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Overview of Prison Privatization in Arizona

February 2003

Introduction

The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) is a Quaker organization that works for peace and justice worldwide. Our work is based on a commitment to nonviolence and the belief that all people have value and deserve to be treated with dignity and respect. The AFSC's programs promote social justice by focusing on a diverse set of social concerns. The organization's criminal justice work began in 1947 and has always focused on the need for an effective and humane criminal justice system that emphasizes rehabilitation over punishment. Here in Arizona, our criminal justice program works to support families of prisoners, to educate the public, and to advocate for the rights of the incarcerated.

This document is an attempt to paint a picture of the current efforts at privatization of prisons in the state of Arizona and the concerns and potential pitfalls of this practice. We recognize that the research represented here is far from exhaustive. In some cases this is due to the fact that we are community organizers and not trained researchers. We gathered what we could from the internet and other sources, but we are not familiar with some of the research techniques that might have provided a more complete picture. In other cases it was also due to unresponsiveness on the part of the private prison corporation or its management. In another case, it was due to the Arizona Department of Corrections charging $.25 per page for written materials such as copies of contracts. Being a non-profit organization, we simply cannot afford to pay so much for these materials (ADC wanted $235 for the materials we requested). For this reason, we have included in each section our Unanswered Questions. These are questions that were asked and not answered or questions to which we simply do not know how to find answers. It is our hope that legislators or other people with more resources and authority will be able to find the answers to these questions. At the very least, we hope they will produce more thought and discussion.

Arizona Overview

There are currently six privately owned prisons in the state of Arizona that we are aware of. Three are contracted with the Arizona Department of Corrections while the other three are owned by Corrections Corporation of America and are contracted with federal bureaus and other states. The state has also contracted with two prison facilities in Newton, Texas to house 264 Arizona prisoners. The following is a summary of the basic information about each facility, beginning with those contracted with ADC.

Marana Community Correctional Treatment Facility, Marana AZ
Operated and managed by: Management and Training Corporation, Ogden Utah
Contracted with: Arizona Department of Corrections
Security level: 2 (Low)
Capacity: 450
Population: Adult male offenders who have demonstrated a need for substance or alcohol abuse intervention.
Ethnic distribution: 49% White, 15% African American, 3.5% Native American, 21% Mexican American, 9.5% Mexican National, 1.4% other

Arizona State Prison-Phoenix West, Phoenix, AZ
Operated by: Correctional Services Corporation, Sarasota, Florida
Contracted with: Arizona Department of Corrections
Security level: 2 (Low)
Capacity: 400
Population: Adult males convicted of felony DUI.
Ethnic distribution: 36% white, 4.5% African American, 15% Native American, 23% Mexican American, 19% Mexican National, 2%.

Arizona State Prison-Florence West, Florence, AZ
Operated by: Correctional Services Corporation
Contracted with: Arizona Department of Corrections
Security level: 2 (Low)
Capacity: 750
Population: Adult males convicted of DUI (500) and "Return To Custody" prisoners convicted of parole violations (250).
Ethnic distribution: 38% White, 8.5% African American, 14% Native American, 23% Mexican American, 15% Mexican National, 1.5% Other

Coconino County Jail, Flagstaff, AZ
Operated by: Coconino County Sheriff's Office
Contracted with: Arizona Department of Corrections
Security level: 1 (Low)
Capacity: 68
Population: Adult male prisoners with one year or less to serve.
Ethnic distribution: 43% White, 17% African American, 9% Native American, 19% Mexican American, 1.4% Other.

Newton County Correctional Center, Newton, TX
Operated by: Correctional Services Corporation
Contracted with: Arizona Department of Corrections
Security level: 2, 3, and 4 (Low-Medium)
Capacity: 600
Population: Adult male offenders with a range of offenses.
Ethnic distribution: Level 3: 0% White, 0% African American, 0% Native American, 0% Mexican American, 100% Mexican National, 0% Other.
Level 2: 61.5% White, 19% African American, 0% Native American, 20% Mexican American, 0% Mexican National, 0% Other.

Central Arizona Detention Center, Florence, AZ
Operated by: Corrections Corporation of America, Nashville, TN
Contracted with: US Marshals Service, INS, State of Hawaii
Security level: Multi-level
Capacity: 2,304
Population: Adult males
Ethnic distribution: Unavailable

Eloy Detention Center, Eloy, AZ
Operated by: Corrections Corporation of America
Contracted with: Federal Bureau of Prisons and INS
Security level: Low
Capacity: 1,500
Population: Adult males
Ethnic distribution: Unavailable

Florence Correctional Center, Florence, AZ
Operated by: Corrections Corporation of America
Contracted with: US Marshals Service, State of Hawaii, INS
Security level: Medium
Capacity: 1,600
Population: Adult men and women
Ethnic distribution: Roughly equal populations of Native Americans from Alaska and Samoans and other pacific islanders from Hawaii.

Unanswered Questions: 1. Are there any other private entities operating in Arizona? For example, CCA's website lists Pinal County and the Pasqua Yaqui Tribe as contracting entities, but offers no further information on the nature of these contracts.

1. What is the ethnic distribution of inmates in the Eloy Detention Center and Central Arizona Detention Center?

Prison Privatization and Arizona Law

Arizona Revised Statues refer to privatization of prisons in several places. ARS 41-1609 authorizes the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) to enter into contracts with the federal government, other states, and private or public institutions located within or outside Arizona. It also authorizes the Director of ADC to declare an emergency for "acts of God, natural catastrophes, prison riots and overcrowding." In an emergency, the Director can confine people committed to the Department to existing public institutions or private institutions for up to one year. Such a decision must be "discussed" with the Governor, Attorney General, and the majority and minority leadership in the Senate and House.

The criteria for establishing contracts with private prison operators are discussed in ARS 41-1609.01. Essentially, the private corporation must have qualifications, experience, and personnel sufficient to carry out the terms of the contract; must be able to comply with "applicable correctional standards"; and must have a history of successful management of other facilities. Proposals must offer cost savings to the state and offer a level of service equivalent to that provided in state run facilities in order to be accepted. This statute also mandates that the Department conduct a biennial service comparison between public and private prisons and that the Department and Governor's Office for Excellence in Government conduct a cost comparison every five years. Unfortunately, the Governor's Office for Excellence no longer exists under Governor Napolitano. No one in the Governor's office was able to tell me whether this practice will continue or how to locate past reports, if any exist. This statute additionally stipulates that private prison operators may not calculate inmate release dates or sentence credits, decide on prisoner jobs or wages, or take any disciplinary action.

It appears that state legislators anticipated the types of problems related to escapes experienced by other states with private prisons. ARS 41-1609.03 states that private prison contractors are financially responsible for reimbursing the state costs related to "emergency, public safety or security services." Additionally, ARS 41-1609.04 states that the private prison operators are also responsible for reimbursing the state for any court costs incurred if an escaped prisoner from a private facility commits a crime while they are at large.

Interestingly, the law does make a distinction between private prisons that "contract exclusively with the state department of corrections" and those that house "adult prisoners who are sentenced…by a court from a state other than this state" (ARS 41-1681). Presumably, these articles are aimed at the three prisons operated by Corrections Corporation of America. These prisons have additional financial burdens. For example, ARS 41-1682 mandates these private prison operators cover Arizona's liability in the event of an escape in the amount of $10 million. These private prisons are also required to maintain fingerprints and photographs of all their prisoners (ARS 41-1683) and must notify state officials of transfers of any prisoners from another state to facilities in Arizona. ARS 41-1830.31 establishes a private prison escapee fund to cover the costs that the state will incur in the event of escapes from private prisons. The private corporations must pay a $10,000 penalty or the actual costs of apprehending escaped prisoners, whichever is more.

Unanswered Question: Who is financially responsible for escapes from private prisons that do contract with ADC?

Perhaps the most intriguing aspects of the Arizona Revised Statutes related to privatization are those that appear to mandate privatization of corrections in some instances. For example, ARS 41-1609.02 states that, "before expanding an existing minimum or medium security level prison or before establishing a new minimum or medium security level prison, the director shall give consideration to contracting for private prisons for the incarceration of: 1. Prisoners convicted of offenses pursuant to title 28, chapter 4, article 3; 2. Prisoners convicted of offenses pursuant to title 13, chapter 14; 3. Female prisoners; 4. Prisoners over the age of fifty-five years; and 5. Other inmate populations identified by the director." This is echoed in ARS 41-1610.04, which outlines the duties of the Joint Select Committee on Corrections. This statute states that, "the committee shall consider the populations identified by the department for placement in private prison facilities pursuant to section 41-1609.02 and include private prison facilities in their recommendations."

Concerns related to prison privatization

Over the past 30 years or so that prison privatization has been steadily increasing, a number of concerns have been raised about this practice. These concerns grew both from basic ethical questions about the commodification of prisoners and from negative experiences of cities and states in their experimentation with privatization of corrections. These concerns can be grouped into three basic categories: Financial concerns, concerns with accountability, and ethical concerns.

Financial Concerns

#1: Do they Really Save Money?

While some supporters of private prisons are motivated by an ideological belief in privatization of any and all government services, most genuinely believe that private prisons will save the state money. However, solid proof of the cost effectiveness of correctional privatization has yet to be provided by any reliable, large-scale study. Most governmental reports on cost effectiveness have concluded that the results are mixed, at best. The first such report was produced by the US General Accounting Office in 1996, and was a review of existing studies on cost comparisons. The GAO concluded that these studies had major methodological flaws that made it impossible to conclude anything about the cost effectiveness of such prisons.¹

In 1998, Attorney General Janet Reno produced the most comprehensive study of private prisons, Private Prisons in the United States: An Assessment of Current Practice. The report concluded that its review of cost studies "does not resolve the question of whether privately-managed prisons are cheaper than publicly-managed ones. The evidence is mixed, with more detailed studies indicating the smallest cost savings from privatization."² This conclusion was echoed by that of another study conducted by the US Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs, which reported, "the cost benefits of privatization have not materialized to the extent promised by the private sector. Although there are examples of cost savings, there are other examples in which such benefits have not been realized."³

This experience is certainly been borne out here in Arizona. In spring of 2001, the Arizona Department of Corrections reported that Management and Training Corporation (which manages the Marana facility) was the most expensive prison contractor, with per-diem costs only 5% lower than the state average.⁴ In fact, MTC's own state of Utah closed the only MTC facility there in 2001, citing budget cuts and statistics that demonstrated that a publicly operated prison would be cheaper to run.⁵

Unanswered Question: According to the Arizona Revised Statute 41-1609.01, ADC is supposed to conduct a "biennial comparison of the services provided by the vendor for the purpose of comparing private versus public provision of services." In addition, the Director of ADC and the Governor's Office for Excellence in Government are supposed to conduct a "cost comparison of executed privatization contracts once every five years for each contract." Unfortunately, the Governor's office for Excellence no longer exists. We were unable to obtain these reports from ADC due to the excessive cost. A review of these documents would more clearly illustrate whether private prisons in Arizona are cost effective.

#2: Hidden Costs

The reality is that there are a number of hidden costs to prison privatization that supporters generally do not mention. The first and most obvious of these is administration and overhead. When a state contracts with a private corporation to house its prisoners, that state is still responsible for administrative functions including record keeping, population management, classification, oversight of case management system, review of disciplinary write ups and grievances, time computation, releases of prisoners, court services, providing prisoners with access to legal services, maintaining the functions of the parole board, transporting prisoners, providing medical, dental, and mental health treatment to prisoners, monitoring the private prisons, and "special operations," which includes the price of sending officers and investigators into private prisons when there is a security breach. The Colorado Criminal Justice Reform Coalition (CCJRC) has developed a formula for calculating these hidden costs and comparing them to the state's estimate of the per diem cost of a prisoner in a private prison. They found that the actual cost of housing a prisoner in a private prison in Colorado is about $10 more than the estimated per diem cost.⁶

One way that states cover up these real costs is a practice referred to as "cherry picking." Essentially, the state sends only the low security inmates and those without medical or mental health problems to private prisons, ostensibly because private prison operators are not trained or equipped to deal with violent inmates or provide medical care. However, these inmates are by nature the least expensive to house, which gives the illusion that the private prisons are operating more cheaply. A review of the private prisons operating in Arizona bears this out: Most are for DUI prisoners or parole violators, and most are low security units. Likewise, the recent transfer of Arizona prisoners to a CSC operated private prison in Newton, Texas was conducted according to strict guidelines. While some medium security prisoners were sent, there were criteria that mandated that those with medical or mental health needs, people in protective segregation, sex offenders, and maximum security inmates would not be sent.⁷

Another hidden cost to privatization is the package of tax breaks and other government subsidies given to these corporations. Many states or counties will offer tax free bonds to finance private prisons, property tax abatements, or infrastructure subsidies (such as water, sewer, or utility hook-ups and access roads) to the companies. An October 2001 study conducted by Good Jobs First reviewed 60 private prisons in 19 states. It found that 73% of these facilities received some sort of development⁸

The report shows that in Arizona, four private prison companies got tax abatements: Correctional Services Corporation's prison for DUI and RTC prisoners (Florence West) and all three of Corrections Corporation of America's Arizona Prisons (Central Arizona Detention Center, Eloy Detention Center, and Florence Correctional Center). The Eloy Detention Center also received some form of infrastructure assistance (not specified) as well as a subsidy for workforce training.⁹ It is important to note here that in 1998, the Arizona State Legislature, under pressure from CCA, passed a bill exempting all private prisons in the state from paying municipal sales taxes on the revenues they receive from their operating contracts.¹⁰

These infrastructure subsidies are particularly troubling in light of the delicate nature of Arizona's aquifer and other natural resources. Building a prison is like building a small city, and it requires a tremendous amount of water. Sometimes it is necessary to construct new sewage treatment plants since the existing ones in these small towns would be overwhelmed by the amount of sewage produced by a 1,500 bed prison. There is a logic to such subsidies when you are building an actual city filled with people who will then pay the state taxes. A prison, on the other hand, does not provide the tax base to cover these subsidies. In California, one state prison (Avenal) uses so much of the local water supply, they are having trouble convincing other industries to locate there because the aquifer cannot support them. A group of farmers actually went to court to stop the California Department of Corrections from drilling more wells because of the impact it would have on the local water table.

Unanswered questions: 1. What subsidies were offered or are being offered for the two proposed prisons currently under consideration (for DUI and for women prisoners)?

2. Has anyone calculated the potential impact of water usage from the two new proposed prisons?

#3: Good Jobs?

Another common argument used to sell private prisons to small towns is that of job creation. As we know, much of Arizona is in desperate financial condition, but the impact is particularly devastating on rural areas. These areas just happen to be those most often targeted for prison expansion. These towns and counties in their desperation will often welcome private prisons with the promise of hundreds of jobs. The reality is much more complex.

First of all, private prisons survive by winning contracts. They win contracts by being the lowest bidder. Where do they make the cuts to allow them to bid for so little money? Largely in staff pay and training. Private prison companies often pay less than states or the federal Bureau of Prisons. They often do not offer pensions, opting instead to offer shares in the corporation's stock, which fluctuates in value, as has recently been demonstrated. Private prison corporations also frequently offer only the bare-bones staff training, which can leave employees frustrated and frightened. It should be no surprise, then, that these facilities frequently have very high turnover rates, even among management. The combination of these factors not only produces a horrible work environment, it also makes these facilities genuinely unsafe for staff, inmates, and the community, as will be discussed later.

Given the fact that the Arizona Department of Corrections is faced with a severe staff shortage of its own, one wonders how in the world the state expects to recruit enough competent staff to run the two new prisons slated for construction in the state.

There is also a question as to how many of these jobs really go to the people in the communities in which they are located. The California Prison Moratorium Project discovered that over 60% of new prison jobs in California, including the best paying jobs, went to people living outside the town.¹² This is because the prison administration promotes from within for high-level positions in order to have an experienced pool of employees. Similarly, when a prison is located in an underdeveloped rural area, many employees opt to commute to work from more urban areas rather than settle in the prison town. This is the case in many of the rural prison towns in Arizona, such as Florence, which has five prisons but no supermarket.

Unanswered Question: Do employees in Arizona's private prisons make the same wage as those in state run facilities? How about the CCA prisons that have no contract with the state?

#4: What Happens If a Private Prison Company Goes Belly-Up?

Many of the biggest private prison companies are on shaky financial ground. This was true even before the current recession. Corrections Corporation of America was completely bailed out of potential bankruptcy by Lehman Brothers. Stock prices of the prison corporations that are publicly traded have fluctuated widely over the years. In Fall of 2002, Correctional Services Corporation launched a resturcturing plan that lead to the closings of seven facilities that lost a combined $600,000 in the third quarter. The company also cut its executive staff by 25% and stopped routinely granting its employees raises.¹³ With the stock market continuing to decline, the outlook for these private prison corporations is increasingly bleak.

The state legislature of Oklahoma was recently warned by James Austin, Director of George Washington University's Institute on Crime, Justice, and Corrections, that its reliance on privatization could leave the state vulnerable. He warned that the state could be faced with huge problems if the private companies went under and had to close their prisons, leaving the state with thousands of inmates it couldn't house. He noted, "you would have to gear up quickly, and this is not a business where you can gear up quickly."¹⁴

Unanswered Question: Is Arizona prepared to handle the extra prisoners if a private prison cancels a contract or goes bankrupt?

Concerns With Accountability

While it can be very difficult to obtain information from state-run prisons, it is ultimately possible to do so because these are government institutions and thus are subject to laws requiring disclosure of public information. However, private prison companies are not currently subject to the same laws and therefore are immune to the normal checks and balances that protect people from abuse by such institutions. There is an inherent threat to democracy when an institution with so much power over the lives of so many individuals is immune to any public accountability. Our experience with criminal justice work has taught us that abuses are less likely to occur in an environment in which there is a high degree of public involvement.

In addition to this larger concern is the more immediate potential for confusion over delineation of responsibilities between states, counties, private prison corporations, and the entities they contract with. Who is responsible when a prisoner escapes? Who is responsible if a prisoner's rights are violated? These questions become more relevant the farther the prison is removed from the source of its prisoners. For example, a privately operated prison located in State A takes prisoners from State B as well as Federal Agencies X and Y. If the prisoners from State B are found to be assaulting the prisoners from Federal Agency Y, and the private prison management is not able to take care of the problem, who is responsible for rectifying the situation? To whom can the family members of the prisoners being assaulted go for redress? Who should they sue?

Unanswered Questions: 1. What are the lines of accountability in the private prisons contracting with ADC? What about those that contract elsewhere? The prison ADC contracts with in Texas?

2. What responsibility do the corporations have to notify state and local authorities in the event of an emergency?

Ethical Concerns

A number of ethical questions arise when private corporations profit from depriving human beings of their liberty. A natural concern is that the very nature of the arrangement invites these companies to prioritize their profits over the needs of those in their custody. There are numerous examples of private prison corporations cutting corners in order to maximize their earnings, primarily through cutting back on staff pay and training and inmate programming. These actions lead to unrest among inmates, understaffing of facilities, and a prison staff that is unprepared to handle potentially dangerous situations. This combination of factors is a threat to the safety of inmates and staff alike.

An illustration of this is the story of Youngstown, Ohio. In 1997, Corrections Corporation of America opened a medium security prison in Youngstown. The company staffed the prison with guards who were inexperienced in corrections and proceeded to fill the facility with 1,700 of the most violent and unmanageable inmates from Washington, DC. During the first year of operations, 20 prisoners were stabbed and two were killed. The staff, inexperienced and terrified, resorted to tear gas and humiliation in an attempt to quell disturbances. These chronic problems were finally brought to light when six prisoners escaped from the facility. CCA waited at least half an hour before notifying authorities of the escapes. Youngstown Mayor George McKelvey was later quoted as saying, "Knowing what I know now, I would never have allowed CCA to build a prison here."¹⁵

Unfortunately, these kinds of stories are not unique to Corrections Corporation of America. The major private correctional companies have a range of unsavory histories including abuses, neglect, incompetence, financial misdeeds. A brief sample of such stories, confined to the corporations currently operating in Arizona:

• The MTC prison in Marana was Arizona's first private prison. An Arizona Department of Corrections planning department report issued after the first year of the prison's operation declared, "almost literally, everything that could have gone wrong has!" The report stated that "in the first 10 months of operation, the prison was run by four wardens…two assistant wardens, three business managers, and two security chiefs," leading to "an overall haphazard approach to management."¹⁶ This high staff turnover was attributed to the fact that "salaries are 18.1% lower than [what] state employees earn." The company's own security chief estimated that the prison could be as much as 75% out of compliance with state safety inspection criteria.¹⁷
• Dade County, Florida cancelled a contract with Correctional Services Corporation after it was discovered that CSC was keeping juvenile inmates past their release dates in order to make more money. An assistant public defender in Dade County was quoted as saying, "They are a completely greedy company. They have a Costco approach to [corrections]."¹⁸
• CCA's Florence Correctional Center in Florence, AZ is notorious for an incident in 2001 in which it was discovered that a prison gang was effectively running the prison. Monitors reported lax security, widespread drug smuggling, assaults, and rioting in the facility.¹⁹ In another CCA prison in Arizona, the Associated Press reported an investigation of numerous reports of sexual contact between guards and women prisoners from Oregon.²⁰

A more detailed accounting of the histories of corporations currently operating in Arizona or which may be currently bidding for contracts in the state can be found in Appendix A in the form of "rap sheets" prepared for each corporation.

A final ethical concern is that private prison companies are dependent on an ever-increasing supply of prisoners in order to stay solvent. When human beings become the "raw material" in a business, there is an inherent pressure on the company to increase the input of people into its system. This creates a disincentive for the companies to accomplish the primary mission of a correctional institution: to reform and rehabilitate its prisoners so that they can reintegrate successfully into society. Instead, the job security of the institutions' staff is partially insured through a high recidivism rate. This issue is particularly important in light of the fact that many private prison corporations offer stock in the company rather than pensions. If our goal is truly to lower the numbers of people engaged in criminal activity, it is contradictory to look to profit-driven corporations to assist in this effort.

Unanswered Question: What are the recidivism rates for people released from privately-run prisons as compared to those in state prisons?

Conclusion

In difficult economic times, lawmakers and other government officials are faced with difficult decisions. Prison privatization may at first glance appear to be a good deal for states and an option that allows legislators to appear both "tough on crime" and financially conservative. Unfortunately, the reality is much more complex. Prison privatization is far from a cure-all for budget woes, and in fact may create many more problems than the financial ones it fclaims to solve. How will the state of Arizona pay for the inevitable lawsuits that will be filed against the state for the misdeeds of these corporations? How can we afford the recidivist crime that results when prisoners are not rehabilitated? How can we afford to put the lives of prisoners, staff, and surrounding communities in jeopardy? These and other questions about prison privatization are now before the state legislature, as it considers contracting for two more prisons and possibly the privatization of the entire state system. It is vitally important that decision makers seek out impartial information about the real costs and benefits of privatization. We hope that this document is a start in that process.

1. US General Accounting Office, Private and Public Prisons: Studies Comparing Operational Costs and/or Quality of Service GAO/GGD-96-158 (Washington, DC:GPO, 1996)
2. Raher, Stephen, Private Prisons and Public Money: Hidden Costs Borne by Colorado's Taxpayers, Colorado Criminal Justice Reform Coalition (Colorado Springs, CO September 2002)
3. CCJRC, Private Prisons and Public Money
4. "Profits and convicts," Report on Business, 9/28/01
5. "MTC corporate profile," Prison Policy News, July/August 2001
6. CCJRC, Private Prisons and Public Money
7. Arizona Department of Corrections Press Release, Arizona Inmates to be Moved to Texas, November 15, 2002
8. Mattera, Philip and Kahn, Mafruza, Jail Breaks: Economic Development Subsidies Given to Provate Prisons Good Jobs First, (Washington, DC, 2001)
9. Mattera and Khan, Jail Breaks
10. Camp, Camille Graham and Camp, George M., The Corrections Yearbook 2000: Private Correctional Facilities Criminal Justice Institute (Middletown, CT, 2000)
11. California Prison Moratorium Project, What Good Is A Prison? Pamphlet. (Berkeley, CA, No date)
12. California Prison Moratorium Project, What Good Is A Prison? Pamphlet. (Berkeley, CA, No date)
13. "Correctional Services faces challenge of fixing its bottom line," Sarasota Herald-Tribune, 3/18/02
14. "Private prison use poses risk to state, expert says," The Oklahoman, January 30, 2003
15. Yeoman, Barry, "Steeltown Lockdown" Mother Jones, May/June 2000
16. Arizona Daily Star 12/6/95
17. Arizona Daily Star 12/6/95
18. "Unhappy campers," Dallas Observer, 9/27/01
19. "Arizona prison 'in turmoil,'" Honolulu Advertiser, 7/1/01
20. "Reports of sex between staff, Oregon inmates at Arizona prison," Associated Press, 10/9/97

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