable to the enlightened policies Islamic rulers followed concerning their able Jewish subjects. Maimonides, the most famous of the medieval Jewish physician-philosophers, was both religious leader of the Jewish community and court physician to Saladin, the Kurdish general who unified a vast expanse of the Muslim world in the twelfth century.
In more modern times, many Jews achieved high social, cultural, and financial position in Egypt where they were prominent in the civil service, and some received titles of “Bey” and “Pasha.” One of these, Cattau Pasha, was Minister of Finance to King Fouad less than fifty years ago.

The intensified struggle of Jews and Arabs has come since the end of World War I and most intensely since the end of World War II, as the two peoples, in their own ways, finally sought to put an end to persecution and to their common status as subject peoples—and ran head on into each other.

Zionism, the most dynamic force of nineteenth-century Jewish nationalism, burst upon the world scene just as Arab nationalism was beginning to rise from the dying Turkish Empire. These simultaneously emerging nationalisms, unfortunately, were destined to fight for possession of the same territory in the Holy Land of Palestine.

The nineteenth century, which saw the rapid spread of science, technology, and parliamentary concepts of political freedom over vast areas of the world, also witnessed the rise of the most vicious persecution of the Jews since the Romans drove them from Palestine in A.D. 135. Pogroms in Czarist Russia and in other parts of Eastern Europe in the 1880’s raised again the fears which had intermittently assailed the Jews through many centuries of partial assimilation into various European societies. Numerous Jewish groups intensified efforts in Western Europe and America to promote migration away from their tormentors. Some settled in Western Europe, others in Canada and South Africa. The largest groups, by far, came to the United States. About 135,000 Eastern European Jews found new homes in the United States during the 1880’s, another 280,000 in the 1890’s, and the movement continued into the first part of the twentieth century. Other thousands were caught up in the dream of resettlement as farmers, and Jewish agricultural colonies were planted in Manitoba, Argentina, Australia, and South Africa.

Beginning in the 1860’s, there were groups of European Jews who preached the then improbable dream of migration to the Holy Land of Palestine. An imaginative and determined Central European journalist, Theodor Herzl, took up this idea and in 1897, at Basle, Switzerland, challenged the First World Zionist Congress to develop a program for creating a Jewish homeland. He suggested how this should be achieved in a pamphlet entitled *The Jewish State*.

The Zionist movement quickly became a widely debated issue in world Jewry. Some Jewish philanthropists gave it limited support,
some intellectual and religious leaders attacked it as both impractical and contrary to the interests of Jewish communities already established in Western countries. The strongest support came from among the Jewish masses seeking to flee from Eastern Europe, even though most of them chose, as the opportunity became available, to migrate to the United States. Around 1903, Herzl began to despair of establishing a homeland in Palestine and seriously raised the question of accepting a British offer to provide lands for Jewish settlement in the temperate highlands of the new British colonial territories in East Africa. At another time, Argentina was considered. All such proposals were, however, firmly rejected by the rank-and-file of Zionists in favor of a "return" to the Holy Land.

Throughout the centuries of the Jewish diaspora, a small contingent of Jews had clung tenaciously to the city of Jerusalem. However, by the end of the 1880's, there were estimated to be only about 30,000 to 40,000 Jews in Palestine, or about five per cent of the total population. This was, of course, before political Zionism, as such, began. By the end of World War I, colonies of Jewish settlers, primarily from Russia, had brought the Jewish population of Palestine to approximately 60,000, or about ten per cent of the total.

Initial negotiations for Jewish settlement in Palestine were carried on with the authorities of the Ottoman Empire which had control of Palestine and the adjoining Arab territories. Land for the Jewish newcomers was acquired by purchase from Arab landowners. Peaceful coexistence was stressed by the promoters of the new settlements, and initially there was little difficulty with Arab neighbors. However, certain kinds of friction arose. At the human level, the sale of land sometimes meant that Arab farm workers were turned out without provision for resettlement or absorption into a new society, and this practice produced bitterness. On the broader, political level, it became increasingly clear to the more educated and sophisticated Arabs that these Jewish settlements were eventually going to be welded into some form of political entity to be carved out of Palestine, or that Jewish immigration might reach such a level that the Arabs would become a minority in their homeland. With that realization began the dark fears that produced a growing Arab determination to oppose by any means the Zionist dream.

These apprehensions among the Palestinian Arabs came very much to the fore after the Balfour Declaration was issued by the British Foreign Minister in 1917, and particularly after that document was incorporated into the Versailles peace agreements and the League of Nations Mandates. The Balfour Declaration was simply a
one-page letter which Lord Balfour wrote to Lord Rothschild stating that “His Majesty’s Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” Coupled with that statement was a gesture of reassurance to the Palestinian Arabs to the effect “that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.” The Arabs, at that time, outnumbered the Jews by almost ten to one. The Balfour Declaration could be interpreted in several ways. Some Zionists saw it as a promise that the Jews of the world would be given all of Palestine and allowed to create there a sovereign state. Others interpreted it as a guarantee of unlimited Jewish immigration, but with no assurance that a Jewish state, as such, would ever be established. For years, bitter debates raged inside and outside Zionist circles over whether full-fledged political statehood was the goal. At various times, some Zionist leaders undertook to calm Arab and other critics by statements denying any ambition to create a Jewish state.

Meanwhile, as was later revealed, the British and the French had in 1916 entered into the secret Sykes-Picot agreement under which these two major powers were to divide between themselves control of much of the Arab world as soon as the Turkish empire could be destroyed. That arrangement was translated into the League of Nations Mandate system under which Britain took over the supervision of Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq, while France acquired dominance in Lebanon and Syria. As this arrangement was being worked out, during and immediately after World War I, the British, through Lawrence of Arabia and others, were making promises to Arab nationalists and to individual Arab chieftains that the dreams of Arab national statehood (and of expanded power for particular leaders) would be fulfilled as the Turkish overlords could be driven out. These promises lay at the basis of the British-supported uprisings which culminated in the liberation of Jerusalem, Damascus and other ancient cities long controlled by the Turks.

By the mid-1920’s, with British administrators and occupation forces installed in Palestine, a seemingly irreconcilable conflict was emerging. The Holy Land was claimed by a growing group of Jewish newcomers, gathering in from many parts of the world. It was also claimed by the long-settled Arab (Muslim and Christian) majority who took it for granted that they should in time control their own political destiny. Both sides became increasingly concerned to rid the land of British mandatory control and to establish their “rightful” claims on their own.
BACKGROUND

COMPETING CLAIMS TO PALESTINE

After the passage of these years, it is still impossible to get agreement on the relative merits of the rival claims to Palestine. Even to try to state what those claims are is to bring down on one's head (as the authors of this statement have discovered) the denunciation of either side, or both. Yet there are two sides to the argument.

The Jews base their claim to the Holy Land on these contentions:

1) Their ancestors controlled Jerusalem and territories to the north and south of that city more than two thousand years ago.

2) In the Scriptures, Jehovah promised this entire land to Abraham and his "seed."

3) The ancient Jewish kingdom was the only independent, indigenous state that area ever had prior to the present day.

4) Though driven out in cruel attacks by the Romans, a remnant of Jews always remained in the Holy Land and, for the past century, constituted a majority in the city of Jerusalem.

5) Through all the centuries of the diaspora, Jews maintained their cultural attachment to their ancestral homeland and regularly reaffirmed that attachment through prayers of "next year in Jerusalem."

6) Modern Jewish resettlement in Palestine was on the basis of peaceful purchases of land, with approval of the only legitimate authorities with whom the Zionist leadership could at the time deal: first, the Turkish Sultan and, later, the British mandatory officials.

7) The Palestinian Arabs were late-comers to the area, a migratory people, and never had a Palestinian Arab state.

8) Centuries of persecution, culminating in the holocaust of the Hitler era, drove the Jews to seek and to create a secure national haven as a matter of survival. Such a haven for the Jews could be provided only in Palestine, whereas the Arabs have abundant lands stretching over vast areas in the region which are, or could be, open to the Palestinians.

9) The Jews offered to live at peace with their Arab neighbors either in a shared state or in a partitioned state, but the Arabs refused either solution and, following their own foolhardy resort to violence and subsequent defeats, have forfeited all claim to Palestine.

10) The enormous and effective investment of Jewish labor and capital in developing the land, its agriculture and industry,
has established through creative use an indisputable Jewish right.

11) The superior technological and financial resources of the Jews allow them to develop the area, not only for themselves, but also for the Palestinian Arabs and other peoples of the region; it is toward that sort of constructive sharing, not racial aggrandizement, that the humanistic spirit of Zionism is directed.

The Arabs base their claims to Palestine and their opposition to a Jewish state on these contentions:

1) The Arabs as a people have lived on the land of Palestine and had unbroken use of its soil for more than 1,300 years.

2) Accepting the mixing of ethnic strains, which has been going on throughout the Euro-Asian land mass through history, there are no pure races in the Middle East. Among the Arab population there are many who have just as good a claim to descent from the indigenous people of Judea and Samaria from 2,000 years ago—are just as truly among "the seed of Abraham"—as any of the Jews, and have a great deal better ethnic claim than can be put forward by most European Jews with their mixed ancestry.

3) In the course of the assorted empires which ruled over the area, Palestinian Arabs participated, at various levels, in administration of the region, even if there was no specific Palestinian Arab state; even under the Turkish empire there was substantial local self-government on a religious "community" basis.

4) The British promised during World War I that they would assist the Arabs to achieve national identity and independence through the creation of appropriate nation-states. The Palestinian Arabs have as much claim on that assistance as any other people of the Arab world.

5) Following the First World War, self-determination was promised to all the subject peoples ruled by the Central Powers, and that promise applied as much to the Palestinian Arabs as to any other people. This principle was violated when the promise was given to support the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine without consulting the Palestinian Arabs, who were then an overwhelming majority of the people.

6) The Palestinian Arabs, though originally welcoming Jewish settlers when they quietly bought land and moved in, never agreed to become a minority in their own homeland.
7) Although some Arab leaders initially believed that Jewish immigration could be accepted on a basis which would not lead to displacement of the Arabs, from the time of World War I onward Palestinian Arab nationalists argued that the Zionist movement would eventually mean control over Palestine by the Jews and expulsion or subjection of the Arabs.

8) The influx of European Jews has threatened the basic cultural character of Palestine as part of Levantine society. Whereas Palestinian Arabs and Oriental (or Arabized) Jews have little difficulty adjusting to each other, the Western Jews undermined the hope for any kind of equitable Arab-Jewish partnership.

9) Zionism is another manifestation of Western imperialism. Arabs inevitably must fear the power represented by links between Jewish settlers and the world Zionist movement and the influence of that relationship with and upon Western governments.

10) Continuing Jewish expansionism is proclaimed by some elements in the world Zionist movement and by some political factions in Israel. The Arabs can never accept in their midst a Jewish state which appears to have no fixed conception of its territorial boundaries and pursues an aggressive policy of trying to stimulate unlimited immigration from all over the world. If successful, that policy would almost certainly create Lebensraum demands for the annexation of still more Arab territory.

11) The idea that the Palestinian Arabs should give up their homeland to Jews and move to other Arab lands because there is space for resettlement is rejected as illogical and inhuman; every people has a right to remain on the lands they have long held as their own.

GROWTH OF THE YISHUV

Between World War I and World War II, parallel but completely separate and distinct national communities emerged in Palestine—the Yishuv, or Jewish community, and the Palestine Arab community. Each had its educational system in which its children were taught to become supporters of the respective national causes. Each developed its political system with its own Arab or Jewish parties; Arab and Jewish social and economic organizations provided for the needs of their respective communities from birth to burial in separate Muslim, Christian or Jewish cemeteries. Arabs and Jews
organized security and underground military or para-military forces. During this era, the Yishuv grew from a few token settlements constituting a mere ten per cent of the population to an effective and strong national community, with nearly a third of the population, but in many respects far stronger than the poorly organized and divided Arab community which opposed its growth.

The Palestinian Arabs did not succeed in their efforts to stop Zionism. Beginning in the 1920's, accelerating in the 1930's and 1940's, the violent struggle of Arab against Jew and Jew against Arab repeatedly broke the calm which the British mandate government tried to maintain. Well warned though the British and the world were by these disorders, no solution to the problem was found. Study commission followed study commission, but the international community paid little attention to what was happening then and gave scant thought to what might happen later.

With Hitler's rise, his assault against Europe and his evil campaign to exterminate the Jews, the flight from Europe became for many European Jews a matter of life or death. Here again, before and after World War II, the Christian West was weighed and found wanting. Instead of opening wide their gates to refugees from Nazi persecution—and perhaps saving millions of lives—the free nations vacillated, took half measures, and waited. In the end, Western Europe and America, plus the Soviet Union, fought and at great cost won a war for their own survival against the Nazi military machine while an estimated six million Jews were murdered. When the fighting ceased, the remnant of continental Jews could, for the most part, think only of getting away from Europe as quickly as possible. With Jewish settlements already well established in Palestine, with a vigorous World Zionist Organization working to assist in resettlement, the movement to Palestine of concentration camp survivors and Jews from other countries grew in size and urgency. The British mandate government tried to impose controls upon that movement but succeeded only partially and in the end abandoned the struggle to administer Palestine, as the flow of immigrants continued and inter-communal violence mounted.

How many of the Jews who went to Palestine in the 1930's and 1940's would have migrated to some other country if they had been given encouragement cannot be known. In any case, the Christian West was able to escape in large measure from its accumulated centuries of anti-Semitic guilt, by cooperating with the dedicated Zionist leadership in helping displaced Jews find refuge in a predominantly Arab land.

At the time the UN partition plan was adopted, the Jewish third
of the population of Palestine owned about six per cent of the land. The Arab two-thirds of the population owned about a third of the land, and felt they had good claim on that major portion of public lands listed as government domain. At partition, the Palestinian Arabs saw themselves being forced to give up much of their lands, private and communal, to Jewish settlers as part of a grand-scale international effort at restitution and compensation to the Jews. The Palestinian Arabs, chiefly a Muslim people, concluded that they were being required to pay for the anti-Semitic sins of the Christian West.

This is obviously a simplified and only partial explanation of how the Zionist movement and the present state of Israel came to gain broad Western support, but it will be impossible to understand current Arab attitudes apart from this unflattering interpretation of why the United States and Western Europe gave support to the creation of Israel and have continued to support it. In fact, some Arabs came to feel that in Western nations pro-Zionism for Jews abroad was the natural corollary of continued anti-Semitism at home.

PARTITION AND WAR

One of the first great problems faced by the infant United Nations was the collapse of the British mandate and the necessity to find some internationally acceptable solution to the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine. The UN study commission recommended partition as the only solution with any hope of success. This plan called for the creation of separate Jewish and Arab states and the acceptance of international status for Jerusalem with free access for all races and religions.

This United Nations plan was approved by a two-thirds vote of its then members—and made possible by agreement-for-the-moment of the United States and the Soviet Union. Partition was never accepted by the local Palestinian Arabs nor by any of the neighboring Arab states. The Jews did accept partition and prepared to proclaim the state of Israel at the earliest possible moment, May 14, 1948. Long before the partition plan could go into effect, however, clashes developed between underground groups and para-military units already active on both sides. Arab terrorists, linked to the so-called Arab Liberation Army, attacked Jewish farm settlements, offices, factories, buses, and isolated individuals. Jewish terrorists inflicted similar blows upon the Arabs. On the night of April 9, 1948, Jewish extremist para-military groups killed 254 men, women and children
in the Arab village of Deir Yassin—as some of the participants in the massacre later said, "to persuade the Arabs to get moving." On April 12, a reprisal by the Arabs resulted in the deaths of 77 Jewish doctors, nurses, university teachers and students travelling in a Red Cross convoy to Hadassah Hospital near Jerusalem.

Thus a state of civil war had already developed in Palestine over the period from December, 1947, following adoption of the UN partition plan, right through the final weeks of the British Mandate. Within hours after Dr. Chaim Weizmann and his Zionist colleagues proudly raised the Star of David flag and launched the Jewish state, military units from Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq began an open assault upon Israel. After some initial successes for Arab arms, the Israeli forces rallied, broke the siege of Jewish West Jerusalem, and occupied substantial areas in the north of Palestine and in the south which had been assigned to Arab control under the UN partition plan. Israel wound up holding a third more territory than it would have held had the Arabs accepted the original UN partition plan.

A series of armistice agreements finally terminated hostilities in 1949. But peace did not come. Organized fighting was replaced by a propaganda war that has never ceased—and by innumerable acts of terror and counter-terror.

The Palestinian Arab state called for in the UN partition resolution was never created. Instead Jordan annexed the West Bank, including the Eastern sector of Jerusalem. Egypt assumed a kind of protectorate control over the Gaza Strip. Israel, in turn, absorbed Jewish West Jerusalem, the Negev and parts of Galilee.

The Arabs had been beaten and humiliated but neither the Israelis nor the United Nations could compel them to make peace. In the absence of peace, Israel held on to its territorial gains, as did Jordan.

In the closing phases of the war of 1948-49 it became clear how weak and disorganized the Arab forces were, how competent and determined were the Israelis. Despite the disparity between the total numbers of people on the two sides, vastly favoring the Arab countries over Israel, the actual military superiority of Israel over all its Arab neighbors was made clear through the Israeli victory in early 1949. That dominance has persisted through the intervening years. It has been convincingly demonstrated by Israel's ability to strike quickly and to win spectacular victories over the Arab states in the wars of 1956 and 1967, and to dominate the military situation along the cease-fire lines and in the air to this day.

The general response of the Arabs to the establishment and consolidation of a Jewish state in their midst has continued to be one of
bitterness, frustration, and a sense of humiliated impotence. Their chief satisfaction for a long time has come in a war of propaganda rarely matched in passion and vituperation and in a kind of mystical faith that in time, somehow, the Arabs would achieve the military power with which to destroy Israel. The Arabs in defeat remained weak and disorganized. But they have believed that their cause was just and that it would prevail in the end.

Meanwhile, the United Nations set up machinery and provided funds to care for the minimal subsistence needs of nearly a million Arab refugees scattered across Gaza, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. Out of these refugee camps and from other Palestinians in exile came increasing cries for revenge and for a chance “to go home.” Thus, through the 1940’s and well into the 1950’s, there seemed no hope for a resolution of the conflict. There remained only an uneasy truce, broken occasionally by acts of terror and counter-terror. Moreover, the Arabs stepped up their propaganda war into more and more blood-curdling threats of eventual revenge against Israel, a state whose very existence Arabs refused to concede. The Arabs insisted on the maintenance of belligerency against Israel and a boycott against all trade and communications across the common boundaries.

THE WAR OF 1956

When President Nasser, after a series of diplomatic rebuffs, nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956 and eliminated British and French management, he precipitated a fresh international crisis. At this point, the Israelis saw an opportunity to settle accumulated scores with Egypt, to halt irritating border attacks, and perhaps to move the situation away from non-recognition toward some kind of peace. A debate which had raged inside the Israeli cabinet for many months was resolved in favor of the hard-line faction which had pressed for full-scale war against the Egyptians. Great Britain and France supported this course, and on October 23, 1956, the three powers signed a secret treaty at Sèvres which gave the green light for an Israeli attack. On October 29, Israeli tanks invaded the Sinai, supported by French planes. In a swift and decisive victory they swept all before them, to the Suez Canal and to the southern tip of Sinai at Sharm el Sheikh. Great Britain and France joined in, somewhat ignominiously, with a belated airborne attack of their own on the Canal area. However, the combination of United Nations condemnation, United States opposition, and Soviet threats of atomic missile intervention forced the French and British to back down—and out.
The Israelis were not easily dislodged, however. They were reluctant to abandon their hold on the Sinai, if the Egyptians still refused to agree to recognition and a formal peace. Most particularly, they did not want to give up their control of the entrance to the Strait of Tiran, and allow the Egyptians to return to Sharm el Sheikh with the likelihood of a renewal of harassment of Israeli shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba. In the end, a kind of backstairs deal, with the United States as mediator, produced Israeli withdrawal from the whole of Sinai in exchange for American assurance that Egypt would not interfere with shipping through the Strait. As part of these arrangements, a United Nations Emergency force was established on the Israeli-Egyptian border and at Sharm el Sheikh on the Straits of Tiran. These forces were stationed only on the Egyptian side of the border since the Israeli government refused to admit them to Israeli territory.

ARAB UNITY AND DISSENSION

Between the winding up of Israel's Sinai campaign of 1956 and the outbreak of the June War of 1967, the tides of politics in the Middle East seemed to run strongly for a time toward the foggy shore of Pan-Arab unity. However, they were beaten back again and again by Arab distrust and divisiveness. Complicating cross-currents in this time were the rivalries and ambitions of various major powers toward the area. These assorted conflicts within and toward the Arab world have been of great assistance to Israel.

The Baghdad Pact had been created in 1955 to provide regional defense against communism and Soviet expansionism and had been signed by Great Britain, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The attempt to draw in Jordan and Syria failed. Far from providing a barrier to the spread of communist influence in the region, the Baghdad Pact spurred anti-Western hostility and Soviet penetration. By the end of 1955, Syria became a formal ally of Egypt and a fellow customer for Soviet arms. In February, 1958, on Syrian initiative, the Syrians and the Egyptians merged to form the United Arab Republic. Pan-Arab unity seemed to many to be the immediate wave of the future, and Gamal Abdel Nasser the greatest Arab leader of the century.

In July, 1958, Iraq underwent a brief, bloody revolution which resulted in the murder of the pro-British king and his prime minister, the triumph of a leftist leadership, and new opportunities for the Soviet Union. However, rivalries between political leaders in the U.A.R. and in Iraq—plus pride of the Iraq leadership in their anti-
Western independence—checked the further growth of Arab unity at that point. Iraq did not join the United Arab Republic. Instead, the Iraqi revolution fell into the hands of radical army officers who were pro-Soviet, anti-Western, anti-Nasser—and, of course, anti-Israeli.

Opposition to Israel remained the one consistent element of unity in the discordant Arab world. The rulers of the conservative, oil-rich Arab kingdoms and sheikdoms looked with horror upon the revolutionary-minded leaders of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq with their talk of “Arab socialism” and “Arab unity.” The latter governments repeatedly involved themselves in plots against the royal, feudal, and pro-Western Arab governments. Yet all Arab factions shared the same desire to destroy Israel. What they could not agree on was the means by which to accomplish that goal. They differed on when and how a showdown with Israel should come and on the wisdom, meanwhile, of border raids, commando attacks inside Israel, and artillery shelling across the cease-fire lines. Inevitably, these differences of judgment and rivalries for leadership inside the Arab world led to propaganda attacks of Arab against Arab.

Even the revolutionary Syrians and Egyptians fell out before their union was four years old. Syrian nationalists, some of whom had taken the lead in urging merger upon Nasser, organized a revolt in 1961 and carried through secession from the United Arab Republic. Subsequent negotiations to restore the Syro-Egyptian union failed, as did efforts to create a Syro-Iraqi union, despite the fact that both Syria and Iraq were ruled for a time by sister branches of the socialist-oriented Ba’ath party.

GROWTH OF PALESTINIAN FEDEYEEN MOVEMENT

Meanwhile, the bitterness of the Palestinian Arab refugees was nourished by the Arab governments, which refused to support any solution of the refugee problem other than the “return home” formula. Several hundred thousand were still in makeshift refugee camps scattered across Gaza, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, providing incitement to acts of violence along the armistice lines and inside Israel. Most of these refugee-commando attacks were mounted from Jordan or Syria. The Jordanian government did little to aid or to stop the attacks. The Syrians, disputing their borders with Israel, openly supported the Palestinian commandos, while Syrian army artillery lobbed shells, month after month, from the ridges of the Golan Heights into nearby Israeli agricultural settlements. Efforts inside the United Nations to halt these attacks, or even to censure the
Arab governments for allowing them, were regularly vetoed by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, when Israel struck back—as she did from time to time, and often on a massive “two-eyes-for-an-eye” basis, the United Nations promptly condemned her.

In 1965, the Palestinian Fedayeen (“those-who-sacrifice-themselves”) fighters, who from the start have been divided into diverse and uncoordinated groups, were beginning to find a greater unity of purpose and the rudimentary elements of an integrated program of para-military training and operations. The Al Fatah group was emerging as a serious weapon of the resistance fight, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the purported overall political spokesman for the Palestinians, was stepping up its propaganda and its claims of support from the Arab governments.

By the fall of 1966, the terror and counter-terror activities between Israel and her Arab neighbors had reached such a level that there were ominous signs of a major explosion. In October, Fedayeen attacks brought death to several Israelis, an Israeli protest in the United Nations, another Soviet veto, and renewed threats of retaliation from Israel. In early November, Syria and the United Arab Republic signed a new defense agreement providing for the establishment of a joint military command. On November 13, Israel struck a massive blow at the Jordanian town of Es Samu, killing eighteen Jordanian soldiers and civilians and wounding fifty-four, according to official UN observer reports. This time there was no veto in the Security Council, and Israel was condemned “for this large-scale military action in violation of the UN Charter and of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan.” The United Nations warned Israel that such military reprisals could not be tolerated and threatened “further and more effective steps” if Israel repeated such actions.

Israel inevitably complained that the UN was unfair in its reaction to incidents of violence. The Arabs, on the other hand, saw the UN resolutions condemning Israel (of which there had been many) as futile gestures with no restraining effect. Moreover, back of all Arab complaints against the United Nations was the conviction that, despite annually repeated UN resolutions calling for repatriation or compensation for the Palestinian refugees who had fled or been expelled, nothing had or would be done.

The Israeli attack on Es Samu prompted the Jordanian government, not only to protest to the United Nations, but to lodge a public complaint against the United Arab Republic and Syria for their failure to provide promised assistance. Nasser, the supposedly militant leader of the Arab struggle against Israel, was rebuked by
the supposedly most moderate Arab government for excessive moderation!

From the beginning of 1967 to the outbreak of all-out war on June 5, the Middle East crisis deepened. Border clashes, particularly on the Syrian-Israeli frontier, increased in frequency and intensity. On April 7, 1967, one incident escalated into an aerial battle over the outskirts of the Syrian capital of Damascus, with the Israelis shooting down six of the defending Syrian planes. Again Nasser was rebuked, this time by his Syrian ally, for Egyptian inaction.

THE ESCALATING CRISIS

From this point onward, the situation worsened, with increasingly threatening speeches from both sides. The Israelis became convinced they had to show the neighboring Arabs, and particularly the Syrians, that attacks across the Israeli border were too costly and dangerous to continue. Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol promised "measures no less drastic than those of April 7." From these warnings and from intelligence supplied by the Russians, the Syrians and the Egyptians concluded that Israel was preparing to invade Syria. Nasser, moreover, became convinced that this time he would have to demonstrate his militancy against Israel or forfeit claim to leadership of the Arab world.

On May 12, The New York Times reported from Tel Aviv that "Some Israeli leaders have decided that the use of force against Syria may be the only way to curtail increasing terrorism." On May 13, the Syrian Foreign Office communicated to nations on the Security Council the Syrian fear of imminent Israeli aggression. On May 19, Secretary-General U Thant issued a statement in which he said "Intemperate and bellicose utterances . . . are unfortunately more or less routine on both sides of the lines in the Near East. In recent weeks, however, reports emanating from Israel have attributed to some high officials in that state statements so threatening as to be particularly inflammatory in the sense that they could only heighten emotions and thereby increase tensions on the other side of the line." Taking note of these reports, the Israelis three times invited Soviet Ambassador Chuvakhin to visit the Syrian border areas and see for himself that there was no massing of Israeli forces there. The Soviet diplomat refused. Both Russians and Arabs argued that in a small, heavily-armed country like Israel mobilization could be carried out overnight and there was no need for advance build-up on the border.

On the other side, the Egyptian leaders had concluded that a mas-
sive build-up of Egyptian troops on the Israeli-Sinai frontier was needed to impress and deter the Israelis. Accordingly, President Nasser moved a substantial number of troops into the Sinai. On May 16 the United Nations was requested to withdraw its Emergency Forces from the Israeli-Sinai armistice lines so that U.A.R. troops could move up to the border, as General Fawzi, Egyptian Chief of Staff put it, “to be ready for action against Israel the moment it might carry out an aggressive action against any Arab country.”

For three days, there were anxious, hasty discussions at the United Nations—during which time the Israelis denounced the proposed UNEF withdrawal from the U.A.R. side of the frontier, asserted Israel’s right to be consulted in the matter, and reaffirmed the position Israel took in 1956 by refusing to allow UNEF units on the Israeli side of the border.

U Thant recognized that UNEF troops were on U.A.R. soil only with Cairo’s permission and that Israel, having barred UNEF from its territory, could send its forces right up to the border. He therefore concluded that the U.A.R. had every right to ask for UNEF withdrawal and to move its troops up to the border too. President Nasser and other Egyptian officials have said that they never intended for the UNEF to withdraw completely from the Sinai and certainly not from Sharm el Sheikh, where there was no question of a direct face-off with Israeli troops. Whatever may have been intended (and the tangled communications involving Cairo Headquarters, local Egyptian commanders, local UNEF commanders, and the United Nations political officials far-away in New York did not make it clear) U Thant’s action brought about total UNEF withdrawal, including the handing over of Sharm el Sheikh to U.A.R. military control. Once the U.A.R. authorities were installed there again, they felt bound to re-institute the blockade of Israeli shipping in the Strait of Tiran which they had been forced to give up as the result of the Israeli attack in 1956 and the Israeli withdrawal “deal” worked out by the Americans. On May 22, President Nasser announced his intention to re-establish the blockade. To the Israelis, this step was a legal cause of war, a clear official Arab act of aggression.

The movement of U.A.R. troops up to the Sinai frontier, the withdrawal of UNEF troops, and the proclaimed blockade of the Strait of Tiran set off waves of rejoicing throughout the Arab world and increasingly spine-chilling threats from the Arab press and radio. The Israeli people were seized by the fear that they were about to be attacked from all sides by an enemy determined to drive them into
the sea. The Israeli cabinet ceased its debates and prepared to make its pre-emptive strike in the pre-dawn hours of June 5, 1967. The Arabs, on the other hand, including specifically President Nasser, insist that they did not intend to attack Israel but had only tried to get themselves in readiness to meet the Israeli blow, which in fact did come. The Arabs view the War of June, 1967, like the war of October, 1956, as simply another episode in a long-term campaign of Israeli aggression and conquest against the Arab peoples.

During the last three weeks of the pre-war crisis, there was much agitated conferring among the major powers and between each of them and the governments of Israel, Jordan, Syria, and the United Arab Republic. Both the Soviet Union and the United States communicated to each side their urgent concern that hostilities be avoided. Both expressed the desire to avoid being dragged into a confrontation with each other, and both indicated a belief that some compromise settlement could be patched together.

The authors of this paper, having studied the historical record and conferred with numerous experts on the Arab-Israeli conflict, accept the judgment that the war of June, 1967, was a war nobody intended to happen.

It is our conviction that the long accumulation of border incidents, of Palestinian Arab commando attacks, and massive Israeli military reprisals had brought the area close to the point of explosion long before the U.A.R. called for a withdrawal of UN Emergency Forces from the Israeli-Sinai border and announced a blockade of the Strait of Tiran, that each side had made threats which the other side was bound to interpret as a prelude to an attack, and that the words and deeds of military leaders on each side carried each to a point of no return. We feel that the behavior of both the U.A.R. and Israel was provocative and precipitate.

It is our further conviction that the role of the United Nations in the crisis period was handled in a faltering, uninspiring manner and that instead of working creatively to preserve time and room for maneuver its decisions tragically accelerated the slide toward disaster.

It is our judgment that the world community in general carries a heavy burden of responsibility for vacillating and incompetent efforts at peace-making during the mounting crisis of the spring of 1967, but carries an even heavier responsibility for allowing the refugee problem, the disputed border problem—the
whole Arab-Israeli conflict—to grow progressively embittered and difficult of solution for more than two decades.

Finally, we are convinced that the Soviet Union and the United States have not acted responsibly over the past two decades to "cool" a situation which has constituted an immense danger to the world. Power of the sort wielded by these two nations imposes upon them responsibilities which will not be discharged by mutual proclamations of total self-righteousness coupled with antagonistic power plays. If the two powers cannot cooperate better in the future than in the past, both will demonstrate an irresponsibility and an impotence which can bring not only the Middle East but mankind to ruin.

In the complex pattern of mistakes that led to the war of June, 1967, there is blame enough for all. That is not the real issue. The issue is that there are no devils and no angels in the Middle East, only distraught, fearful human beings with real human needs and desires. They require all the constructive help they can obtain to get out of the tragedy which engulfs them and to avoid making the same mistakes that were made in the first half of 1967—and in the several years prior to that.

Any significant effort at peace-making must reflect the realities of the past and must come to terms with the vital interests of both sides for today and for the long future.

A SPECIAL NOTE ON REFUGEES—ARAB AND JEWISH

The story of the Middle East, in human terms, has for more than the past quarter century been peculiarly the story of refugees. There have been, first of all, the several hundred thousand survivors of the Nazi holocaust who escaped from Europe just before, during, or after World War II. There were the approximately 750,000 Arab refugees who left their homes just before, during, or after the war of 1948. There are the several hundred thousand Oriental Jews who left their homes in north Africa or southwest Asia after the state of Israel was created. Among all these groups were some subject to, or who believed themselves subject to, overpowering coercion, or even to death if they did not flee. All three groups felt themselves without effective protection for their persons or their property either from local authorities or from the international community.

It is obvious that the amount of loss, the extent of suffering, the degree of coercion to flee varied greatly from individual to individual and from country to country. Many barely escaped with their lives,
broken in body and spirit, and penniless. A few managed to move from one country to another unharmed and to bring with them their families and their financial resources intact. Yet for most of the Arab and Jewish refugees, life in the new places has been at best hard and uncertain, and at worst traumatic and hopeless. The world community, at one point or another, has shamelessly evaded its responsibilities toward all three groups of refugees—and is still evading those responsibilities.

There have been many attempts to deal with the problems of Middle East refugees in isolation, but the problem has been, since the beginning, an integral part of the Palestine problem as a whole, and must be dealt with in this context. If there had not been a violent confrontation between Arab and Jewish nationalisms, there would almost certainly have been no Arab refugee problem, no Jews displaced from their ancestral homes in the Arab world, and certainly no mass dislocation in the later war of 1967.

**Arab Refugees**

There has been no more bitterly disputed part of the record of the past quarter century than the question of what has happened to the Arab refugees and why.

After the passage of so many years, it is of course difficult to reconstruct what happened to the Arabs of Palestine, caught up in the swirling conflict of 1948. From research materials available and from direct discussions with many persons who were on the scene, it is our considered judgment that most of those who fled did so out of the perfectly human tendency to panic in the face of warfare and to flee from the fighting.

What has happened to the Palestinian refugees through these years of exile has been inadequately reported and poorly understood in the outer world. To the refugees, the basic, indisputable facts are that after more than twenty years: (1) they have not been allowed to go home, and (2) they have not been able to reclaim or to gain compensation for the properties they lost. These basic realities are the fundamental source of their bitterness.

As to resettlement, two elementary facts are widely overlooked. First, whatever a Palestinian refugee has done (or has experienced) since he left his home, he still clings with passionate tenacity to his claim to a piece of ground, a landscape, a community from which he originally came. He may, in the corner of his mind, know that he will never go back, but he finds it impossible to resign himself to the idea that he must abandon all right to return and must accept perma-
nent resettlement—even if he has in fact already worked out a tolerable resettlement. Second, according to estimates by responsible United Nations officials, more than 60 per cent of the Arab Palestinian refugees have found new homes and jobs and have been incorporated into local economies where they have settled. These adjustments have been made on the basis of both individual initiative and the help of the various Arab governments.

However, it must be kept in mind that those Arab refugees who have been absorbed into new jobs and homes are chiefly the educated, the young, the technically skilled, and those with financial means. The hard-core camp population continue to be the elderly, the very poor, the sick, the widows and orphans, the wives and children of the unskilled workers who have left the camp for temporary work elsewhere, and particularly the farm families who are difficult to incorporate into a largely subsistence and traditional agriculture, even if the local people were willing to encourage their absorption.

That the Arab governments cannot resettle Palestinian refugees in more or less permanent situations against their will should be obvious. There is documented evidence of refugee demonstrations against Arab governments which were accused of promoting schemes which could be interpreted as designed to make the Palestinians forget their homeland. Moreover, both the refugees and the host governments have been constantly haunted by the fear that successful resettlement would help the Israelis and the world to forget the injustice done to the Palestinians and to accept a large-scale fait accompli.

There can be no doubt that the festering unhappiness of the Palestinian refugee, whether still in camps or holding regular jobs and enjoying relatively normal lives, has been through all of these years one of the principal factors in prolonging the bitterness and the conflict. Likewise, it is an aspect of the situation about which many Israelis feel very uncomfortable and on which the Israeli dissidents attack their own government most vigorously. More than one prominent Israeli has publicly denounced his government for inept and inhuman handling of the refugee problem and has stated that no peace can be made with the Arab neighbors until Israel takes a more helpful and generous position on the Arab refugees.

Jewish Refugees

A large percentage of the Jewish population in Israel today can, on one basis or another, be described as having been refugees. In the
years of the struggle with the Arabs there has developed a special problem of the so-called Oriental or Arab Jews who have come to Israel since 1949, many of whom are refugees from Arab countries. By some Israeli estimates, about 600,000 of its citizens fall into this category.

In some cases, Arab hostility to local Arabized Jews—in places like Yemen, Algeria, Morocco and Iraq—reached such intensity that Jewish property, jobs and lives were threatened. With mounting harassment, discrimination, and persecution, some of these Jews were stripped of their possessions and fled as true refugees to Israel. In other cases, Jews in Arab countries were subjected to intensive recruiting efforts by Israeli representatives. Some of those who chose to go to Israel voluntarily—and without having suffered particularly at the hands of their Arab neighbors—found themselves deprived of much or all of their property as they left for Israel. In other cases, some were able to make satisfactory arrangements to transfer their assets in some useful form.

In any case, the government of Israel welcomed these newcomers, despite the fact that many of them were unbelievably distant in culture from the predominantly European Jews who created the state and still lead it. The Israelis showed both great humanitarian concern and high efficiency in incorporating these new settlers into the country.

In any honest and comprehensive search for equity for all refugees, Arab and Jewish, efforts should be made to establish the claims of the Arabized Jews who moved to Israel against those governments in their former homelands where unfair seizures of property have occurred. True justice in the Middle East must be concerned with the rights of both Jews and Arabs wherever those rights have been violated. Appropriate international efforts should be made, as part of any eventual overall peace settlement, to deal with those claims and rights which we have pointed out here without attempting to judge or quantify.
Peace must come again some day in the Middle East. Short of an improbable agreement between the antagonists, it can come in the discernible future only if the United Nations and the major powers can, first of all, bring about a reduction in the level of violence in the area and, secondly, define and support, more decisively than they have yet done, a comprehensive political settlement. It is urgent for the welfare of the Middle East and of the world that the leaders of all nations with important interests and involvements there move energetically in behalf of such a settlement.

The prospects for peace steadily fade away, and time appears to be running out. Each side is the victim of what it is convinced is the aggression of the other side. Everyone feels deeply aggrieved at an enemy from whom he cannot escape, whom he suspects and fears, and with whom he sees virtually no hope for peace. All are caught in a web of self-justification, bitterness, and hatred. Each side feels that force is the only language the other side will understand. And each side is wrong; force, we are convinced, is precisely the language neither side understands.

Although most Palestinian Arab refugees have found jobs and at least temporary homes in Jordan and in the neighboring Arab states, about a half million Palestinian Arab refugees remain, after twenty years, in "temporary" refugee camps, many of them having been made refugees twice during that period. Further violence makes still more refugees and pushes still further ahead the uncertain date for solving their problems. Since the June War of 1967, attitudes have hardened and voices of moderation, which are not absent on either
side, have tended to fall silent, largely self-suppressed for the time being by the bitter emotions which physical violence has created.

The arms race among the Middle Eastern powers is on in earnest again. Nations which need all the resources they can acquire to further the economic and social advancement of their peoples are caught up in a frenzied competition to acquire the hardware of war and to divert large numbers of their men to use it.

Moreover, the Fedayeen resistance forces, made up of Palestinian Arabs, have reached new levels of public esteem and support and have gained a hold on the emotions of the young people, and of most of their elders, unequalled by any other political or ideological group. Both Israeli and Arab governments are increasingly wedded to a no-compromise line and to strident propaganda attacks on the other side.

Provocations for a new full-scale conflict are evident to everyone. The Arabs and the Israelis continue on a collision course ever deeper into a fourth-round war. This needs to be remembered even though it is now argued by some military observers that Israel has such overwhelming superiority in the air that the Arabs would not dare cause a war now. There are heightened risks this time that nuclear weapons could be introduced into the conflict and that a major show-down between the Soviet Union and the United States in the area could develop. Peace in the area, and conceivably the peace of much of the rest of the world, is being put at the mercy of the unpredictable and uncontrollable forces that inevitably operate in times of continuous irregular warfare. Wars are rarely made on purely rational grounds. Wars break out when the rational case for attack, however flimsy, gets the support of overwhelming irrational pressures.

It is clear that the issues are profound and complex, that the passions on both sides are inflamed, and that the case each side presents to the world and against its enemy allows almost no room for compromise. Yet, however fractional the hope for peace may be, it must be pursued in the United Nations, in the talks among the major powers, and in continuing discussions with the leaders of the peoples concerned in the region, including representatives of the Palestinian Arabs, with all dispatch, energy, and imagination. A military solution will be no solution. There is no tolerable alternative to a political settlement.

These are the convictions of the Quakers who join in issuing this appeal to our own leaders and our fellow citizens and put forward these expressions of concern and good will to both Arabs and Israelis.
We know that any suggestions on the making of peace in the Middle East will be considered by some on all sides as meddlesome. All analyses of so difficult a problem are subject to errors of fact and of judgment; yet we feel, despite the obvious presumption, that we must attempt an appraisal of the issues and prospects in the hope of advancing in some measure the search for greater understanding and eventual peace.

As we see the Middle East conflict, our conclusions are:

1) The situation is not yet hopeless. It is exceedingly dangerous and steadily worsening. Time is working against everyone.

2) The contending sides are unable to solve their conflict directly and alone. They are incapable of reaching, on their own, any meaningful kind of truce.

3) Outside initiatives—vigorous and sustained—are essential if any settlement is to be reached. To succeed, those initiatives must have broad governmental and popular support, particularly in the United States.

4) No conceivable settlement could possibly satisfy the desires and demands of both sides, and it is almost inevitable that any workable solution will contain elements seriously objectionable to both.

5) There has in the past few years emerged an important new factor—the Palestinian Arabs, self-consciously seeking a role in their own salvation. They must be heard.

6) The United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, adopted on 22 November, 1967, remains the most practical and acceptable basis for achieving a peaceful settlement and should be faithfully and promptly implemented.
III

Viewpoints on the Conflict

We should like, despite the inescapable risk of oversimplification, to try to summarize the various viewpoints as we have encountered them—at the United Nations, in several world capitals, and in the Middle East—on how the conflict can be solved.

1. UNITED NATIONS VIEWPOINTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST

There are, of course, many attitudes on the Middle East among the members of the United Nations. Almost any action taken by the United Nations comes slowly, is certain to represent a compromise, and is afterwards subject to diverse interpretations. The United Nations from its inception has been intimately concerned with the Palestine problem: the legal creation of Israel involved formal action of the United Nations, and through the intervening years the UN has adopted an extensive series of resolutions concerning the Middle East. An official UN body (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency) still has the primary responsibility for providing essential services for the Arab refugees. UN observers still maintain a watch along the ceasefire lines. In all, there have been at least a dozen United Nations agencies, commissions, and special offices created to deal with various aspects of the Palestine problem since 1947.

On November 22, 1967, the Security Council of the United Nations voted unanimously for Resolution 242, which spelled out the basic guidelines for a comprehensive Middle East peace. (The text of the resolution appears in the Appendix.) Under that resolution, the
Secretary-General of the UN appointed Ambassador Gunnar Jarring of Sweden to serve as his Special Representative to seek ways "to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution." The November 22 Resolution, confirmed by later UN votes, remains the most complete official policy statement of the UN on a Middle East settlement, and has been the starting point for the Big Four talks.

The guidelines expressed in this Resolution, reflecting the wording and intent of both the UN Charter and various Middle East resolutions, assert the following basic principles and requirements:

a) "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace.
b) "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent (1967) conflict; and

c) "termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force."

Three practical steps in implementation of these principles are then affirmed by the November, 1967, Resolution as necessary in the search for settlement:

a) "guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
b) "achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
c) "guaranteeing territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones."

Acceptance of these guidelines was delayed until late 1967 because the Arab states, supported by the Soviet Union, insisted upon the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied territories as a condition for implementation of other provisions of the Resolution, while Israel, supported by the United States, refused to accept that sequence. In the end, the demand for prior Israeli withdrawal was dropped. The Resolution, remarkable for its unanimous acceptance by the Security Council, did not provide a timetable. Although its definition of basic principles and supporting practical actions may seem clear to the ordinary reader, it has been subjected to contradictory interpreta-
tions in sophisticated language by representatives of interested governments.

Ambassador Jarring tried for more than a year but failed to gain agreement from the Arab states and Israel for practical steps toward implementing the agreement. The chief stumbling blocks for his mission have been the refusal of the U.A.R. and Jordan to enter into face-to-face negotiations with the Israelis, as Israel has demanded, and the refusal of Israel to pledge itself to honor the UN principle of “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” and the call for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. Meanwhile, the growth of violence in the area prompted France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States to undertake a series of Big Four talks in search for ways to bring support to the Jarring mission. Clearly, there are differences of interpretation among the great powers—as well as between Israel and the Arabs—on particular points in the November Resolution, but they all continue to say that they base their search for peace on the principles of the UN Resolution.

It is the conclusion of the authors of this paper that the combatants in the Middle East should be expected by the international community to accept the principles and requirements of this Resolution, to maintain effective contacts with the UN Special Representative, and to work actively and in good faith for its implementation.

2. THE RELATION OF THE GREAT POWERS TO THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

The recurrent debate over whether the great powers should “become” involved in the Middle East suggests an unhistorical view of the situation. The great powers are involved. They have been involved for a long time. They share the guilt for perpetuating anti-Semitism into the era of the multi-religious, secular state. They helped to create the conditions which stimulated the longing of many Jews for the presumed safety of a national home.

The French, the British, and the Turks had major and historic roles of influence in the Arab world for a very long time. At the end of World War I, the French and the British, through the League of Nations mandate system, supplanted the Turkish empire, and their cultural influences are still visible in many ways. The British had, moreover, the primary political role in opening the way for large-scale Zionist settlement in Palestine and hence a fateful influence on
almost everything important that has happened in the area for the
past fifty years. The first major Jewish immigration, as noted above,
came from Czarist Russia, with most of the necessary funds being
supplied by German, French, British, and American Jews.

After World War II, the imperial power of both Britain and France
grew into rapid decline, and the drive for full national independence
swept across the region. The two super-powers, the Soviet Union
and the United States, became the contenders for dominant influ-
ence.

The United States had developed large oil interests, as well as
educational and Christian missionary activities, in the Arab coun-
tries. Though less important now than in past years, these interests,
as seen by some observers, have had an undue influence upon U.S.
policy in behalf of the Arab cause. On the other hand, it was the
support of the United States in the United Nations in the fall of 1947
that tipped the scales in favor of partition of Palestine. Ever since
then, the American government has provided large-scale economic
and military aid to Israel, and its tax policies have enabled American
Jewish citizens to contribute even larger sums to Israel on a tax-
deductible basis. Hence, the United States, as seen by others, has
seemed to allow its policy toward the Middle East to be shaped by a
vigorously active Zionist minority pressure-group among its citizens.
Arabs, even the most pro-American, are convinced that United
States commitments to Israel are dictated so completely by an Amer-
ican Jewish voting bloc that the President of the United States has
no real freedom of action to pursue an even-handed policy. Others
argue that American policy has at crucial points been distorted by a
simplistic opposition to communism.

At crucial points the United States has turned its back on the
Arabs during the past twenty years, with a predictable decline in
American prestige among the Arab nations and a corresponding rise
of Soviet influence. One such occasion came early in 1955, after an
Israeli attack on the Egyptian-administered Gaza, when the
Egyptians approached the United States with urgent requests to
purchase arms. Despite two previous years of American economic
aid and promises of American arms, eventually the United States
refused to provide military supplies except on the basis of a joint
military security pact or in small quantities for payment in dollars.
The British and the French, also approached by Nasser, made dis-
couraging responses. In June, 1955, President Nasser, convinced
that the West would not supply his needs, began negotiations to
secure arms from the Russians. From that time on, Soviet military
influence in the eastern Mediterranean grew steadily.
Another and related turning point came in the first half of 1956 when the United States and Great Britain, increasingly disturbed over Nasser's arms deal with the Soviets, decided to withdraw their support, directly and through the World Bank, for the construction of the Aswan High Dam. As a final insult, unnecessarily attached to the rejection, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles let it be known publicly that the United States doubted the soundness of Egypt's credit. This impugning of the nation's financial stability further embittered Egypt against the West. In short order came the expulsion of the British and the French from the Suez Canal, the Israeli-French-British attack, and Soviet aid for the High Dam.

The United States has followed no uniform policy against supplying arms to Israel's neighbors, as in the case of Egypt, but has provided military supplies to Saudi Arabia and Jordan, helped to underwrite the Baghdad Pact in the days when a conservative-ruled Iraq was a member, and sent in troops and supplies to bolster the pro-Western government in Lebanon in 1958.

In various ways, the United States has deeply involved itself in the economic, political, and military affairs of the Middle East, partially filling the vacuum left by the collapse of British and French power in the region. But, as has been clear since the mid-1950's, the Americans have not gone unchallenged.

The Soviet Union has continued the Czarist foreign policy of seeking major influence in the Mediterranean-Middle East area. Moreover, the Soviet Union now regards the Middle East as being within its vital defense area. It wants to drive NATO influence out of the eastern Mediterranean as a matter of its own national security. Accordingly, it has eagerly supplied vast quantities of arms, both before and after the June war, to the U.A.R., Syria, and Iraq, and has made a standing offer to provide Jordan with similar assistance. Soviet military aid to Arab countries after June, 1967, was carried out on such a scale and with such speed as to indicate a determination to alter rapidly and radically the post-war military situation in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union has, of course, taken an interest in the growth of the communist party movement in the Middle East, and it is reasonable to assume that its party ideologues would be pleased by the spread of communist-controlled governments in the area. However, the Soviets have repeatedly shown, in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, their willingness to overlook imprisonment of local communists and prohibition against communist party activity in the interest of maintaining good ties with friendly, anti-Western Arab governments. The Kremlin policy has clearly been to count on the slow growth of
the states of the Arab socialist pattern toward an increasingly accommodating relationship with the Soviet Union. Soviet leadership has been extremely astute in handling those relationships so as to avoid offending its sensitive and independent-minded Arab friends.

The primary interest of the Soviet Union in the Middle East seems clearly geared to considerations of military security and trade, ahead of the spread of communist party power as such. The eastern Mediterranean and Middle East are clearly regarded as part of a vital defense perimeter. It wants friendly or neutral neighbors in that “cushion” zone and freedom from threats of confrontation with big power rivals so close to home.

Potentially, American and Soviet involvement in the Middle East and their support roles in the Arab-Israeli conflict constitute one of the greatest of the many threats to world peace. Both nations now have powerful fleets in the Mediterranean and nuclear missile and air bases close at hand. Here nuclear confrontation could occur. However, properly directed, Soviet-American involvement in the Middle East is one of the chief hopes for peace. The two super-powers could achieve a kind of balance-of-interest relationship with one another, a competitive co-existence, in the Middle East. Efforts to make United States and Soviet involvement in the Middle East truly responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people of the area for peace and prosperity are essential.

The Soviet Union and the United States find the big power talks about the Middle East important in their own self-interest, highly useful as a means of communicating about their respective commitments in the Middle East. Since the peace of the whole world is so significantly tied to Soviet-American relations, it is essential that, in an area where they compete with special keenness for influence, trade, and power, they should clearly understand each other's objectives and attitudes. Moreover, it is evident that so long as the United States has a special sponsor relationship with Israel, and the Soviet Union has a special sponsor role toward some of the Arab states, continued conflict between Israel and the Arab states poses the possibility of serious conflict between the two great powers. It is also evident that each of them must favor some mutually acceptable solution to the Middle East crisis. At this point, neither of the great powers can look with favor on the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East, but that grim prospect becomes increasingly likely the longer the conflict continues.

During 1969, the United States and the Soviet Union carried on intensive negotiations concerning possible plans for implementing
the UN Resolution, searching for arrangements on which they could agree and which they could attempt to persuade the Arabs and the Israelis to accept. Progress was slow but in time the differences were narrowed and the relative positions were clarified.

Reflecting the Israeli demands for direct negotiations, the United States has tended to emphasize the necessity for the antagonists to seek ways of communicating with each other in order to work out security arrangements acceptable to both sides. The Soviets, reflecting the primary concerns of the Arab states, have stressed the indispensability of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.

**Soviet Views on Peace in the Middle East**

In Israel and the Western world, there has been much speculation as to what the Soviets, in fact, want to happen in the Middle East and what their ambitions are concerning Soviet influence in the area. We are, of course, not privy to any Soviet secrets, and we are well aware of the unreliability of even the most expert Kremlinologists. However, from our own talks with Soviet Middle East experts and with high Western officials who have dealt with Soviet diplomats on these questions, we are led to offer these summary comments on Soviet policy on the Middle East:

1) The Soviet Union accepts the existence of Israel as a sovereign national state and has repeatedly told its Arab friends that they, too, must accept the existence of Israel.

2) The Soviet Union believes that a comprehensive "package-deal" political settlement is the most desirable solution to the Middle East conflict but will not press for any settlement which is unacceptable to the United Arab Republic.

3) The UN Security Council Resolution 242, voted for by the Soviet Union on November 22, 1967, is still the proper basis for a political settlement, but that resolution, as the Soviets interpret it, requires a withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied after June 5, 1967, and does not require the Arab states to carry on direct negotiations with Israel.

4) The Soviet Union has granted large-scale military assistance to Syria, Iraq, and the United Arab Republic and is prepared to increase that aid in order to protect these countries against further attacks, as a means of making this no-peace/no-war period costly for Israel and as a way of exerting additional pressures upon Israel for an acceptable settlement. The Soviets
are aware of the military superiority of Israel and the inability of the Arabs to launch an effective attack; they do not see a radical change in that situation soon.

5) While the Soviet Union has made great gains among the Arab peoples during the past twenty years, at the expense of the United States and other Western powers, it does not want another all-out war in the Middle East; it certainly does not want a nuclear confrontation with the United States over the Middle East. The Soviets feel some apprehension about the possible dangerous consequences from an indefinite prolongation of this present no-peace/no-war situation and are not comfortable about the costs the Soviet Union must bear in sustaining the Arab states through a long and risky continuation of the present struggle.

6) The Soviet Union expresses strong sympathy for Al Fatah and other Palestinian commando organizations and hopes to influence the evolution of their political ideology; however, the Soviets want to see them kept in a subordinate role and do not support their purported objective of the elimination of the state of Israel.

United States Position on Peace in the Middle East

The United States voted for UN Security Council Resolution 242 and has continued to support its implementation through the efforts of Ambassador Jarring. However, it was only toward the end of 1969, after eight months of big power talks, that the Americans made public their full interpretation of the resolution. In a speech in Washington on December 9, 1969, Secretary of State William P. Rogers outlined the U.S. position with greater precision than had been made known before. In summary, that position is as follows:

1) The “only framework for a negotiated settlement” is one which accords “with the entire text of the UN Security Council resolution,” for “it is carefully balanced; it provides the basis for a just and lasting peace—not merely an interlude between wars.”

2) A continuation of the present no-peace/no-war situation “would serve the interests of no nation, in or out of the Middle East.”

3) In order to implement the UN Resolution there need to be “binding commitments” from both Israel and the United Arab Republic (and other Arab states) to make peace, and to assume the obligation of preventing “hostile acts originating from their respective territory.”
4) The conflicting parties must themselves work out the detailed provisions for the “security safeguards” along the frontiers, with demilitarized buffer zones set up and “insubstantial alterations” in the pre-June 1967 armistice lines allowed for, as may be agreed upon “for mutual security.” Such agreements could be reached, under Ambassador Jarring’s auspices, in indirect “Rhodes-style talks.”

5) “The Security Council resolution endorses the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by war and calls for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war.” The United States reaffirms its support of “this part of the resolution, including withdrawal, just as we do its other elements . . . We do not support expansionism. We believe troops must be withdrawn as the resolution provides.”

6) Jerusalem should be a “unified city,” with no “restrictions on the movement of persons and goods,” open to “persons of all faiths and nationalities,” and with “roles for both Israel and Jordan in the civic, economic and religious life of the city.”

It does not seem likely that the super-powers can “impose” peace. However, it still appears to be essential for the Soviet Union and the United States to continue directly and in concert their search for ways to foster a peaceful political settlement.

It is the judgment of the authors of this paper that a large measure of responsibility for the distressing continuance of conflict in the Middle East rests upon the great powers, both historically and at present. They are involved and will continue to be involved in the area. What is at stake is the character of that involvement. Unremitting efforts must be made through both bilateral and United Nations channels to persuade the involved powers to show a genuine concern for the peace and welfare of the Arabs and the Israelis—and of the rest of the world. The two super-powers have particular responsibilities to press for the speedy implementation of UN Resolution 242, in its entirety, as the way to peace.

3. PALESTINIAN ARAB POSITIONS

There is basic agreement among all Arabs that the Israeli state was born with the aid of Western political cynicism and achieved through the determination of the Zionists to take over all of Palestine. They regard the result as a shameful injustice to the Arab majority in the area. They believe that until that injustice is admitted, both by the
victorious Israelis and by the international community, steps toward redress, however inadequate, and toward peace cannot be contemplated.

Among the roughly two and a half million Palestinian Arabs in the world, about one half have since June, 1967, lived under Israeli occupation. At the end of the war of 1948-49, approximately 750,000 Palestinians from the areas which came under Israeli control became exiles, most of them living as wards of a United Nations agency of limited powers and meagerly financed by UN member states. This situation continues, the number having increased to more than a million, despite the UN Resolution of December 11, 1948, which establishes their right to choose through the Conciliation Commission whether to return to Israel and live at peace with their neighbors or to resettle elsewhere and accept compensation for lost property and rights. This solution of the problem, annually repeated in UN resolutions, has been blocked, and with the passage of years, while hope has dimmed, determination to seek a return to their homes has grown rather than died among the displaced Palestinians.

Thus, the Arabs of Palestine see themselves as a people in diaspora, just at the time when the Jews have won their struggle for a national home. Ironically, throughout the past twenty years as governments have sought to deal with the Middle East problem, the people most victimized, the Palestine Arabs, have had as a group no internationally recognized standing, no unified voice, no direct instrument of representation. To be sure, as the principal nation-state heir of Palestine territory and as host government both east and west of the Jordan River to the largest single block of Palestinians, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has often been assumed to speak for the Palestinian Arabs. With the best of intentions and the highest sense of responsibility, no government could hope to satisfy Palestinian Arab aspirations under existing circumstances. Cast aside, dispersed and divided, the Palestinians see themselves as the forgotten element in the Middle East during the past twenty years.

Yet in one of history's great surprises, at the lowest ebb of their fortunes, the Palestinians since the June War of 1967 have emerged as a major and inevitably complicating factor in the situation. International relations by definition deal with relations among nation-states; diplomatic procedures are closely geared to this basic understanding. International public servants and their organizations are naturally appalled at the thought of dealing with non-state, non-governing groups, associations, resistance organizations. Yet in the
Middle East there has now emerged a new and imperative demand for the just recognition of claims denied to the abused Palestinian people.

The Al Fatah Dream

There is no agreement among Palestinians, either refugees or those living under Israeli occupation, upon a single preferred course of action. To Al Fatah, largest of the resistance organizations, the possibility of peace is linked directly with the dissolution of the present state of Israel. Its members call for the creation of a secular, multi-religious state in which Arabs and Jews can live as fellow-citizens within a democratic system. They reject a partition of Palestine, as Arabs rejected it in 1947, citing the difficulty of agreeing upon just and practical boundaries, the transfer of populations, and fair compensation for property. They specifically deny any intention, formerly expressed by Arab extremists, to “throw the Jews into the sea.”

The Palestinian resistance leaders say very matter-of-factly: “We have waited for more than twenty years for the United Nations to secure fulfillment of the international promises to us; and nothing has happened. We have waited for effective action by the Arab governments, and they too have failed us. Only we, the Palestinians, can solve our problems. We are going home. We are prepared to live at peace in a reunited Palestine with our Jewish neighbors. We do not accept as permanent a Jewish Zionist state in Palestine.”

Diverging and Moderate Views

However, there are other Palestinian voices. The United Nations approach to peace-making, as well as the assumptions behind Big Four discussion of the Middle East problem, obviously accepts the present reality and the expected continuance of a nation-state of Israel. Some among the Palestinian Arabs, including persons living under Israeli occupation, now generally silent in the face of inflamed public opinion on both sides, agree that Israel is there to stay, and they are prepared to accept it—if the Israelis withdraw from territories occupied in June, 1967. Moreover, they regard the proposal to create a unitary, secular state in Palestine as unrealistic, quite apart from the evident difficulty—most would say impossibility—of securing its acceptance. To continue the proposal, which in any
event many suspect of being a mere bargaining point, is to postpone the already distant chance of peace.

These moderate Palestinians support the basic principles of self-determination for the Arabs of Palestine. They propose that a beginning be made by Israeli withdrawal and by the creation, under international sponsorship and protection, of a governing body responsible for the West Bank and Gaza. They believe that, during a predetermined period of development, plans could be devised to learn by democratic means the will of the Palestinians, and to decide what political and economic course they could agree upon and what relationships they might freely establish with fellow Arab states and with the state of Israel.

Moreover, it is contended that the acceptance of Israel as defined above is the only way to counter the expansionist hopes of those Israelis who seem to favor an annexationist policy and the only way to undercut the position of those hard-line Israeli cabinet members who, in pursuit of the dream of “strategically secure” boundaries, insist on keeping large portions of the presently occupied territories.

Back of all Palestinian Arab feelings is the fear that there are no bounds to the territorial ambitions of Israel. The early form of Zionist ideology (as they interpret it) still dictates official Israel policy. If and when an undefined Jewish nation-state finds it possible to gather in the millions of Jews whom some Israeli spokesmen have at various times promised to bring eventually into the Middle East, Israel, under pressure from its right-wing parties, or from plain economic requirements, will, they believe, embark upon further expansionist adventures. Arab convictions about an unlimited and unchanging Zionist expansionism, whatever the true intentions of Israel may be, are a very real source of continued Arab fear and hostility.

*It is the considered judgment of the authors of this paper that recognition in practical form of a way to build the community and to establish the political rights of the Palestine people is a necessary early step toward solution of the area’s problems. This must be achieved straightforwardly and honestly, with full cooperation of the international community, of Israel, and of the Arab states. Outside influence for selfish national purposes must be avoided.*

4. ISRAELI POSITIONS

Perhaps the most widely expressed statement of Israeli political opinion is to the effect that Israel has never wanted anything but
peace in the Middle East and the right to exist as a nation. Almost
the entire blame for the Arab refugee problem some Israeli leaders
place upon the Arab governments, both for the original flight and
for the more than twenty years of impoverished exile. They point
out that they were attacked by Arab armies on the day the state of
Israel was proclaimed and that their Arab neighbors have never
accepted the existence of that state. On the contrary, they see them-
selves as having been harassed without ceasing—by propaganda,
trade boycotts, a proclaimed state of belligerency, and endless guer-
rilla attacks. They insist that they were forced to fight three wars in
twenty years in the hope of stopping Arab attacks and of gaining
acceptance of the right of their state to exist. They accuse the Arab
governments of being unwilling to make an acceptable peace or to
restrain the Palestinian guerrilla groups. Big Four efforts to promote
a settlement the Israelis regard as futile and likely to lead only to
greater intransigence on the part of the Arabs. If such a settlement
could be signed, the Israelis say, it would not be fairly enforced.
Moreover, they argue that merely to sign such a document, with Big
Four guarantees, would be to give the Russians a special position of
power in the Middle East. Such a development, they claim, could
only work to the long-term disadvantage of Israel and the Western
nations and increase the likelihood of still greater conflicts in the
future.

Meanwhile, the Israeli official position is to keep insisting that the
only way to make peace is for the Arab governments to negotiate,
point by point, a comprehensive peace. The Israelis have said that
the Arabs must not be enabled to “hide behind” a peace suggested
(or “imposed”) by third parties, for such a peace they think could and
would be repudiated. They want the Arab leaders to have to take
the initiative in admitting to their peoples that they cannot destroy
Israel and in putting their personal and political existence on the line
by declaring officially and publicly the necessity for accepting the
existence of Israel and establishing peaceful relations with her
through bi-laterally negotiated peace treaties.

Let the Arabs, they say, come to the conference table. Until the
Arabs are prepared to sit down for such negotiations—and the Is-
raelis recognize that this is unlikely to happen for a long time—
some Israeli leaders are prepared to hold all of the conquered terri-
tories and to believe that an indefinite prolongation of the present
stalemate serves Israel’s long-term interests. The November UN
Resolution is regarded by Israel only as a statement of goals and a
list of agenda items for direct negotiations between Israel and the
Arab states.
To the Israelis, the roots of the struggle lie in the refusal of the Arab world to recognize the right of the Jewish people to return to their homeland and to establish there, not only a national home, but also an independent state. The persecutions which the Jewish people had endured for centuries and which were brought to a climax by Hitler's extermination camps require as a primary necessity a place where victims and survivors can feel secure and a sovereign state which can defend the elementary human rights of such victims.

The Arabs, who now clamor for Israeli compliance with the 1967 UN Resolution, it is pointed out, have never accepted the 1947 UN Resolution which established the state of Israel. In fact, the Arab states attacked the fledgling Israeli state at its birth (creating thereby the refugee problem) and have given it no peace since then.

Arab demands for the obliteration of Israel in its present form as a Jewish national state are seen by Israelis as a direct threat to their survival as a people, even if they discount occasional direct Arab threats of extermination. For Israelis feel, in the light of long Jewish experience and especially of recent history in Europe, that the possession and control of their own state is their only ultimate security in an essentially hostile world.

The Israeli position is that they did not want or plan the 1967 war. As they see it, the war started before their attack on June 5, with the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba, which they claim was an act of war both in common sense and in international law. However, once the war started, they felt they were fighting for survival, and they won. To give up the conquered territories now, without obtaining a compensatory assurance from the Arabs that they recognize Israel's right to exist and will desist from further hostile acts, would be a return to the insecure position before June, 1967. Israelis feel that, if this is what the world is requiring of them, it is in fact asking them for self-immolation, for a sacrifice of everything that they have fought for and worked for since the founding of their state and before.

Officially, Israel has never declared its long-range intentions toward the occupied areas. Certain Israeli spokesmen, however, have repeatedly said that they will never give up the newly absorbed Arab sector of Jerusalem, will never withdraw from the Golan Heights, will never again accept the boundaries which gave the country a "pinched waist" north of Jerusalem, will not withdraw from Sharm el Sheikh at the southern tip of Sinai, and will absorb the Gaza Strip. High officials have made conflicting statements about Israeli intentions toward the whole of the West Bank. There have been repeated declarations that Israel does not want a large Arab minority. At the
same time, there have been declarations that the West Bank Arabs must remain disarmed and that Israeli security requires a permanent defensive line along the Jordan River, deep inside what was from 1948 to 1967 Jordanian territory.

Israeli actions in the occupied areas and Israeli cabinet-level pronouncements concerning those areas indicate clearly that some Israeli leaders believe implementation of the UN Resolution provisions on withdrawal from occupied territories, however they might be interpreted and restricted, would entail an unacceptable threat to Israel's security. The Israeli government views the provision "withdrawal from territories" in the UN Resolution as not meaning withdrawal from all territories. It has undertaken, meanwhile, to create certain \textit{faits accomplis} which seem to make withdrawal from some areas improbable or even impossible.

Specifically, Israel has proceeded to incorporate Arab East Jerusalem into a Jewish-run unified Jerusalem. No nation has given official recognition of the change, and the United Nations General Assembly has voted 99 to 0 to censure Israel for unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem. Israel responds that UN attempts to control the fate of Jerusalem are biased and irrelevant and that the UN did nothing to protect Jewish rights in Arab Jerusalem during the period 1948-67 when Jordan was in control. Further, Israeli resistance to withdrawal is evidenced by the establishment of Jewish agricultural-military settlements in the West Bank. There is also now a new, small, isolated Jewish community attached to the Arab city of Hebron, created as a symbolic gesture toward rebuilding a Jewish claim to places long closely identified with Jewish history. Israeli bulldozers have wiped out three ancient Arab villages which until 1967 stood in the so-called Latrun Valley salient alongside the strategic road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem; Israelis have made clear that they will have no Arab settlers in this area again. Various long-term Israeli projects are underway in the Sinai. (For the record, it should be noted that a number of Arab villages were wiped off the map in the 1948 fighting and that several Jewish villages which wound up in Jordanian hands were similarly "erased." ) One vigorous minority faction in the coalition government has made it clear that it will insist on Israel's keeping every inch of Arab territory now occupied. Annexationist versus anti-annexationist arguments have become a principal factor within Israeli politics, and not even the Israeli cabinet has been able to agree on a policy. In fact, according to highly placed Israelis, the government of Israel has avoided all serious efforts to discuss the fundamental issue of permanent
boundaries, either within the cabinet or in any public forum, on the
grounds that until there is a likelihood of negotiations with the
Arabs such discussions would only exacerbate conflicts within the
governing coalition and would compromise the country's future bar-
gaining position. Still other leaders have asserted that the present
wall-to-wall coalition would fall if and when serious peace negotia-
tions begin but that a government would then be formed which could
make a negotiated peace.
Meanwhile, in the belief that they can break down Arab hostility,
whether withdrawal takes place or not, the Israelis have under-
taken many public works and social welfare projects among the
Arabs, and substantial numbers of Arabs from the occupied territ-
ories are offered employment in Israel.
Some Israeli officials indicated at one time that they hoped for an
autonomous Palestinian Arab political entity linked to Israel through
some kind of customs union. However, again and again, West Bank
Arab leaders have rebuffed this suggestion on the grounds that it
would lead simply to a Quisling regime. Yet the Israelis are not dis-
couraged. Given time, they feel that they can create enough "new
facts" to get substantially what they want—militarily secure bound-
daries, disarmed Arab neighbors, perhaps even a customs union be-
tween a semi-autonomous Arab West Bank and Israel.

Some Non-Official Israeli Views

Within Israel there are respected voices which, however cautiously,
challenge the government position. These range all the way from a
handful of pacifists to scholarly historians and other professors and
writers to radical leftists. These critics agree that the policy of
no-peace/no-war cannot be continued indefinitely and that disaster
is possible unless the government moves beyond its repetitive
appeals for the Arabs to come to the conference table.

Israeli dissenters often begin an explanation of their position by
some such statement as this:

"We uphold the existence of the state of Israel. We fought to
create it. We will fight to the death to preserve it. If we are
driven into a corner where we must fight the Arabs to maintain a
Jewish state, we will fight. But in the long run, the survival of our
Jewish state depends, not so much upon guns or upon boundaries,
as upon having peaceful, cooperative relations with our Arab
neighbors. This means that we must find ways to enable the
Palestinian Arabs to secure their legitimate rights and to satisfy
their proper needs and hopes."
As a professor at Hebrew University put it:

"Israel may be able to win and win and go on winning till its last breath, win itself to death . . . After every victory, we face more difficult, more complicated problems . . . The abyss of mutual hatred will deepen and the desires for vengeance will mount."

Alternatives to present Israeli policies are rarely put forward in any great detail by government critics or pressed with assurance. It is insisted, however, that: (1) it is impossible to negotiate a comprehensive peace at this time with any imaginable group of Arab leaders and that (2) the obsession of Israeli leaders with calculations of "militarily secure" boundaries—and new settlements right up to the new boundaries—can lead only to the freezing of Arab attitudes of rage and hostility which will make the achieving of any ultimate security impossible.

A distinguished Israeli lawyer and member of the Law faculty of Hebrew University has declared publicly:

"A border is secure when those living on the other side do not have sufficient motivation to infringe on it . . . We have to remind ourselves that the roots of security are in the minds of men . . . We have fallen today into a vicious circle: since there is no trust in the Arabs' desire for peace, people emphasize the need for security (apparently as a substitute) and even say that one really couldn't rely on a peace agreement with the Arabs even if they agreed to it, since it wouldn't be a 'true peace'."

He also expresses his dissent from the oft-stated demand for immediate, directly negotiated, bilateral Arab-Israeli comprehensive peace treaties with this comment: "I don't think that it is possible to exchange this situation (the continuing sporadic conflict)—for one that is not as bad by the joint endeavor of the parties to the dispute."

It is the judgment of the authors of this paper that the present Israeli policy of prolonging indefinitely the military occupation of Arab territories and of disclaiming responsibility for the plight of the Arab refugees, plus the repeated statements by Israeli leaders that some, if not all, of the lands taken over since June 5, 1967, are now permanently Israeli, make direct negotiation of an Arab-Israeli settlement virtually impossible. It is our further judgment that such a stance will be ultimately self-defeating for Israel and can bring only continued violence and make virtually inevitable a fourth-round war, with unforeseeable consequences for all Arabs, all Israelis, and many other peoples across the world.
5. VIEWPOINTS OF JORDAN AND THE U.A.R.

Jordan and the United Arab Republic are the Arab states most directly affected by the conflict with Israel, have paid the heaviest price in loss of manpower, war materiel and territory in the June War, and are most directly involved in the continuing attacks and counter-attacks across the cease-fire lines. Their responses to peacemaking efforts are crucial. Without their cooperation no political settlement is possible.

Central in their approach to a settlement has been the demand that Israel withdraw from all territories under Arab control prior to June 5, 1967. They are supported in this view by what they regard as the clear and non-negotiable directive of the UN November 22 Resolution, which these two Arab states have publicly accepted.

Jordanian and Egyptian officials interpret the United Nations Resolution as being “not an Arab formula for peace.” It requires them to give up positions which for twenty years they held to tenaciously as matters of principle: (a) refusal to recognize the state of Israel and to end the state of belligerency; (b) refusal to grant to Israeli shipping the right to use the Suez Canal; and (c) refusal to permit freedom of access for shipping bound for the Israeli port of Eilat through the Strait of Tiran. The giving up of those positions, say the Arabs, is an immense concession. Reluctantly, after three wars, they have concluded that they must agree that Israel is a reality, political as well as geographic, in the Middle East and is not going to disappear. They say that they are willing to put an end to the conflict—provided Israel withdraws from the territories which she has occupied since June, 1967.

The governmental leaders of Jordan and the United Arab Republic recognize that the Palestinian commando groups are an influential force in opposing such a political settlement. However, they argue that if a “just” peace plan is implemented with total Israeli withdrawal from conquered territories and proper satisfaction of the Arab refugee claims, the Palestinian groups will eventually accept the settlement as the best attainable solution, as will, they believe, the more irreconcilable elements in all Arab states.

Jordanians and Egyptians say that the chief barrier to a political peace settlement is quite simply the refusal of the Israelis to give any assurance that they will end their military occupation of Arab lands and withdraw from the conquered territories. Moreover, they regard the June defeat as a “lost battle,” not a lost war. (A grim Arab joke is to refer to what the Israelis call the “Six Days War” as
the “longest six day war in history.”) The Arab governments believe that only military defeat or strong external pressure from the United Nations and from the Big Four will ever persuade the Israelis to withdraw. Therefore, Jordan and the U.A.R. welcome the talks among the major powers on the Middle East, but they are pessimistic about the possibility that the United States will ever agree to the application of sufficient pressure on Israel to get a settlement.

Within Jordan and the United Arab Republic there are few who will criticize government policies openly. Criticism of those policies, where it can be found, is generally in terms of calling for more vigorous military action against Israel. This is particularly true in Jordan where the Palestinian refugees constitute about half the total population and where Palestinian fighter organizations have their principal bases. Although King Hussein, for a time, tried to control these groups and discouraged their attacks across the cease-fire lines, he was eventually forced by public opinion to give them considerable support, even though it is clear that they constitute a direct threat to his own rule, and frequent are the predictions that they will overthrow him. The dangers to his regime and to the moderate views he represents inevitably grow the longer a peaceful settlement with Israel is delayed.

The activities of the Arab fighting organizations are looked upon as criminal terrorism by the Israelis who inflict severe reprisals upon the commando camps in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, upon towns and villages said to be bases for the “terrorists” and upon individuals and families in Israeli-occupied territory who are accused of aiding, feeding or housing members of any of these organizations. The Arabs, on the other hand, increasingly have come to look upon the Fedayeen as noble “freedom fighters,” heroic men in the mold of the “Resistance” in Nazi-occupied Europe. The more leftist Arabs, of course, liken them to the Vietcong battling against the forces of “Western imperialism.”

In terms of military accomplishments the Arab guerrilla groups cannot claim very impressive results. The efficiency of the Israeli border and interior defense forces is extraordinary. They keep order throughout the occupied areas with remarkably few soldiers or police in evidence. Fedayeen damage to Israeli civilian and military property has been limited. Yet the Arab attacks continue and have become particularly troublesome in the Gaza strip and occasionally occur in the major cities of Haifa, Tel Aviv and other areas of pre-1967 Israel where the Israeli Arabs were supposedly pacified and reconciled to their Jewish neighbors.
The fact is that terrorism and counter-terrorism are increasingly the language through which Israel and her Arab neighbors attempt to communicate. Given the fears on each side, the outsider can understand why these horrible acts occur. What the outside observer cannot understand is what anyone hopes to accomplish by a continuation of this destructive pattern. Arab terrorism creates immediate Israeli reaction—often on the basis of "two eyes for an eye." This, in turn, is guaranteed to recruit fresh Fedayeen volunteers and to launch new attacks. In such a situation, no Arab government controls the activities of the commando groups, and the downward spiral toward disaster continues.

*It is the judgment of the authors of this paper that the Arab states must establish control over commando groups operating from their territories to halt the continuing acts of violence. It is also our judgment that the Israeli government should abandon its policy of massive retaliatory "over-kill" strikes against Arab targets and give up its preventive attacks on far-ranging military targets in the United Arab Republic, in Jordan, and in Syria. It is essential that a cease-fire be re-established as part of a series of steps toward implementing the UN peace-plan resolution. It will be important for Israel and the outer world to realize that so long as the no-peace/no-war situation continues and the truce lines take on, in Arab eyes, more and more the character of "illegal permanent boundaries," the harder it will be to maintain any genuine cease-fire.*

6. SOME CRITICAL VIEWPOINTS ON NEGOTIATIONS

Jewish Attitudes

One of the most troublesome issues at stake in efforts to bring about an Arab-Israeli settlement is the issue of direct negotiations. To the Israelis the matter is very simple: Nations that were involved in the making of war on each other must make the peace with each other; a peace is unthinkable which is not arrived at through direct dialogue between the antagonists. They suggest that the only explanation for a refusal to enter into direct negotiations is an unwillingness to make peace and a desire, whether overtly expressed or not, to renew the war as soon as it is practicable to do so. Since the Arabs have, after all three wars, refused to negotiate directly with Israel, the Arabs have not given up their long-term determination to destroy Israel. When the Arabs come to their senses and indicate a willingness to negotiate, then, and only then, will it be clear that the Arabs are prepared to accept the existence of Israel and live at peace with it.
The Israeli official position, as expressed at various times by Foreign Minister Abba Eban, is that "all issues" are negotiable. Meanwhile, however, certain other Ministers from time to time have made public speeches for domestic consumption in which it is claimed that this or that territorial issue is "non-negotiable." Such declarations inevitably strengthen the Arab conviction that the Israeli demand for negotiations is not sincere.

More significant, in the view of the authors of this paper, is the analysis given by several responsible high officials within the dominant wing of the Israeli governing coalition, repeated on numerous occasions to U.S. diplomats, to members of Congress, and to private citizens:

"It is impossible to make peace with the Arabs now, or for several years to come. They will not negotiate a peace on terms we will accept; we will not agree to peace on their terms. The Arab societies are still backward, unstable, and led by incompetent leaders. Not until social revolutions have changed Arab society, not until new and competent leaders have risen to power, will it be possible to make peace. Meanwhile, we Israelis have military superiority, we have defensible boundaries, we can defeat any combination of Arab military power thrown against us and will be able to do so for the next five or ten years—and who can plan his life for more than five or ten years?"

Arab Attitudes

To the Arabs, the issue of direct negotiations appears in a very different light. They see the Israeli demand for direct negotiations as a way of trying to by-pass the peace-making arrangements provided in UN Resolution 242 and of negating the substantive requirements of that resolution. The refusal of the Israelis to give assurances in the United Nations, privately to the Americans, directly to Ambassador Jarring, or in any public form of any intention to withdraw from the territories acquired in the June War, and to accept the UN Resolution's mandate concerning the "inadmissability of the acquisition of territory by war," is interpreted by the Arabs as proof that the Israelis do not intend to agree to peace within the guidelines laid down by unanimous vote of the Security Council. In the light of such a frozen attitude, the Arabs view the negotiations proposed by the Israelis as little more than an invitation to sign a surrender document, leaving to Israel the territorial gains she made in the June War, in defiance of the UN.
The Arab states point out that in adopting the United Nations charter its members have committed themselves to abide by a different set of standards and rules concerning war and conquest than those which obtained in an earlier age. They argue that both the UN Charter and the Security Council resolutions adopted under that charter do not support Israel’s apparent desire and intention to try to operate under the old pre-UN traditions of conquerors. The Arabs do not intend to enter into so-called negotiations in order to bargain with the Israelis to return some small or large portion of the lands occupied since June 5, 1967, when they believe Israel is obligated by the UN Charter and by Security Council Resolution 242 to give back all those territories.

Moreover, Arab representatives remind the world that, though the creation of Israel was first contemplated under the United Nations Partition Resolution of 1947, the establishment of the state was not based upon a negotiated settlement between the Jews and the Arabs, and in fact took the form of an imposed settlement against the unwavering opposition of all the Arab states and against the will of the Palestinians. Thus, they reason, Israel is in a poor position to insist upon a direct, bi-lateral negotiated settlement of the War of 1967.

Further, the leaders of Arab governments are under such great internal and external political pressures from fellow Arabs to resist Israel that agreement to negotiate would be immediately and widely interpreted among the Arab masses as capitulation, with grave attendant hazards for the Arab governments and for the leaders involved. The Arabs insist that the Israelis are fully aware of these problems and are demanding negotiations simply because negotiations cannot in the present circumstances take place.

What the Arabs argue for is the establishment of a set of detailed provisions for the phased, mutually accepted implementation of UN Resolution 242, those provisions to be worked out by the UN Special Representative, with the help of such other UN or third-party intermediaries as might be appropriately employed. Such arrangements could eventually be incorporated in a binding agreement signed by both parties. The substance of the peace—acceptance by the Arabs of the existence of Israel and agreement to live in peace with her behind agreed boundaries, and the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces—is what is important, say the Arabs, not the procedures by which the agreement is prepared. They admit that if a true and lasting peace is to come between Arabs and Israelis they must in time enter into a great variety of contacts and relationships. But those relationships can develop, they insist, only after the basic elements
of trust have been established through the acceptance and full implementation of the UN's peace resolution.

**Big Government Efforts on Negotiations**

The American, British and French representatives in the Big Four discussions have been struggling to devise a formula for phased negotiations which the Soviet Union, Jordan and the U.A.R., as well as Israel, will accept. It is their hope that the Big Four can set down the ground rules for developments toward peace with such precision and manifest fairness as to bring about, first, indirect, Rhodes-style deliberations and, eventually, face-to-face dealings between representatives of the Arab governments and Israel leading to a formal peace undertaking. These ground rules have not been established, although each side has shown enough flexibility on a few issues to encourage the powers to continue their work.

*It is the judgment of the authors of this paper that direct negotiations are not possible at this time, and will not be possible until the Arabs feel themselves in a stronger bargaining position than they occupy today or the Israelis show greater flexibility on fundamental issues than they have shown thus far. Neither side feels itself strong enough to have genuinely free and comprehensive negotiations, and they are in almost total disagreement on interpreting the guidelines for reaching the agreement on peace called for by the UN resolution. Strong and determined efforts by the Big Four, aided perhaps by a more active role for a mediator, will be required to define the basic conditions for peace and the successive stages for implementation of an agreement. Given such determination and patient persistence, it is possible that the substance of an effective agreement can be reached by indirect means. In the end, of course, agreement must be encased in a formal, unequivocal and binding agreement for peace. But it is only after there is acceptance of such a fundamental document for ending the years of violence that the long, slow processes leading to really peaceful relations can begin.*
IV

Suggestions for the Bases of a Practical Peace Settlement

It is hard enough to determine the historical facts about the Arab-Israeli conflict and to make certain that they are recorded accurately. It is extremely difficult to hear with precision the viewpoints of the various interested parties and to interpret them fairly. To move beyond these hazardous exercises and to attempt to put forward specific proposals is patently presumptuous. However, people of many diverse viewpoints have suggested that Quakers should as a part of this statement try to develop some proposals on how a peace might be achieved. It has been said with good-humored bluntness: “Everybody knows the Quakers are in favor of peace, but so is everyone else. What are the practical steps to be taken toward peace? The Quakers should try to come forward with some specific suggestions, even at the risk of being ridiculed.”

We believe that everyone is in favor of peace in the Middle East—in the abstract. As in all conflicts, it is natural to want a peace that gives one’s own side what it wants, or peace which represents total surrender by the enemy. The trouble is that peace as a concrete reality is almost always based upon accommodation, bargaining, compromise—even after an overwhelming victory by one side. So must it be if peace is to come to the Middle East.

Are there any grounds for hoping that the bases for an accommodation in the Middle East can be found? We believe there are, despite abundant reasons for discouragement and even despair. We know full well that whatever approaches are suggested will be subject to rejection and abuse by both sides—and may prove, objectively, to be ill-advised. Nonetheless, with all the risks involved, we are prepared
to state our conviction that the following guidelines offer the most promising approaches to a settlement of the Middle East troubles that seem likely to be available.

1. THE FIRST STEP MUST BE AN EFFORT AT PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL DISENGAGEMENT

Insofar as anti-Semitism still exists anywhere in the world, or may develop in the future, it is a problem with which responsible leaders everywhere must deal and against which world opinion must be mobilized. This, like all other forms of racism, must be combated vigorously if there is to be a decent life in this interrelated age for any of us. But anti-Jewish prejudices, discrimination and persecution are not a problem which the Arab countries must be expected to solve for the rest of the world by repeatedly trading away Arab territory. To place that burden upon the Arabs is to transfer from the West to the Middle East the most loathsome aspects of the anti-Jewish madness and to make peace for the area, in any true sense, impossible.

Convictions about an inevitable continuing Jewish expansionist drive alongside continuing Arab technical and military weakness long ago became a dominant factor in the Arab view of the world. It is, understandably, a fixation, a cause of fear, and a basis for hostile Arab judgments on all other current political phenomena involving Israel. The sometimes explicit, sometimes merely hinted references of Israeli leaders to a continuing in-gathering of Jews from all over the world give to the Arabs a sense of fear, hopelessness, and resentment that overclouds all attempts at rational discussion of a Middle East settlement. These attitudes will continue so long as that in-gathering can be interpreted as tied to an expansion of the Jewish-held territories in the Middle East at the expense of the Arabs.

Prior to the June War, and since, some Israelis have said that, by the intense application of labor and capital, Israel could absorb all the Jews of the world, if that should become necessary, within the truce lines recognized prior to June 5, 1967. All Israeli leaders insist that it was not any Jewish territorial ambition that produced the June War or that would stand in the way of peace now. However, having acquired new territories as the result of that war, many Israelis do not want to give them back and some indicate that they want even more. Only a forthright declaration by the Israeli government repudiating the accusation that its plans for Jewish immigra-
tion are tied to any further demands for territorial expansion can begin to allay the most persistent Arab fears.

The Arab paranoia over the prospects of unlimited Israeli territorial expansionism is matched by a Jewish paranoia toward the prospects of unceasing Arab determination to destroy Israel and to slaughter all Jews. The daily commando attacks on Israeli communities, military outposts, or individual soldiers and civilians, of course, feed that fear. So do Arab propaganda broadcasts, declarations and calls for a Holy War which seem to support the Israeli charge that the Arabs will not accept the existence of Israel in any form. The Israeli government and people continue to brush aside the commando attacks as having no more military significance than traffic accidents, regrettable though bearable, but they serve to unify a loose coalition government that would otherwise fly apart and bind an otherwise critical and peace-hungry people to the hard-line policies of the government. Even those Israelis who denounce their government, sometimes in the most devastating terms, nonetheless also denounce the commando violence and say that if that violence brings on another war, they, while still critical of what they regard as their own government’s stubbornness and stupidity, will join the fight, as Israeli patriots, to defend their nation against destruction. The further the Arabs go in trying to solve the conflict with the Israelis through violence, the more violence the Israelis will use against the Arabs. The more threats against the existence of Israel are uttered by Arab spokesmen, the more the Israelis become convinced that no peace with the Arabs is possible.

It is the judgment of the authors of this paper that the emotionally overcharged atmosphere in the Middle East must be cleared, the mutual fears and hatreds must somehow be abated, the beginnings of mutual credibility must be established—if the first steps toward a settlement are ever to be taken. This means, we believe, that there is urgent need for certain unequivocal declarations of intent. First, the Israeli government must give forthright assurances on eventual withdrawal from occupied territories as part of an overall peace settlement and should attempt to refute accusations of further expansionist aims. Second, the Arab governments must declare their acceptance of the fact of Israel’s existence as a sovereign state and must make clear their willingness to live in a condition of non-belligerency with Israel. Third, the Big Four should declare their readiness to underwrite a peace settlement agreed upon by Israel, Jordan, and Egypt and negotiated in consultation with the Palestinian Arabs.
2. THE SECOND STEP MUST BE AN EFFORT AT MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT.

Absolutely nothing can be accomplished toward a peaceful settlement if the acts of violence on both sides continue to escalate. Therefore, a most urgent issue in the area and before the United Nations and the Big Four is finding the means to reduce and, it is hoped, to halt the violence. To this end we suggest:

a) that an attempt should be made to secure special agreement for the establishment of a substantial United Nations emergency peace-keeping force to hold suitable demilitarized buffer zones, on both sides of agreed demarcation lines, for a limited period and subject to removal only by explicit vote of the UN Security Council;

b) that despite the inadequacies of similar UN efforts in the Middle East in the past, a special United Nations Commission to supervise effective cease-fire arrangements be set up to function on both sides of all cease-fire lines for the purpose of compiling an accurate and immediate record of all acts of violence, whether labeled as terrorism or counter-terrorism reprisals, these reports to be transmitted regularly and promptly to the United Nations and to the news media of the world;

c) that a conference be convened by the United Nations of the arms-supplying nations involved in or likely to become involved in the Middle East arms traffic, to explore ways of reducing the flow of arms into the Middle East and to undertake suitable UN action declaring the Middle East a nuclear-free zone.

It is the judgment of the authors of this paper that the world community must for some years maintain an effective international police force for the Middle East. Despite obvious difficulties and substantial costs, it is incumbent on the world community to employ every available means to halt the violence that is causing such widespread misery for the people of the Middle East and to help these people rebuild their hopes for a decent future.

3. THE THIRD STEP MUST BE AN EFFORT TO STRUCTURE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

Even after psychological and military disengagement, when tempers have cooled, the shooting has stopped, and long-dead hopes of peace are reviveing, it is unlikely that one grand, comprehensive
peace plan can be drawn up and accepted at a given moment by all the parties to the conflict. Certainly, this is quite impossible in the form of "direct negotiations" for which the Israelis have so persistently pressed. An enormous amount of indirect bargaining, involving the great powers, the United Nations Special Representative and perhaps others, will have to take place before anything approaching direct and general Arab-Israeli negotiations can occur. Sooner or later, something like the Rhodes-style indirect consultations and negotiations will have to be initiated as first steps toward peaceful agreement. However, eventually, under United Nations auspices, representatives of the Arabs, specifically including the Palestinians, and of the Israelis must accept concrete agreements, and those agreements must be encased in official, public, written documents.

It is the judgment of the authors of this paper that the Israelis should cease their opposition to the Big Four talks and publicly lay aside their insistence on immediate bi-lateral "direct negotiations" with the Arabs. Otherwise the conclusion is inescapable that the Israeli government accepts as unavoidable the indefinite prolongation of a no-peace/no-war situation. It is further recommended that the Big Four invite the contending parties to enter into sustained talks with suitable intermediaries, under United Nations auspices, for the purpose of reaching mutual agreement on the implementation of the plan for peace embodied in the United Nations Resolution of November 22, 1967, with such elaborations and refinements as may be necessary to produce a workable settlement acceptable to and publicly signed by both sides.

In the creation of a political settlement, we believe that the fundamental guidelines may be summarized as follows:

a) The right of existence for all states in the Middle East must be accepted by all other states in the area.

b) All claims and acts of belligerency of one Middle Eastern state against another must be ended.

c) Israeli claims to the acquisition of territory by conquest in the June War of 1967 must be abandoned and Israel must make firm commitments for withdrawal from territories occupied after June 5, 1967, it being understood that other provisions of UN Resolution will be faithfully implemented.

d) The right of self-determination for the Palestinian Arabs must be recognized by all parties to the conflict and appropriate
United Nations arrangements should be set up to determine the will of the Palestinians. Pending such a determination, a temporary United Nations Trusteeship or some comparable type of international administration should replace the Israeli military occupation for Gaza and the West Bank.

e) During the necessary interval before the establishment of peace in the area, some form of temporary international authority must be established in the demilitarized Sinai and in the Golan Heights.

f) Jerusalem is unique, and a solution to the problem of Jerusalem will have to be unique. The story of the last two decades is a denial as much of the uniqueness of Jerusalem as of its holiness.

Three religious intensities meet in Jerusalem. No non-Jew can enter into the feelings and emotions of Jews at the Wall of the Temple. No non-Muslim can realize the Muslim regard for the Dome of the Rock. For Christians, certain special sites in Jerusalem arouse deep emotion.

The world should establish inviolable rights of access for Jews in perpetuity to the Wall, for Muslims to the Dome. Both must assure freedom of access for Christians to their holy sites.

It is difficult to set down in cold print even an outline of the requirements or possibilities of this task. Inevitably, an attempt to do so will prove the most unsatisfactory part of our analysis of the desperate problems of the Middle East.

In time it should be possible to create some sort of federal condominium to govern an undivided and demilitarized Jerusalem. Meanwhile, the most satisfactory arrangement would seem to be separate Jewish and Arab boroughs, with certain shared municipal services, under some coordinating United Nations agency. That the city should be undivided and demilitarized is obvious common sense. That it should be united under exclusive Israeli control seems unlikely ever to be acceptable to most Muslims and Christians. Jerusalem must not again become a divided zone of conflict as it was for twenty years. It cannot peacefully become the sole possession of one religion or one national state.

g) The shipping of all nations must be guaranteed the right of free and innocent passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal.

h) The Palestine Arabs who became refugees after the passage of the 1947 U.N. partition resolution have the right, in accordance
with repeated U.N. declarations, to one of two forms of compensation. Within some agreed annual maximum, Israel should agree to receive within its 1967 borders a number of returning refugees, who are willing to live at peace with their Jewish neighbors and who will receive compensatory provision for their re-establishment.

For most refugees, this course will be neither feasible or desired. These should receive compensation for the loss of their property, including appropriate payment for the years of non-use of lands, houses and other properties left in Israeli hands. They should receive generous assistance in re-establishing themselves.

Israel should contribute its part to the costs of compensation, but it is right and proper for other nations, especially of the Western world, and of whatever ideology, to share in the payment of those charges. Whatever that figure, it will be less than the cost, over the next decades, of a Middle East in ferment, and is in any event required by the most elementary humanitarian considerations.

While many Jews migrated voluntarily to Israel, considerable numbers were evicted from their permanent homes in parts of the Arab world in conditions of total destitution, and such cases should be included in the compensatory processes on terms comparable with the treatment planned for Arab refugees.

4. THE FOURTH STEP MUST BE PEACE DEVELOPMENT.

If psychological and military disengagements can be achieved, and if a practical political settlement can be eventually arranged, the Middle East will still be a long way from true peace. It is not realistic to assume, after all the bitter conflict of these many years, that “normal” political and economic ties will be quickly established between Israel and the Arab states and that mutual trust and friendly personal relations will rapidly develop between Jews and Arabs. Many small and large acts of good will, many shared experiences of constructive achievement must take place and many new social institutions for both Jews and Arabs must be developed in order to create the climate of understanding in which real peace can grow. Many acts of support will be required on the part of the international community for such enterprises of reconciliation to succeed.
In the long run, Jews and Arabs must themselves take the primary responsibility to push forward with the tasks of reconstruction and reconciliation. What outside groups, governments and international agencies do or fail to do may only aid or hamper the accomplishment of those tasks. Here, we believe, are some pertinent suggestions:

a) A greater role should be envisioned for international economic aid, and it should be calculated more in human terms and less in international political terms. Though there is still a role for bi-lateral aid schemes, so selfishly have the great powers sought to tie aid programs to their own economic, political and military purposes, that bi-lateral aid from these sources is seriously compromised. No single proud Middle Eastern state wishes to see its future in terms of an association with outside political influences, nor should any be required to do so. More and more contributions of manpower and money should be channeled through the United Nations or through an institution to be created, perhaps a Middle East Institute for Research, Planning and Development, able to lift its sights from local problems to regional and worldwide considerations, avoiding the compromised and competitive domination of the great powers.

It is the suggestion of the authors of this paper that nations of the middle rank, politically uncompromised in the Middle East, concerned for peace and justice and willing to invest generously in orderly advancement of the area, should take the lead in organizing cooperating institutions and activities wherever possible among all nations of the region. They should find ways to maximize local leadership and resources, providing politics-free advice and counsel and a balance within the inevitably confused Middle East political structure. Financial support for such initiatives should, of course, also be drawn from the great powers if given without strings.

b) A Middle East Bank for Development should be created, perhaps in association with the World Bank, to provide needed funds and to help facilitate the wisest use of resources over the region. It should be clearly understood in advance, however, that any effort to “buy” peace, to put an economic value upon the hopes and dreams and loyalties of human beings, will inevitably fail.
c) A Middle East Human Resources Institute should be established in Jerusalem to carry out regional demographic studies and to plan for the day—perhaps far distant—when the technical competence of any one part of the region may be usefully employed elsewhere; to encourage educational programs which could assist the development of most-needed skills; and to advise and counsel on the development of pertinent, action-oriented, interdisciplinary educational programs and intercultural research. Within its scope might be a Center of Semitic Studies, whose aim would be, in local institutions and overseas studies programs, to provide channels through which Jews and Arabs may acquaint each other with their respective backgrounds and traditions. For some time perhaps, such efforts will be most fruitful at universities in neutral areas abroad. In all of this activity, efforts for rational and maximal use of human resources within the several social traditions must be made. Flexibility and openness in defining emerging political, social and economic relationships for the future must be sought.

*It is the judgment of the authors of this paper that here, in the field of social development, lies the greatest of the discernible human challenges in the Middle East. Progress in this field may go further to re-create the world role of the two great Semitic peoples than any other effort that might be undertaken.*
There is no question that one of the main barriers to the constructing of a Middle East solution is the widely shared belief on all sides that under existing circumstances no peace is possible now or in the predictable future. This pessimistic view is reinforced by the cynical judgment on each side that the enemy has no interest in peace.

The Israelis say that the Arabs are not interested in peace because: (a) the existing Arab governments would be overthrown if peace were made; (b) the governments of Jordan and the UAR would lose their subsidies from the oil-rich Arab states once the conflict ends; (c) Arab societies would have to undergo a social revolution if peace should come; (d) the Arab states would lose whatever sense of Arab solidarity they now possess once the Israeli challenge were removed; (e) Soviet financial aid to the Arab world would be greatly reduced once peace came. Moreover, the Fedayeen will find glory and financial support only so long as a state of war or near-war can be maintained. In short, say the Israelis, the Arabs are not interested in peace, they have not abandoned their long-proclaimed dream of driving Israel into the sea, and they are interested only in playing games through the United Nations and the Big Four discussions in order to prevent peace. Israelis also express frequently the conviction that the Soviet Union does not want peace in the Middle East, preferring perpetual turmoil out of which it may reap political rewards among the increasingly “radicalized” Arab masses and their leaders.

The Arabs say that the Israelis are not interested in peace because: (a) they need a state of war or threat of war to keep the money
flowing in from American Jews and other Jews around the world; (b) they need a continuing crisis to maintain domestic morale and acceptance of an uninspired, faltering coalition government; (c) they need a war economy to maintain a high level of economic activity and prevent the return of unemployment and the economic stagnation which obtained before the June War; (d) they need the myth of the beleaguered Jewish homeland to attract new immigrants and to prevent the return of the trend toward outward migration of European Jews which was evident before the June War. And, the Arabs point out, the Israelis have shown their contempt for peace-making efforts by their rejection of the UN Resolution of November 22, 1967, and numerous other UN resolutions, before and since; by their cynical establishment of Jewish communities in the occupied Arab territories; and by their hostility to the Big Four discussions on the Middle East. Moreover, say the Arabs, the Israeli obsessive demand for a comprehensive peace through immediate and direct negotiations with Arab leaders, given the present psychological and political situation in the Arab countries (of which the Israelis are fully aware), is such an unrealistic proposal that the Israelis can make it only on the basis of a shameless hypocrisy, knowing that this maneuver is the surest guarantee that no progress toward peace will be made.

The arguments on both sides are overpowering. Examining them soberly, how can anyone imagine for a moment that anything can be in store for the Middle East except more bloodshed and more bitterness and almost certainly at least one more major, all-out Arab-Israeli war? Yet there are other factors which must be examined too:

1) The ordinary people on both sides are sick of war and the threats of war and want to be allowed to live in peace.

2) Among both Arabs and Israelis, particularly among some groups of intellectuals and students, there are sharp critics of the existing governments and of the current collision-course policies. The Israelis are a highly individualistic people and very much divided about their government and its policies. Arab dissenters are far less visible and less vocal, yet within the Arab states are many people weary of the life this conflict forces upon them and critical of the failures of their leaders. On each side the people will march once more when the bugle sounds, but they will do so with little enthusiasm and with little faith that their government knows what it is doing and can bring peace at the end of the battle.
3) Familiarity with war has not brought a diminished fear of war in the Middle East. On the contrary, there are deep apprehensions that if all-out war comes again it will be far more ghastly than anything previously experienced, that the principal cities on both sides will be bombed, that civilian casualties will be heavy, and that much of the positive achievements of these hard-working peoples, bought with great effort over the past twenty-five years, will, on both sides, lie in ruins. Fear has never been a guarantee against going to war, but, despite all the warlike rhetoric on both sides, fear of the consequences is now exercising a restraining influence—for a time.

4) Apart from these human considerations, the governments of the Arab states and of Israel have good reason to question the possibility that any national benefit can come from another war. On the Arab side there is widespread expectation that another war would mean another Arab defeat. On the Israeli side there is a widespread conviction that Israel cannot afford another "victory."

5) Still another reason for hope lies in the shared judgment of the Soviet Union and the United States that their own self-interest and the desired future of their relations with each other demand a calming down of the Middle East. Specifically, the Soviet Union must give high priority to its conflict with China and the attendant dangers. The United States remains mired in a costly and unpopular war in Southeast Asia. Neither of the super-powers wants to be dragged into an unpredictable war in the Middle East. Neither can view with equanimity the possibilities that the smaller states whom they serve as patrons will come to dictate the course of the larger states’ policies.

Beyond all these political considerations, which can be interpreted variously and debated endlessly, we feel, as Quakers, that we must assert the human claims of Jews and Arabs alike, and of all of us, for a life freed from the threat of wholesale destruction and the constant risk of violent death. The peoples of the Middle East are tired of this conflict. They want to get on with the tasks of building a decent existence for themselves and for their children. They do not see a way out and their passions are easily inflamed by new calls to arms. Yet, at the same time, they could be moved by a vision of peace with justice if enough voices are raised for such a vision—before everything blows up again.
VI

A Quaker Expression of Concern and an Affirmation of Hope

Any analysis of the Middle East situation is bound to be incomplete, and will, in varying measure, displease everyone, including its authors. Any proposed solution is certain to be flawed by seeming, on particular points, to favor one side over another. Any particular set of suggestions, including specifically these, will invite criticism for being too general or too detailed—or both. We have no pride in our authorship; we have no special interest or privileged position to defend.

Some, including other Quakers, will find what we have written “too political.” We will only point out that what we are faced with in the Middle East is a thoroughly political situation and that attempts at economic amelioration or at cultural cooperation will come to nothing until some significant progress is made on the basic political problem. We persist in believing that, despite all the proofs of hopelessness, progress toward a political settlement can be made.

We appeal, therefore, first, to the United Nations and to the representatives of the Big Four to continue, with renewed energy and imagination, their search for a military disengagement and a political settlement. Outside involvement has helped to produce and perpetuate the conflict; outside assistance must be used to effect a solution.

We appeal to the Israelis to reassess their present policy of seeking security primarily through the annexation of Arab territory to provide “secure and strategic boundaries.” We hold the conviction, shared by numerous Israeli citizens and other concerned residents of the area, that Israel cannot hope to survive indefinitely as an
armed camp surrounded by vastly more numerous hostile Arabs. Despite official Israeli intentions to run an enlightened and humane occupation, the longer Arabs and their lands are held under Israeli control the deeper will grow the bitterness and hatred. In such a climate the cry for a war of revenge to destroy Israel will inevitably gain in popular support. In time the Arabs will have the technical and military skills to go with their superior numbers and to match the Israelis. The tacit assumption of Israeli leaders that time is on their side, that if they can only be allowed to wait it out they will be able to create so many “new facts” that eventually a more accommodating Arab leadership will come to the fore with which a reasonable peace can be made—this assumption, we earnestly believe, is false. If it is maintained as a basis for Israeli policy, we can see only disaster for Israel—and for the rest of the Middle East. Israel’s ultimate peace and security are dependent upon having peaceful relations with its Arab neighbors. We, therefore, appeal most urgently to Israel to realize the fruitlessness of rigid policies, to recognize the obligation, as military victor in past combats, to make the first moves toward peace. Let us be plain:

*It is the judgment of the authors of this paper that without certain definite first moves by Israel, which only the militarily dominant power can make, progress toward a settlement of the Middle East situation cannot be made. Those first moves should involve firm public commitments to withdraw from Arab territories and to aid in the search for positive solutions to the Palestinian refugee problem. Such moves will be proof of strength, as well as statesmanship, not “concession of weakness.”*  

We appeal to the Arab states to reassess their present policies which are also caught up in a no-peace-and-not-quite-all-out-war pattern, to bring the commando groups under control, to reaffirm categorically their acceptance of the state of Israel as a sovereign and internationally recognized reality in the Middle East, and to renounce all claims of belligerency against it. Such an intention has already been publicly proclaimed by Jordan and the United Arab Republic in their notification of the acceptance of the UN Resolution of November 22, 1967 and has been frequently re-stated by their officials. The Israeli government does not believe these are valid assurances and may never believe them until a peace agreement is actually signed, implemented and lived with. We urge the Arab leaders to summon the courage to tell their peoples as an expression
of responsible patriotism that, however unfair they may consider the manner of its creation, Israel is a reality which must be accepted and lived with in their own long-term interest. We urge the Arab governments to turn with new energy to the tasks of social and economic development and the broadening of regional cooperation.

*It is the judgment of the authors of this paper that the Arab states should make an unequivocal public commitment now, through the United Nations, to accept an Israeli state within mutually agreed and final borders as part of a total peace settlement, and to undertake negotiations for the establishment of those boundaries and whatever demilitarized buffer zones may contribute to the greater sense of peace and security for both.*

We appeal to the Palestinian Arabs to accept the fact that the state of Israel has come into being on a portion of their original Palestine homeland and to recognize that attempts to destroy that state can only bring more suffering and more injustice for more people than will be the case if Israel is accepted. At the same time we urge the Palestinians to seek to concert their voices and to become an active and constructive force in the making of peace. We do not presume to judge whether their best interests will be served by the establishment of a new independent Arab Palestine, or by the creation of a semi-autonomous Palestine federated with Jordan, or by reabsorption into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Nor do we pre-judge the future relations of the Palestinians with Israel. We feel that the Palestinians have a right to self-determination and should claim that right. The introduction of such a new factor could help to break the present stalemate.

We appeal to Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Lebanon, Syria and Israel to allow and encourage the Palestinian Arabs to seek to determine, freely and democratically, their own fate. To take such a far-seeing approach will be to allow some measure of mutual disengagement. Such an approach can succeed, however, only if all four states faithfully refrain from the temptation to use the Palestinians for their own national ends.

We appeal to the leaders of the American Jewish community, whose hard work and generous financial support have been so important to the building and sustaining of Israel, to reassess the character of their support and the nature of their role in American politics. Our impression, confirmed by many comments from Israelis inside Israel, is that there is a tendency for the leaders of the American Jewish establishment to identify themselves with the more
hard-line elements inside the Israeli cabinet, "to out-hawk the hawks," and to ignore or discount the dissident elements, in and out of the Israeli government, that are searching for more creative ways to solve the Middle East problems.

As free American citizens, members of the American Jewish community have every right to utilize all the instruments of a free society to register their convictions and desires, and to try to influence legislative and executive action. However, the nature of some of these pressures and their extensiveness have sometimes served to inhibit calm public discussion of the issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and, on occasion, to induce public officials to endorse policies concerning Israel in which they do not believe and which they in fact regard as likely to be counter-productive for Israel as well as for the cause of peace. This is not a new phenomenon in American politics, but it is nonetheless disturbing. No one who is truly concerned about the long-term fate of Israel and the long-term threats to inter-faith harmony and brotherhood can be indifferent to these dangers.

We appeal to the Congress, the White House and the State Department to carry forward a continuing, searching examination of all the interests and issues at stake in the Middle East and to support a truly even-handed policy which will both protect the existence and peaceful development of Israel and bring justice and the hope of orderly progress to the Palestinians and other Arabs—within the frame of a comprehensive and agreed-upon peace.

We appeal to the world community—to governments, international agencies and voluntary organizations—to persist in all reasonable efforts to promote peace in the Middle East and to resist the counsels of despair, to continue and enlarge the flow of financial support for developing the social and economic life of the Middle East peoples and for satisfying the material needs and hopes of the refugees, Arab and Jewish; and to continue to work at the many large and small tasks which must be performed in behalf of the long-term spiritual and cultural reconciliation of the Jewish and Arab peoples.

Any formal settling of the current Arab-Israeli conflict can represent only the beginnings of peace. The building of truly cooperative relationships will require many years in time and many changes in attitude. Such constructive changes will not come automatically. For the time to be well spent there is urgent need for a sustaining long-term vision of what a new order of things for the Middle East might be. Fortunately, even in the midst of the armed conflict there
are many individuals and groups struggling with at least partial formulations of what a New Middle East might be. Those dreams, incidentally, are not confined to the so-called moderates or "doves," but are found in unmistakably idealistic forms among both the Palestine resistance fighters and the Greater Israel faction among the Jews. Despite their harsh, irreconcilable conflict of the moment, there are indications that some such vision as this for the long future might eventually win broad acceptance on both sides:

1) Some kind of confederation relationship of the Arab states of Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria with Israel—with ease of trade and travel and an elimination of armed borders among them.

2) A general scaling down of arms throughout the area and the withdrawal of Big Power military power from the entire region.

3) Large-scale, long-term technological and economic development of all units within the federation but with each national group protected in the maintenance of its cultural and political autonomy.

Such a dream may at the moment seem absurd. However, there are thoughtful Jews and Arabs who are thinking in precisely these terms. It is conceivable that the future may belong to such ideas of Middle East cooperation and harmony rather than to the prophecies of unending war.

As this statement goes to press a remarkable article, "The Future of Israel," has just been published in the April, 1970 issue of Foreign Affairs. It was written by Dr. Nahum Goldmann, President of the World Jewish Congress and former President of the World Zionist Organization. Rejecting an indefinite continuation of the present armed struggle state of affairs as ultimately disastrous for Israel, for international Jewry and for the whole world, Dr. Goldmann calls for the permanent neutralization of Israel as a special kind of state. He suggests that a permanently neutralized Israel living within agreed boundaries could be accepted by her Arab neighbors, and that such an Israel could eventually make the spiritual and cultural contribution to the Jewish people and to the world that the founders of the Zionist dream hoped for. He sees little hope for Israel as just another national state, trying to defend itself indefinitely through its own military strength behind cease-fire lines and surrounded by hostile neighbors. He believes that a neutral Israel could attain both peace and security and a chance to develop the special genius of its people.
FINAL THOUGHTS

As we review what we have written, we are struck by a major deficiency which we do not know how to correct: we have been incapable of communicating the depth of human anguish experienced on both sides, incapable of showing how those feelings color, shape, and dominate the words and deeds of able, intelligent, responsible people on both sides.

Non-Jews probably cannot understand the desperate, “here-we-stand” stubbornness of many Israelis. The trauma of the years of the Hitlerite holocaust has seared the souls of all Jews of middle age and older. It is mainly the people of this older generation who govern Israel today. They identify the strength of Israel with their personal safety and with the survival of the Jewish people. Any proposed change in policy which can be interpreted as weakening the defensive capacity of Israel is resisted by many Israelis as an invitation to suicide.

Non-Israeli Jews share these emotions. As one American Jew said to us:

"You have to remember that every thoughtful middle-aged Jew in the West carries deep within his gut two basic emotions—fear and guilt. Fear that what happened to six million Jews in the Nazi era could happen again—and to me next time. And guilt that, somehow, we who were spared didn’t do enough to save those who were destroyed. Zealous support for Israel, whatever else it means, is a way of fighting off the fear and the guilt.”

The passionate devotion of Jews, Israeli and non-Israeli, to the cause of a permanent, strong, prosperous Jewish state in the Holy Land is one of the central facts of Middle Eastern and world politics.

We also have not been able to depict with sufficient vividness the extremes of bitterness, frustration and rage felt by the Palestinian Arabs.

Anyone who visits the Palestinians in their refugee camps, talks with the young commandos in their camouflage uniforms, listens to responsible officials of UN or other international voluntary agencies or Arab governmental organizations is bound to be struck by the complex and tragic nature of the problems which beset the Palestinian refugees. He quickly discovers that no government needs to "whip up" bitterness and hatred among the refugees toward Israel. He can easily enough determine that the refugees themselves have again and again resisted efforts which some governments have made to resettle them. Most of all, he discovers that the overwhelm-
ing passion of the Arab refugees is "to go home." The attachment of Palestinian Arabs to the rocky soil of this Holy Land is quite as passionate as that of the Jewish newcomers.

Moreover, the outsider needs no extensive research to discover that the Palestinians are deeply distrustful of all suggestions that the Jews are willing to limit the size of their state, to refrain from further conquest of Arab lands, and to live at peace with their Arab neighbors.

At bottom, each side is filled with what seems to be absolute distrust of the other. The Israelis fear that the Arabs do not accept their existence, will not make peace with Israel, and could not be trusted to keep the peace if one were signed. The Arabs fear that the Israelis will not return any of the Arab lands now occupied and will, in time, demand more. At the heart of the peace-making problem is the challenge to find ways to put down those two great fears. We believe those ways can be found.

Our last word, then, is about people. Our basic concern is not with politics, power, or sovereignty, for these are only instruments in the search for the good life. The real tragedy of the Middle East today is that people are not enjoying the good life. For many, bodily conditions are harsh and their physical situation impoverished and unfree. Large numbers of the younger generation are wasting their precious youth in learning to kill, and in this way their bodies and minds are denied the chance to do the constructive work their communities so urgently need. For most men and women of the area, fear, hatred, and anxiety about what the future holds for themselves and their children fill their minds, to the exclusion of those things which bring joy and purpose and enlargement of life. But beyond the mind is the soul or spirit of a man, and of the larger community of which he is a part. At a time when the deepest values in persons and in nations are being challenged in both constructive and destructive ways throughout mankind, the world community simply cannot afford to lose the constructive genius of the Semites in internecine conflict. Here are brilliant and energetic peoples, whose present and potential value to all men is immense.

The real issue, significant for everyone, is whether the sterile negatives of today's life in the Middle East, by which all men are imperilled, can be converted to a pattern of human cooperation not yet known or seen among men. Of all places on the face of the earth, Jerusalem should be the city where peace is made manifest in real terms—else why struggle for holy places in ways which negate their message and dissipate their holiness? Today we are all mockers of
our faiths, we who call ourselves Christians no less than others, for we have done great evil. Indeed, the wider world has done so poorly with this business of national sovereignty and international relations that it is in desperate need of those, individually and nationally, who will set up totally new standards of relationships across physical frontiers and the frontiers of the mind and spirit. Today we see the nations of the Middle East sinking into the crude and outmoded patterns of violence and war so familiar elsewhere. Instead, what mankind needs is the example of a new adventure in cooperation unlike anything that has gone before.

Is what we call for sentimental nonsense, unrelated to the cold facts of realpolitik? Yes, if realpolitik is real and is the best that man can achieve! No, if men can believe that there are no hopeless situations, but only hopeless men. In these dark days we find hopeful men on both sides of the tragedy who are deeply concerned for the human condition and for the spirits of men. May their voices be more widely heard. And may common sense and human justice prevail.
Appendix

TEXT OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION—NOVEMBER 22, 1967

U.N. doc. S/RES/242 (1967) (S/8247); adopted unanimously on November 22)

The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the
Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war
and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the
area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the
Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in
accordance with Article 2 of the Charter.
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establish-
ment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include
the application of both the following principles:
   (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the
   recent conflict;
   (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for
   and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
   independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within
   secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
   (a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international
   waterways in the area;
   (b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
   (c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political inde-
   pendence of every State in the area, through measures including the estab-
   lishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Represen-
   tative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with
   the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to
   achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions
   and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on
   the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.
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Members of the working party are of diverse faiths and backgrounds. Some have had extensive experience in the area. Approaching Middle East problems from varying points of view, they have labored long to reach agreement on this study, impelled by their deep concern about the need for peace in the area.
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