Belts, Roads, and Battlegrounds: Chinese Outbound Initiatives in Conflict and Post-Conflict Settings

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Background: Chinese Aid in Context

The tallest building in Ethiopia, the African Union’s (AU) sleek new headquarters, is perhaps the most symbolic of Chinese involvement in overseas peace and security affairs. Constructed at a reported cost of more than $200 million, the building towers over the nearby Nyerere Peace and Security Building built with the support of German aid and the construction site of an annex being built by a Chinese company. The building itself offers African officials everything needed to conduct their business, including Lenovo computers for every African delegation to the AU. Perhaps also suggestive of Chinese provision of aid, though, a tour of the building reveals almost no information about China’s involvement in its construction. When the author visited in November of 2016, tour guides were not able to answer questions regarding the cost of the building, name the Chinese company involved in the construction, or describe the role that African countries played in the design of the building, and the building did not feature a space for visitors to readily obtain this information.

Such is the nature of Chinese involvement in international development broadly, and its growing involvement in peace and security affairs. On the one hand, Chinese aid projects are arguably now more physically visible than aid projects supported by any other aid provider: Across the developing world, China is supporting massive infrastructure projects, and the construction of government buildings and stadiums. On the other hand, China’s aid is more opaque when it comes to the available data: China has not joined platforms such as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), nor has it started sharing information with the Aid Transparency Index. It does not formally publish information on the types of projects that it is supporting across the world. As a result, Publish What You Fund places China second to last in its ranks of aid transparency of 46 donor states and organizations, just above the United Arab Emirates.
This trend continues when it comes to consultations and coordination mechanisms. While there have been some isolated cases of experiments involving donor coordination, diplomatic communities in most countries remain perplexed as to the nature of China’s aid priorities.⁴

While specific information on China’s Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) remains difficult to obtain, a growing number of Chinese and non-Chinese sources have started to map the dramatic emergence of China as a leading provider of overseas assistance, and as a key player in post-conflict settings. In terms of official information, China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid in 2011 released by the State Council documents that ODA increased by nearly 30 percent from 2004 until 2009, and that the vast majority of concessionary loans in 2009 (61 percent) support infrastructure projects.⁵

In the absence of systematic official information, one of the best sources available is the AidData project at the College of William & Mary, which offers a comprehensive catalogue of projects identified through publicly available sources. The project’s geo-spatial tool reveals that there are significant Chinese aid projects located in nearly every part of Africa experiencing social conflict, and in the majority of armed conflict zones.⁶ A growing academic literature spanning political science and area studies further documents China’s emergence as a top development partner for a wide range of countries experiencing armed conflict, civil war, or civil resistance, including South Sudan, Myanmar, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Republic of the Congo, and Zimbabwe.

As China’s bilateral involvement in the development–security nexus has grown, its involvement in multilateral peace and security affairs has also kept pace. At present, China deploys more peacekeepers to the United Nations than any other member of the Security Council, and ranks second in terms of its financial contribution (10.29 percent).⁷ Since initiating involvement in peacekeeping over 25 years ago, China has sent more than 30,000 blue helmets overseas.⁸ In 2016, increasing signs have emerged that China aspires to take a leadership position vis-à-vis the global peacekeeping efforts. Rumors going around the U.N. suggest that it is presently jockeying for leadership over the U.N.’s Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which has been controlled by the U.S. and France since its inception.⁹ While rumors remain largely unconfirmed, China’s unprecedented support for a high-level training for peacekeeping officials in Beijing in 2016 has been understood by observers as a sign of China’s rising interest in the leadership role.¹⁰

China is also increasingly involved globally in peacemaking – sending Special Envoys to a range of African, Middle Eastern, and Southeast Asian hot spots to attempt to contribute to the resolution of armed conflict. In 2011, China sent an envoy to Sudan to engage in promoting peace talks between the government and the South Sudanese opposition. Following the split, China has continued to deploy envoys to engage in shuttle diplomacy between the two countries around resource sharing.
This role has also been prominent in Northern Myanmar, where China and the United Nations jointly observed cease-fire talks between the Myanmar government and the Kachin Independence Army in 2014 and 2015. In Syria and the Middle East, China has also greatly deepened its support for engagement with opposition parties and separatist movements, signaling a growing intent to broker peace. Another key area in which China plays a critical role is around policing of the high seas, where it has been leading the effort to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Drivers of Chinese Involvement in Peace and Security Issues

Many observers look at China’s rapidly developing involvement in global peace and security issues with growing suspicion and scrutiny, and speculate about China’s intentions in going overseas. As Central Party School scholar Zhao Lei comments on Western views of Chinese involvement in peacekeeping, “Western states value China’s contribution to peacekeeping and hope that it will take on more responsibility, but simultaneously also have suspicions about China’s growing power and intentions.”

Given China’s contribution to global GDP and its domestic status, that China would be involved in governance issues related to peace and security is considered by many scholars as “normal.” However, the question of what is driving China’s involvement remains, and it is argued here that a wide range of factors combine to both push and pull Chinese involvement in peace and security issues, particularly in some of the world’s most unstable contexts. Not intended to be an exhaustive catalogue, the factors below are identified by the author as the key drivers of Chinese involvement.

(1) **Traditional Need for Diplomatic Support**: Chinese analysts and commentators on Chinese aid generally take as their starting point China’s support for decolonizing African and Asian states beginning in the 1950s as a show of solidarity and support for the developing world in the face of Western imperialism. Both Western and Chinese commentators agree that Chinese support for decolonialization brought tremendous benefits to China vis-à-vis the international community, and in particular with respect to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) taking over representation of China at the U.N., in enhancing China’s international prestige, and later in supporting Chinese multilateral initiatives. While the global context has changed tremendously, China’s need for support within the international community remains, and its reliance on traditional allies continues. The PRC’s ties with many states now struggling to emerge from conflict go back to the 1950s.

(2) **Political-Commercial Push-Pull Dynamics**: Related to the first point, the commercial-political nexus in China is also driving China’s rapidly increasing engagement in post-conflict settings. As mentioned above, for historical reasons, many conflict-affected and post-conflict states are traditional Chinese allies.
Given the special political relations between China and such states, Chinese entrepreneurs have greater access to business opportunities there. This is especially the case in contexts where political elites can approve projects with little to no consultation with public audiences. Additionally, political elites from countries such as the DRC and Zimbabwe were trained in China and have maintained extremely close ties to Chinese institutions. Both state-owned and private enterprises are involved in the process of extracting concessions, contracts for turnkey projects, BOT schemes, and resource-extraction deals, all seeking the backing of Chinese government actors in their initiatives as they believe that this will draw in benefits and subsidies from the Chinese government, while also generating greater pressure on political actors in unstable political environments to support their projects. The result is that China’s special political relations open a space where business interests can extract project approvals with growing ease, but then must rely on or develop a close political relationship between the two countries in order to maintain these deals. The case of Myanmar discussed below offers one glimpse into these dynamics.

(3) **Incumbent Government Demand:** Recent empirical evidence provides strong support for the argument that incumbent governments in contested societies find Chinese aid relatively easier to access due to China’s policy of noninterference as articulated in China’s White Paper on ODA. For example, one statistical study demonstrates that the birth regions of political leaders across the developing world receive 75 percent more in Chinese aid than regions not fortunate enough to be where a leader was born. According to this logic, there is a high probability that incumbent governments in contested spaces will push for China to provide aid and other resources in ways that offer them favorable outcomes vis-à-vis such conflicts. As a senior official from a Chinese development bank involved deeply in discussions around Chinese aid in the Congo told the author: “[W]hile they [the development bank] have encouraged the government to implement small-scale agricultural projects, [the president] only wanted support for highly visible projects such as highways, stadiums, and other infrastructure that might help the election campaign.”

(4) **Military Interests:** The Chinese military itself is a driver of greater Chinese involvement in overseas peace and security issues. Increasingly, military actors have become openly supportive of a Chinese role in peacekeeping, arguing that such multilateral involvement is critical for the development of Chinese capabilities. They also point out that involvement in such settings can reduce the chances of greater-scale conflict that might damage China’s own global interests. As early as 2004, the Chinese Ministry of Defense made reference in its Defense White Paper of the importance of peacekeeping to China’s international military cooperation. Military analysts Zhao Jingfang and Zhu Tao contend that China’s “military diplomacy” has become a key fulcrum of Chinese efforts to contribute to peace and prosperity, arguing that participation in U.N. peace operations and global anti-terrorism efforts is critical to these endeavors.
Calls for Protection of Commercial Interests: As China has become deeply invested commercially in a wide range of highly unstable business environments, demand has built for the Chinese government to become more involved in the protection of Chinese assets and citizens overseas. As Han Fangming, an outspoken official from the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), noted in a media interview, “Chinese companies have discovered that in Africa and Latin America…it is very difficult to obtain good public safety services from the Chinese Embassies or local authorities.”

Critical media coverage of Chinese citizens stranded or kidnapped overseas has also pushed the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the People’s Liberation Army, as well as a wide range of scholars and officials to call for greater resources to protect Chinese citizens and assets. This has been the case particularly since the Manila hostage crisis of 2010, when the Chinese media and public commentators openly mocked the ability of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to protect Chinese nationals. A massive state media campaign was launched in 2011 to profile new capacities following crises in Egypt, and later in Libya and Syria, all of which required the evacuation of thousands of Chinese nationals. The title of one such article is instructive: “Chinese Nationals Evacuated from Libya En Masse: Foreigners Envious of the Chinese Government’s Preferential Treatment for Its People.”

Belts, Roads, and Battlegrounds

The scope of Chinese plans for major investments in conflict hot spots under the Belt and Road Initiative, while representing a major opportunity for peace and development, could also present serious challenges if conflict dynamics are not given careful consideration. At present, one of the most rapidly advancing projects developed under the scheme is a special economic zone in Pakistan, bordering the separatist insurgency in Balochistan. Described as Pakistan’s Shenzhen, the Gwadar Mega-Port project is slated to turn a small fishing community into a city of 2 million at a cost of more than $46 billion. What is unclear is how China will provide peace and security for the zone, and the nature of Chinese considerations vis-à-vis how the zone will impact conflict dynamics.

This and other initiatives would do well to carefully study the experience of Chinese companies in collaborating with the Myanmar military government from 1988 – 2012 in advancing a variety of megaprojects. During this period, Chinese companies invested over $15 billion in massive oil and gas, hydropower and extractives projects in close cooperation with the Myanmar army, and with close strategic political backing secured from China. For some of the projects, the Chinese state-owned enterprises involved partnered directly with the military in implementing them, whereas in others, they partnered with companies very close to military interests. In 2011, a decades-old cease-fire agreement collapsed when hostilities erupted between the Myanmar army and ethnic armed groups over the provision of security to one hydropower dam adjacent to a cease-fire line. Later that year, an $8 billion project to construct of a mega-dam that was also in close proximity to the fighting between the Myanmar army and armed ethnic groups was halted. In 2012, another layer of Myanmar’s domestic conflict engulfed a Chinese copper mining project, also jointly owned by the Myanmar army in the country’s heartland, and work came to a standstill after conflict between security forces and local communities resulted in severe violence. The companies involved in implementing these projects contended that as long as they built “islands of security” and cooperated with a powerful military that investments might remain secure. They quickly discovered, however, that it was impossible to isolate themselves from local conflict dynamics. As the BRI moves forward, how can Chinese stakeholders learn lessons from such experiences? The failure to do so could result in new battlegrounds across the BRI. On the other hand, careful thinking in this direction could just as easily result in a silk road to peace.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): The efforts of a wide range of Chinese provincial governments, entrepreneurs, and other stakeholders to gain recognition, and central government support for developing prestige projects has led to a rapid deepening of Chinese involvement in conflict hot spots around the world. The BRI and the development corridors that have been drawn under the Initiatives pass through some of the world’s most unstable contexts. Many provincial governments, companies, financial institutions, and others have drawn up grand plans, pulling Chinese finance agencies and institutions into backing investments across these parts of the world. One Chinese scholar identified more than 54 memorandums of understanding between Chinese government agencies at all levels that have been signed with overseas entities with respect to BRI cooperation or BRI projects. At the same time, the growing recognition that China needs to provide peace and security in support of these initiatives has been articulated by central government actors, and a wide range of Chinese policy advisors, generating pressures for diplomatic and security-military Chinese involvement. The private sector has also become extremely vocal in discussing gaps in security for outbound projects, as it seeks to develop a strong overseas presence of Chinese security companies. This development has captured the attention of Chinese policymakers who are making arguments supporting the push for the Chinese government to become more involved in providing public security goods overseas.

Chinese Perceptions of Lack of Space in Existing Global Institutions: Chinese frustrations with the World Bank and other existing international institutions are playing a role in pushing China to enhance its investment in post-conflict settings, and especially contexts shunned by Western initiatives, where China can seize unique opportunities. At the same time, the Chinese government is increasingly dissatisfied with its lack of influence in shaping the global peacekeeping agenda. As Professor He Yin of the China CIVPOL Peacekeeping Training Center argues, China has a serious deficit when it comes to its ability to influence global narratives on peacekeeping, largely due to the “lack of willingness of the U.S. and Western states to accept China’s efforts to change institutions, rules and structures” when it comes to U.N. peacekeeping. Despite China being the second largest financial contributor at a cost of nearly $800 million (US) per year (2016), its staff involved in the civilian management of peacekeeping at the U.N. Secretariat represent only a small fraction of U.S. national staff. A number of Chinese reform initiatives have focused on reigning in the U.N. Peacekeeping budget, which is now nearly $8 billion (US). China has consistently proposed suggestions for reform at the Security Council since 2009, but has seen very limited progress on its initiatives. The other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council have raised concerns that China’s initiatives are aimed at cutting back human rights protections. It is true that China has pushed for cutting budgets related to human rights trainings.
At the same time, though, Chinese peacekeepers have nearly perfect disciplinary records, and China has earmarked new funds for the training of 2,000 foreign peacekeepers, as well as pushed for the development of a standby force.\textsuperscript{29}

**Chinese Approaches to Post-Conflict Settings?**

A number of key questions are raised by China’s rapidly growing involvement in post-conflict countries. First, is China developing a unique approach or approaches to peace and security issues in these contexts? Second, how will Chinese involvement impact the OECD member lead initiatives?

In response to the first, Chinese academics have advanced the notion of an “economic peace,” which is distinct from the liberal peace advanced by OECD initiatives. In this view, the most central element to external peacebuilding efforts in a given context is support for infrastructure and improvement of livelihoods, with a de-emphasis on the building of political institutions and laws. According to this theory, once resources are made available to overcome developmental gaps, states themselves will select appropriate governance institutions, and at this point only need more limited technical support.\textsuperscript{30} Professor He Yin, a former Peacekeeper and expert based at the China CIVPOL Peacekeeping Police Center, is a leading proponent of this argument. In his view and that of many other Chinese policy analysts, China should focus on its core capacities in administering outbound aid, which include infrastructure, economic development, and poverty alleviation. In practice, it would seem that this theory largely does represent the path that China has followed – as the empirical research on Chinese ODA references above demonstrates, Chinese aid is focused on infrastructure and poverty alleviation, with few projects focusing on rule of law or environmental or social safeguards.\textsuperscript{31}

If this “economic peace” becomes the Chinese model for engagement in post-conflict settings, there is the risk that a very unhealthy division of labor may emerge between China and other donors. If China only provides infrastructure and buildings, and is not involved in the OECD-dominated arena of building regulatory frameworks, rules, and institutions, a greater chasm will emerge between the physical world of infrastructure development and the more abstract realm of regulation. Government officials in conflict states tasked with approving, regulating and overseeing projects will inevitably be pulled in very different directions as the terms of infrastructure projects and OECD-supported institutional initiatives clash with one another. Cambodia -- where the author has worked for more than eight years between Chinese business stakeholders, environmental regulators, and community-based interests -- offers a glimpse of some of the risks involved. In this country, China’s closest ally in Southeast Asia, Chinese companies have advanced nearly a dozen projects valued at $500 million or more, and built extremely close ties with the Cambodian Prime Minister’s Office and the Cambodia Development Council (CDC).
At the same time, OECD initiatives have provided high levels of support to the development of environmental and social safeguards, and to local land rights. In 2012, OECD initiatives and a Chinese-backed urban development scheme in the center of the nation’s capital resulted in a standoff between Chinese companies, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Land Management Authorities, and the World Bank, which ultimately led to the collapse of a land titling project, the World Bank’s withdrawal of support from the country, violent conflict involving security forces and thousands of community members, and ultimately the failure of the urban development scheme.

**Challenges to Developing Joint Initiatives to Address the Institutional Side of Development**

While China may not become a leading actor in efforts to support the development of institutions, governance structures, and laws, it is critical that those involved in such initiatives find ways to build complementarities between Chinese initiatives, and vice versa. A number of major donors have been seeking to work in this direction – for example, the United Nations Development Programme, the UK’s Department for International Development, and the German GIZ all maintain projects in China that seek to build engagement and support for Chinese involvement in various initiatives to strengthen governance and alleviate poverty overseas. Yet given the size and scope of China’s plans for the BRI and the magnitude of its likely impact on peace and security issues in the future, much more could be done. In particular, it is critical that the United States government rapidly enhance engagement with China in this regard. While U.S. officials often point to legal and bureaucratic obstacles to engagement with China in third-country settings, it is absolutely critical that the U.S., as the world’s No. 1 supporter of global peace and security initiatives, builds a very strong dialogue and platform for working and coordinating with China. The emergence of competing architectures to address peace and security issues is neither in the interests of the United States, China, or developing countries.

At present, a key challenge for many of these initiatives is that Chinese budgetary resources are not generally accessible to the Chinese agencies that have expertise and capacity in these areas. A number of initiatives between international and Chinese actors have collapsed when conversations on cost sharing have started to emerge. A second challenge is that those with expertise in environmental and social safeguards in China have not received any homegrown support or incentives to get involved in provision of support overseas. This means that, when it comes to the challenges of post-conflict countries, there is a huge gap in knowledge and capacity between Chinese national experts and their counterparts from OECD countries.
In the author’s own work with the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) in providing support to environmental governance initiatives in Southeast Asia, the mobilization of Chinese aid resources also proved to be particularly challenging. Beginning in 2009, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) initiated cooperation between the Cambodian Ministry of Environment and the Chinese MEP to share China’s experiences in building a framework for environmental impact assessment – the first such initiative to involve the Chinese MEP. A series of trainings supported by AFSC and German aid agencies were implemented in Cambodia between 2009-2015, with the Chinese media providing high-profile coverage of the initiatives. Chinese government support was finally mobilized for the project in 2016, but this required a tremendous effort on the part of the Chinese environmental experts involved in negotiating with a range of other agencies to remove bureaucratic limitations and secure resources.

Similar obstacles will be present in efforts to support joint involvement with Chinese institutions in nearly every area of governance. Participants in such initiatives will need to look closely at how Chinese philanthropy and even the private sector support efforts to speed up such initiatives, and draw in more Chinese government support.

**Bridging Gaps: A Collective Approach to Do No Harm Along the Belt and Road**

At present, discussions between China and Western countries concerning development assistance remain clouded in a fog of narratives of China’s outbound role, which refer to China variously as a neocolonial power, as a provider of rogue aid, or as a provider of aid to destabilize OECD development practice. A growing number of scholars, such as Jean-Claude Berthelemy, point out, however, that most of these articulations are completely detached from empirical analysis. More recent empirical works demonstrate that neither a country’s endowment of natural resources, nor factors such as governance or regime type play a role in determining Chinese aid projects.

What this points to is a critical need to fill in the gaps in understanding: first, of OECD, or largely Western, knowledge of China’s outward involvement; and second, in China’s knowledge of the contexts where its involvement is rapidly increasing. Paramount to the first challenge is the need for Beijing to make available more information regarding Chinese outbound assistance. As such information becomes more available, it is likely that many of the Western-generated “rogue aid” types of narratives will disappear.

In terms of the second issue, the challenges are much more serious. While post-conflict and conflict studies have been largely mainstreamed in most OECD settings and across Africa, no such tradition of study exists in China.
Over the past five years, at least two initiatives to build centers for peace and conflict studies have started to emerge, one at Nanjing University and another at Jinan University, but progress is slow, and few Chinese researchers or policy advisors are engaged in the study of conflict sensitivity, aid effectiveness, or the relationship between business and development activities and conflict dynamics.

These spaces could be strategic for investment by China and traditional Western donors alike – in China, aid actors need more support from policy experts to develop a deeper understanding of the needs of post-conflict and conflict settings; meanwhile, in OECD countries, aid actors need to build new relationships and conversations with Chinese officials, if at a minimum to avoid growing frictions and conflict.

Perhaps a good starting point might be the “Do No Harm” principle, which has grown from applied research on the impacts of development activities on conflict dynamics into a powerful tool for preventing and mitigating the impacts of aid, development, and commercial activities on conflict. As more Chinese scholars and practitioners become interested in post-conflict settings, tools such as “Do No Harm” might be applied by Chinese and OECD-based practitioners to jointly assess the risks that various initiatives may have on global conflict hot spots. On one level, such exercises will help fill a serious gap in China’s BRI: the lack of modalities to consider how rapidly expanding initiatives will impact fragile conflict dynamics. On another level, such efforts will inevitably enable practitioners to reframe many of the traditional debates within development studies as well as the growing dichotomy between China and Western states over whether economics or liberal politics are key to peace.
Mr. Tower completed his undergraduate work in business administration, and his graduate studies in political science and Asian studies at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. In July of 2015, he earned a Certification in Company-Community Mediation in Complex Environments from the Graduate School of Business at the University of Capetown in South Africa. Mr. Tower speaks fluent Chinese and Bahasa Indonesia, and has translated numerous books and academic articles from Chinese to English, including more than 50 academic articles in the field of international relations.

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4 One such experiment has taken place in Cambodia, where China became actively involved in World Bank coordination meetings for a number of years. See: James Reilly, “A Norm-Taker or Norm-Maker? Chinese Aid in Southeast Asia.” Asia Studies Review, May 2013.


6 Note that the database includes only projects from 2004 – 2012. China.aiddata.org.


8 See: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-06/02/content_25598282.htm.

See for example, “China: Projecting Power Through Peacekeeping.” The Diplomat, October 2015.

Central Party School is otherwise known as the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Beijing.


The current DRC President Joseph Kabila was trained at the China National Defense University, pausing his studies to return to the Congo to be sworn into office after political turmoil resulted in the death of his father, Laurent Kabila.


Author’s interview, June 14, 2014, Beijing.


For analysis on this, see: Jeffrey S. Payne. “The G.C.C. and China’s One Belt, One Road: Risk or Opportunity?” August 11, 2016. (http://www.mei.edu/content/gcc-and-china-s-one-belt-one-road-risk-or-opportunity).

Belt and Road Cooperation Academic Forum, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, March 2016.

A wide range of new security companies have emerged over the past two years, many initiating and investing in new platforms for discussion of security issues around outbound investment. For example, the National Security Forum of China was convened in November of 2015, pulling together a wide mixture of Chinese company executives, diplomats, government officials, academics, and security company representatives.
27 Security Council Statements by China were made in 2009. (http://www.360doc.com/content/11/0916/18/7499155_148799539.shtml), 2010, 2013, and more recently.
28 Lynch. “China Eyes Ending Western Grip.”
34 Dreher and Fuchs, “Rogue Aid?”
35 The concept of Do No Harm was first proposed by Mary Anderson. See Do No Harm. How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999.
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