Reading
Between the "Lines"
by Mona Ghali
Lines and their derivates are nothing new to the Middle
East region. The stone wall of the Old City of Jerusalem built by Sultan
Suleiman the Magnificent during the 16th century was intended to protect
the city’s inhabitants. The Green Line, or the 1949 Armistice
Line, demarcates the state of Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The Bar Lev line along the Suez Canal built after the 1967 Arab-Israeli
war and overrun by the Egyptian army in 1973 was an immobile and defensive
military line. The “wall” at Erez border crossing evolved
gradually with the onset of the first intifada in 1987. First, an unobtrusive
check post, it later expanded to include more elaborate and permanent
structures for vehicle inspections and passenger control on the eve
of the inauguration of the defunct “safe passage route”
connecting the Palestinian Autonomous areas in the Gaza Strip and West
Bank.
The Separation Wall (popularly known as the Wall)
is the most recent wall to be erected. Winding through the West Bank
for more than 650 km the Wall does not coincide with the Green Line,
but cuts across as much as six kilometers of Palestinian land. Ostensibly
constructed to deter Palestinian suicide bombers from entering Israel,
government spokespersons claim that it is neither intended to demarcate
nor prejudice negotiations concerning the final borders of a Palestinian
state or entity. However, if Erez is indicative, then the Wall will
take on permanence despite claims to the contrary and will become a
de facto border for Palestinian urban and rural centers in the West
Bank, thereby obviating the creation of a viable Palestinian state.
The first phase of the fence in the northern West
Bank is due to be completed in July 2003. In its shadow is the Roadmap
endorsed by the Quartet comprising the US, Russia, the UN and EU, formally
presented by the US president in June following the appointment of Mahmoud
Abbas (Abu Mazen) as Palestinian Prime Minister. The Roadmap proposes
a three phased process leading to an end to Israeli military occupation
and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state by the end
of 2005, and the resolution of the Israel-Palestinian conflict. But
even as the parties entered into the first phase of the agreement it
was evident the gradualist approach to peace-making adopted by the Roadmap,
as did the Oslo Accords, would lend itself to manipulation and foot
dragging. By the end of June, an agreement involving Hamas and Islamic
Jihad in which the two groups agreed to refrain from carrying out attacks
on Israeli interests for a 3-month period was perceived cautiously as
a positive step toward implementing the Roadmap. Further tentative moves
toward re-engagement were evidenced in a security agreement between
the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority.
Despite these developments, most believe that the
goodwill and respite will be temporary and that the violence that has
resulted in the deaths of 2,398 Palestinians and 704 Israelis and left
28,000 injured (23,150 Palestinians and 4,849 Israelis) Israel and the
Palestinian Autonomous and Occupied Territories since September 29,
2000 would continue. The vast majority of Palestinians continue to be
dubious of Israeli intent and American seriousness. In isolation, the
Wall may be as alleged, a short to medium-term response to persistent
security threats. Perhaps it was this success in containment of the
Erez model that prompted the more elaborate and circuitous Wall in the
West Bank. But, for an Israeli government to allocate over USD 2 billion
for the Wall’s construction, particularly one confronting fiscal
budget deficits, suggests that the transcendent purpose is neither to
restrict movement as a temporary response to security concerns, nor
to increase its leverage in bilateral negotiations. Collectively and
in the context of continuing settlement activity and the construction
of the Trans-Israel Highway (or Road No. 6), a 324 km highway stretching
from the Galilee in the north to the Negev in the south and located
inside the pre-1967 borders, the Wall suggests a strategy aimed at de
jure annexation and integration of the West Bank and its water
resources and separation and ghettoization of Palestinian cities, towns
and villages. Reports indicate that the Wall will incorporate the Jewish
settlements excepting 15 and about 98 percent of all settlers. As Meron
Rappaport writing in the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth states,
“A look at the map leads to a simple conclusion – the separation
fence being built at this time basically overlaps the Sharon map for
a Palestinian state -- a bit more than 40 percent of the West Bank split
and sliced into pieces.” Alternatively, one could interpret it
as a map of Sharon’s vision for an Israeli state, thereby implicitly
acknowledging his priorities.
If as the maps intimate, the Wall is part of a strategy
to influence the final borders in a permanent Israeli-Palestinian settlement,
then it will also indirectly influence options for the refugee problem
by affecting the absorption capacity of a proposed Palestinian state.
Host countries of Palestine refugees such as Jordan, Lebanon and Syria
will be part of multilateral negotiations concerning the refugee issue.
But the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq suggests that Baghdad may
also play a role if the US Administration exerts its influence on a
governing Iraqi Council or alternative national body to resurrect a
modified version of the plan proposed by former Israeli Prime Minister
Levy Eshkol in 1967 to resolve the refugee problem by resettling Palestinians
to Iraq or the Sinai. Since the latter is a non-starter with Egyptian
authorities, the Iraqi option may seem attractive and feasible particularly
vis-a-vis the 200,000 Palestine refugees currently hosted by Lebanon
and whom Lebanese authorities consistently refuse to nationalize and
integrate into Lebanese territories in any final settlement. Were it
not for the current chaos in Iraq the historical footnote may have greater
resonance among US Administration officials. As it stands now American
influence via a proxy in Iraq is prudently restrained.
However, the Bush Administration’s passivity
vis-à-vis the Wall lends Ariel Sharon a free hand in the West
Bank. But, even if successful in realizing the full extent of the Wall,
it is doubtful that such a construct can substitute for a just solution
to the conflict. A B’Tselem report describes the Wall as follows:
At its most extensive, it will consist of an electronic
'smart fence' in the centre to warn of any attempt to cross; on the
eastern side of this fence, a trench, ditch or other obstacle to act
as a barrier against vehicles; another fence for delay purposes; a
paved service road next to this delay fence. West of the 'smart fence'
are a number of paths: a trace path to disclose the footprints of
anyone crossing; a two-lane patrol road; a road for armored vehicles
and another fence. The barrier will also include watchtowers and entry
gates at various intervals and an exclusion zone of undetermined length.
The line of vision for each is blocked whether positioned
at the Israeli or Palestinian side of the Wall, a metaphor for the insularity
and short sightedness that has come to dominate the mindscape. A Palestinian
population that is encircled, impoverished, embittered and disenfranchised
may alternate from periods of pacifism to activism but it will not submit
to the will of the more powerful agent indefinitely. How it emerges,
however, whether governed by an accountable and responsible authority
is equally important. At the same time, Ariel Sharon recently acknowledged
that “to maintain 3.5 million Palestinians under occupation is
terrible for Israel, the Palestinians and for the Israeli economy…”
For occupation to end, the walls must begin to be torn down, figuratively
and literally.
About the Author
Mona Ghali was director of the AFSC Palestine Youth Program
in Gaza from 2000 to June 2003.
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